

## LIST OF PMSC RISK ASSESSMENTS

RISK Assessment Number	RISK Assessment Name
FP PMSC RA (F)1	Forth River Passage - Standard Vessel
FP PMSC RA (F)2	Port of Leith - Arrival / Sailing Leith Approach Buoy to Berth
FP PMSC RA (F)3	Port of Rosyth - Arrival/Sailing No.1 Rosyth Channel Buoy to Berth
FP PMSC RA (F)4	Port of Methil - Arrival/Sailing Methil Pilot Station to Berth
FP PMSC RA (F)5	Methil Energy Park - Arrival/Sailing Methil Pilot Station to Berth
FP PMSC RA (F)6	Port of Kirkcaldy - Arrival/Sailing Close Approaches of Dock to Berth
FP PMSC RA (F)7	Port of Burntisland - Arrival/Sailing Close Approaches of Dock to Berth
FP PMSC RA (F)8	Inverkeithing - Arrival/Sailing Saint Davids Beacon to Berth
FP PMSC RA (F)9	Braefoot Jetty - Arrival/Sailing Eastern Limits to Berth
FP PMSC RA (F)10	Port of Grangemouth - Arrival/Sailing Hen & Chickens to Berth
FP PMSC RA (F)11	Crombie Berthing/Sailing
FP PMSC RA (F)12	Hound Point - Arrival/Sailing Eastern Limits to Berth
FP PMSC RA (F)13	Cruise Vessels at Anchorage
FP PMSC RA (F)14	Forth - River Transit and Berthings/Sailings small comercial craft (tugs, workboats etc.)
FP PMSC RA (F)15	Cruise Vessel Tender Operations (Hound Point / Newhaven)
FP PMSC RA (F)16	Port of Leith - Arrival / Sailing Leith Approach Buoy to Berth with Jack-Up Barge on Leith Approaches
FP PMSC RA (T)1	Tay River Passage - Standard Vessels
FP PMSC RA (T)2	Port of Dundee - Arrival/Sailing Port Approaches to River Berth
FP PMSC RA (T)4	Tay Large Vessel Movement - Arrival/Sailing
FP PMSC RA (T)5	Port of Dundee - Oil Rigs - Arrival/Sailing Port Limits to Berth
FP PMSC RA (T)6	Tay - River Transit and Berthings/Sailings small comercial craft (tugs, workboats etc.)
FP PMSC RA (F&T)1	Forth & Tay - Vessel at Anchor
FP PMSC RA (F&T)2	Forth & Tay - Towage Operations
FP PMSC RA (F&T)3	Forth & Tay - Immobilised Vessels
FP PMSC RA (F&T)4	Forth & Tay - Bunkering Operations in Dock
FP PMSC RA (F&T)5	Forth & Tay - Bunkering Operations in Tidal Waters
FP PMSC RA (F&T)6	Forth & Tay - NAABSA Berths
FP PMSC RA (F&T)7	Forth & Tay - Diving Operations
FP PMSC RA (F&T)8	Forth & Tay - Recreational Events
FP PMSC RA (F&T)9	Forth & Tay - Underwater Cables & Pipelines
FP PMSC RA (F&T)10	Forth & Tay - Marine Pollution (Tidal Waters)
FP PMSC RA (F&T)11	Forth & Tay - Marine Pollution (Enclosed Dock)

PMSC RISK ASSESSMENT - RISK RANKING

Rank	HazardID	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Hazard Scoring
2	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 02 - 1.3 Contact</a>	Contact	8.125
4	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.2 Contact</a>	Contact	7.375
14	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.2 Contact</a>	Contact	6.5
1	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 02 - 1.5 Grounding</a>	Grounding	8.375
3	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.2 Contact</a>	Contact	7.875
4	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.2 Contact</a>	Contact	7.375
6	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 01 - 1.1 Dragging Anchor</a>	Dragging Anchor	7.25
6	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.3 Grounding</a>	Grounding	7.25
8	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 02 - 1.2 Contact</a>	Contact	7
9	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize</a>	Sinking / Capsize	6.875
9	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.1 Collision</a>	Collision	6.875
11	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion</a>	Fire / Explosion	6.75
11	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.2 Contact</a>	Contact	6.75
13	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 02 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion</a>	Fire / Explosion	6.625
14	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion</a>	Fire / Explosion	6.5
14	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 02 - 1.1 Capsizing / Flooding</a>	Capsizing / Flooding	6.5
17	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.2 Contact</a>	Contact	6.375
17	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.1 Collision</a>	Collision	6.375
19	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.3 Grounding</a>	Grounding	6.25
19	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.3 Grounding</a>	Grounding	6.25
19	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.3 Grounding</a>	Grounding	6.25
19	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 07 - 1.1 - Swamping / turbulence / interaction</a>	Swamping / interaction / turbulence	6.25
23	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.2 Contact</a>	Contact	6.125
23	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 04 - 1.2 Contact</a>	Contact	6.125
25	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.2 Contact</a>	Contact	6
25	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.2 Contact</a>	Contact	6
25	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion</a>	Fire / Explosion	6
28	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.3 Grounding</a>	Grounding	5.875
28	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion</a>	Fire / Explosion	5.875
30	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.3 Grounding</a>	Grounding	5.75
30	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.2 Contact</a>	Contact	5.75
30	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 16 - 1.2 Contact</a>	Contact	5.75
30	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize</a>	Sinking / Capsize	5.75
30	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	5.75
30	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 01 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	5.75
30	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 03 - 1.1 Contact Refer Also to FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 1</a>	Contact	5.75
37	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.3 Grounding</a>	Grounding	5.625
38	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 06 - 1.3 Fire</a>	Dundee - Feb 2018	5.5
38	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.2 Contact</a>	Contact	5.5
38	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.3 Grounding</a>	Grounding	5.5
38	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion</a>	Fire / Explosion	5.5
38	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.1 Collision</a>	Collision	5.5
38	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.1 Collision</a>	Collision	5.5
44	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion</a>	Fire / Explosion	5.375
44	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.1 Collision</a>	Collision	5.375
44	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 16 - 1.1 Collision</a>	Collision	5.375
44	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 16 - 1.5 Fire</a>	Fire	5.375
48	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)</a>	Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	5.25
48	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)</a>	Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	5.25
48	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.1 Collision</a>	Collision	5.25
48	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.3 Grounding Refer Also to: FP PMSSC RA (F&amp;T)7</a>	Grounding	5.25
48	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.2 Contact</a>	Contact	5.25
48	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.2 Contact</a>	Contact	5.25
48	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.1 Collision</a>	Collision	5.25
55	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion</a>	Fire / Explosion	5.125
56	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.1 Collision</a>	Collision	5
56	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.2 Contact</a>	Contact	5
56	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion</a>	Fire / Explosion	5
56	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.1 Collision</a>	Collision	5
56	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize</a>	Sinking / Capsize	5
56	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion</a>	Fire / Explosion	5
56	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion</a>	Fire / Explosion	5
56	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize</a>	Sinking / Capsize	5
56	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product)</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	5
65	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.2 Contact</a>	Contact	4.875
66	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product)</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	4.75
66	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 01 - 1.2 Contact</a>	Contact	4.75
66	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.1 Collision</a>	Collision	4.75
66	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize</a>	Sinking / Capsize	4.75
66	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.2 Contact</a>	Contact	4.75
71	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 05 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel</a>	vessel	4.625
71	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.7 Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)</a>	Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	4.625
73	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)</a>	Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	4.5
73	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.3 Grounding Refer Also to: FP PMSSC RA (F&amp;T)Z</a>	Grounding	4.5
73	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize</a>	Sinking / Capsize	4.5
73	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	4.5
73	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize</a>	Sinking / Capsize	4.5
73	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	4.5
73	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize</a>	Sinking / Capsize	4.5
73	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize</a>	Sinking / Capsize	4.5
73	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	4.5
73	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize</a>	Sinking / Capsize	4.5

73	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.2 Contact</a>	Contact	4.5
73	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 04 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel</a>	vessel	4.5
85	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize</a>	Sinking / Capsize	4.375
85	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize</a>	Sinking / Capsize	4.375
85	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 16 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize</a>	Sinking / Capsize	4.375
85	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize</a>	Sinking / Capsize	4.375
85	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize</a>	Sinking / Capsize	4.375
85	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize</a>	Sinking / Capsize	4.375
85	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (Oil Products)</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	4.375
85	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion</a>	Fire / Explosion	4.375
93	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 02 - 1.2 Fire</a>	Fire	4.25
93	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.3 Grounding</a>	Grounding	4.25
93	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	4.25
93	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 16 - 1.7 Loss of Containment (Oil Products)</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	4.25
93	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize</a>	Sinking / Capsize	4.25
93	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.1 Collision</a>	Collision	4.25
99	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize</a>	Sinking / Capsize	4.125
99	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.1 Collision</a>	Collision	4.125
99	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.2 Contact</a>	Contact	4.125
102	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize</a>	Sinking / Capsize	4
102	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 02 - 1.4 Collision</a>	Collision	4
102	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.7 Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)</a>	Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	4
102	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.7 Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)</a>	Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	4
102	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.2 Contact</a>	Contact	4
102	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.7 Loss of Dock Level</a>	Loss of Dock Level	4
102	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	4
102	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.3 Grounding</a>	Grounding	4
102	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product) Refer also to FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 04</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	4
102	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.3 Grounding</a>	Grounding	4
102	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 16 - 1.3 Grounding</a>	Grounding	4
113	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion</a>	Fire / Explosion	3.875
113	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.875
113	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.875
113	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.3 Grounding</a>	Grounding	3.875
113	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.875
113	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (Oil Products)</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	3.875
113	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.1 Collision</a>	Collision	3.875
113	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 08 - 1.1 - Collision / contact</a>	Collision / Contact	3.875
121	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 05 - 1.3 Loss of Containment (Oil Products)</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.75
121	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 06 - 1.2 Capsize / Flooding</a>	Capsizing / Flooding	3.75
121	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 05 - 1.2 Contact</a>	Contact	3.75
121	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 02 - 1.1 Collision</a>	Collision	3.75
121	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 02 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.75
121	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion</a>	Fire / Explosion	3.75
121	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.3 Grounding</a>	Grounding	3.75
121	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 08 - 1.2 - Swamping / interaction / turbulence</a>	Swamping / interaction / turbulence	3.75
129	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 03 - 1.2 Grounding Refer Also to FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 1</a>	Grounding	3.625
129	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Collision</a>	Collision	3.625
129	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.1 Collision</a>	Collision	3.625
129	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.625
129	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.625
134	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 01 - 1.3 Grounding</a>	Grounding	3.5
134	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.3 Grounding</a>	Grounding	3.5
134	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize</a>	Sinking / Capsize	3.5
134	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize</a>	Sinking / Capsize	3.5
134	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize</a>	Sinking / Capsize	3.5
134	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 02 - 1.3 Grounding</a>	Grounding	3.5
140	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 06 - 1.4 Hull Damage</a>	Hull Damage	3.375
140	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 05 - 1.4 Fire/Explosion</a>	Fire / Explosion	3.375
140	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 04 - 1.4 Fire/Explosion</a>	Fire / Explosion	3.375
140	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.7 Allision</a>	Allision	3.375
140	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.375
145	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 01 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion</a>	Fire / Explosion	3.25
145	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 04 - 1.3 Loss of Containment (Oil Products)</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.25
145	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion</a>	Fire / Explosion	3.25
145	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion</a>	Fire / Explosion	3.25
145	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 07 - 1.2 - Collision / contact</a>	Collision / Contact	3.25
150	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 09 - 1.4 Loss of Containment / Power / Communication</a>	Loss of Containment / Power / Communication	3.125
150	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion</a>	Fire / Explosion	3.125
150	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 09 - 1.1 Contact</a>	Contact	3.125
150	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.125
150	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion</a>	Fire / Explosion	3.125
150	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion</a>	Fire / Explosion	3.125
150	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion</a>	Fire / Explosion	3.125
150	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.3 Grounding</a>	Grounding	3.125
150	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.3 Grounding</a>	Grounding	3.125
150	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.125
160	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3
160	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)</a>	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3
160	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.3 Grounding</a>	Grounding	3
163	<a href="#">FP PMSC RA (F&amp;T) 09 - 1.3 Fire / Explosion</a>	Fire / Explosion	2.75

<b>FORTH PORTS LIMITED</b>	<b>Document ID</b> FP PMSC (R) 1/03	<b>Original Date</b> Jul-13
<b>Risk Ranking</b>	<b>Review Due</b> Ongoing	<b>Revised By / Date</b> MM / August 2015

PMSC RISK ASSESSMENT - RISK RANKING

Rank	HazardID	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Most Likely Risk scored at Residual level				Worst credible Risk scored at Residual level				Hazard Scoring
			People	Property	Environment	Business	People	Property	Environment	Business	
6	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.1 Dragging Anchor	Dragging Anchor	5	5	5	5	8	10	10	10	7.25
66	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	4	6	4	4	5	5	5	5	4.75
134	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	2	4	2	4	1	5	5	5	3.5
102	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	3	3	3	3	5	5	5	5	4
145	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	2	2	1	1	5	5	5	5	3.25
30	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	3	3	3	4	10	10	10	5.75
14	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 02 - 1.1 Capsizing / Flooding	Capsizing / Flooding	3	3	3	3	10	10	10	10	6.5
93	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 02 - 1.2 Fire	Fire	4	4	2	4	5	5	5	5	4.25
2	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 02 - 1.3 Contact	Contact	5	10	5	10	10	10	5	10	8.125
102	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 02 - 1.4 Collision	Collision	2	4	2	4	5	5	5	5	4
1	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 02 - 1.5 Grounding	Grounding	6	9	3	9	10	10	10	10	8.375
129	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 03 - 1.1 Contact Refer Also to FP PMSC RA (F&T) 1	Contact	3	3	3	3	3	5	4	5	3.625
30	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 03 - 1.2 Grounding Refer Also to FP PMSC RA (F&T) 1	Grounding	4	6	4	2	6	8	8	8	5.75
73	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 04 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel	Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel	6	6	2	2	5	5	5	5	4.5
23	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 04 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	3	6	3	3	8	10	8	8	6.125
145	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 04 - 1.3 Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	3	3	3	1	4	4	5	3.75
140	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 04 - 1.4 Fire/Explosion	Fire / Explosion	2	2	2	1	5	5	5	5	3.75
71	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 05 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel	Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel	6	6	3	3	4	5	5	5	4.625
121	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 05 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	4	2	2	2	5	5	5	5	3.75
121	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 05 - 1.3 Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	3	3	6	1	4	5	5	3.75
140	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 05 - 1.4 Fire/Explosion	Fire / Explosion	2	2	2	1	5	5	5	5	3.75
121	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 06 - 1.2 Capsizing / Flooding	Capsizing / Flooding	2	2	4	2	5	5	5	5	3.75
38	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 06 - 1.3 Fire	Fire	6	9	3	6	5	5	5	5	5.5
140	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 06 - 1.4 Hull Damage	Hull Damage	1	2	1	1	3	5	5	5	3.375
19	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 07 - 1.1 - Swamping / turbulence / interaction	Swamping / interaction / turbulence	9	6	3	6	10	4	2	10	6.25
145	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 07 - 1.2 - Collision / contact	Collision / Contact	3	2	1	2	5	3	3	3	3.25
113	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 08 - 1.1 - Collision / contact	Collision / Contact	6	2	2	6	5	2	3	5	3.875
121	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 08 - 1.2 - Swamping / interaction / turbulence	Swamping / interaction / turbulence	6	2	2	2	5	5	3	5	3.75
150	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 09 - 1.1 Contact	Contact	2	2	2	2	2	5	5	5	3.125
163	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 09 - 1.3 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	1	1	1	1	3	5	5	5	2.75
150	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 09 - 1.4 Loss of Containment / Power / Communication	Loss of Containment / Power / Communication	2	2	2	2	2	5	5	5	3.125
66	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	5	5	5	5	3	5	5	5	4.75
56	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 11 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
129	FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	2	4	2	2	5	5	5	4	3.625
102	FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	2	6	4	2	5	5	4	4	4
134	FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	1	3	2	3	5	5	5	4	3.5
73	FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	4	5	4	4	5	5	5	4	4.5
113	FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3	4	3	3	5	5	3	5	3.875
73	FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	2	4	6	6	3	5	5	5	4.5
17	FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	6	9	6	6	6	6	6	6	6.375
3	FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	5	10	10	10	6	6	6	8	7.875
19	FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	3	6	6	3	6	8	8	10	6.25
85	FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	4	4	5	4	4	4	5	5	4.375
145	FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3	3	3	2	4	4	3	4	3.25
113	FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	3	6	6	2	3	4	4	3.875
71	FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.7 Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	3	3	3	9	5	5	4	5	4.625
48	FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	4	6	4	4	6	6	6	6	5.25
38	FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	5.5
19	FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	3	6	6	3	6	8	8	10	6.25
85	FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	4	4	5	4	4	4	5	5	4.375
150	FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3	3	3	2	4	4	3	3	3.125
113	FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	3	6	6	2	3	4	4	3.875
48	FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	4	4	2	4	10	6	6	6	5.25
17	FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	5	10	5	5	6	8	6	6	6.375
93	FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	2	4	4	2	4	6	6	6	4.25
134	FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	4	3	2	3	5	3	4	4	3.5
150	FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3	3	3	2	4	4	3	3	3.125
129	FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	3	6	6	2	3	3	3	3.625
102	FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.7 Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	3	3	3	3	2	6	6	6	4
56	FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	4	4	4	4	6	6	6	6	5
25	FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	8	8	4	4	6	6	6	6	6
28	FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	3	6	6	6	6	6	6	8	5.875
85	FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	4	4	5	4	4	4	5	5	4.375
145	FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	4	4	2	2	4	4	3	3	3.25
150	FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	12	4	4	4	2	3	3	3	3.125
48	FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	4	2	4	2	6	6	6	5.25	5.25
56	FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	4	4	4	2	6	6	6	5	5
48	FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.3 Grounding Refer Also to: FP PMSSC RA (F&T)7	Grounding	4	4	2	2	8	8	8	5.25	5.25
134	FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	3	2	3	1	3	4	4	3.5	3.5
150	FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3	3	2	1	4	4	3	3	3.125
160	FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	2	2	4	1	3	3	4	3	3
9	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	4	9	6	6	8	8	6	8	6.875
23	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	5	10	5	5	4	8	6	6	6.125
37	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	3	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5.625
73	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	4	6	4	6	5	4	3	4	4.5
121	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3.75
30	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	4	4	8	8	4	6	6	6	5.75
102	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.7 Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	3	3	3	3	2	6	6	6	4
73	FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	4	6	4	4	5	5	4	4	4.5
4	FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	6	9	9	9	6	8	6	6	7.375
73	FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.3 Grounding Refer Also to: FP PMSSC RA (F&T)7	Grounding	2	4	4	2	4	6	6	8	4.5
134	FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	1	3	2	3	5	3	4	4	3.5
85	FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	6	6	4	4	4	4	3	4	4.375
160	FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	2	2	4	4	2	3	3	4	3
66	FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	6	6	2	4	5	5	5	5	4.75
11	FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	3	6	3	6	6	10	10	10	6.75
113	FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	2	6	2	6	1	5	4	5	3.875
73	FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	3	5	5	5	3	5	5	5	4.5
56	FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	6	6	2	6	5	5	5	5	5
73	FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	4	4	6	6	3	3	5	5	4.5
38	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5.5
4	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	5	10	5	5	6	10	8	10	7.375

30	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	3	6	3	6	2	10	6	10	5.75
73	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	4	3	4	5	5	5	5	5	4.3
11	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	4	4	4	4	10	10	8	10	6.75
113	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	2	6	3	3	3	5	5	3.875
102	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.7 Loss of Dock Level	Loss of Dock Level	4	4	4	4	3	5	3	5	4
56	FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	6	6	6	6	5	5	4	4	5
25	FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	6	6	3	3	6	8	8	8	6
150	FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	2	4	2	2	3	4	4	4	3.125
93	FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	4	5	3	5	4	5	3	5	4.75
56	FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	6	6	3	6	5	5	4	5	5
102	FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	2	4	6	6	3	3	4	4	4
93	FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	2	6	2	6	3	5	5	5	4.25
14	FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	3	6	3	6	6	10	8	10	6.5
102	FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	2	8	2	6	1	5	3	5	4
73	FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	3	5	5	5	3	5	5	5	4.5
28	FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	6	9	2	9	5	5	5	5	5.875
73	FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	4	4	6	6	3	3	5	5	4.5
48	FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	6	6	4	6	5	5	5	5	5.25
19	FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	6	9	6	9	5	5	5	5	6.25
56	FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
38	FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5.5
102	FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product) Refer also to FP PMSC RA (F&T)5	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	6	6	3	2	4	4	4	4
44	FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	6	3	3	3	8	8	4	8	5.375
30	FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	5	5	5	5	8	8	4	6	5.75
102	FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
85	FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	5	5	2	5	5	5	3	5	4.375
44	FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3	3	3	6	8	8	4	8	5.375
93	FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	3	3	3	6	6	6	4	4.75
99	FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	4	6	4	4	4	4	3	4	4.125
65	FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	5	10	5	5	4	4	3	3	4.875
38	FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	5	10	5	10	3	4	3	4	5.5
30	FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	8	8	4	8	5	5	3	5	5.75
14	FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	10	10	5	10	5	5	3	4	6.5
85	FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	5	5	10	5	2	2	3	3	4.375
44	FP PMSC RA (F) 16 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	6	3	3	3	8	8	4	8	5.38
30	FP PMSC RA (F) 16 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	5	5	5	5	8	8	4	6	5.75
102	FP PMSC RA (F) 16 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4.00
85	FP PMSC RA (F) 16 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	5	5	2	5	5	5	3	5	4.38
44	FP PMSC RA (F) 16 - 1.5 Fire	Fire / Explosion	3	3	3	6	8	8	4	8	5.38
93	FP PMSC RA (F) 16 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	3	3	3	6	6	6	4	4.25
129	FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	2	4	2	2	5	5	5	4	3.625
99	FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	3	6	3	3	5	5	4	4	4.125
6	FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	2	6	4	6	10	10	10	10	7.25
9	FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	4	5	4	4	10	10	10	8	6.875
55	FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	6	6	6	3	5	5	5	5	5.125
140	FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	1	2	3	3	3	5	5	5	3.375
121	FP PMSC RA (T) 02 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	4	6	2	4	3	4	3	4	3.75
8	FP PMSC RA (T) 02 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	8	8	4	8	6	6	8	8	7
134	FP PMSC RA (T) 02 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	3	3	3	6	2	4	3	4	3.5
85	FP PMSC RA (T) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	4	4	3	4	5	5	5	5	4.375
13	FP PMSC RA (T) 02 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	9	9	6	6	5	5	5	8	6.625
121	FP PMSC RA (T) 02 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	3	6	3	2	4	4	5	3.75
48	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	4	8	4	6	5	5	5	5	5.25
66	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	3	9	2	6	3	5	4	5	4.75
121	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	2	4	4	4	2	4	5	5	3.75
56	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
25	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	8	8	6	6	5	5	5	6	6
113	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	2	4	4	4	3	4	5	5	3.875
140	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.7 Allision	Allision	1	3	1	2	5	5	5	5	3.375
113	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	4	4	4	4	4	5	2	4	3.875
73	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	3	9	3	6	3	5	3	4	4.5
150	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	2	2	4	6	1	1	4	5	3.125
99	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	4	4	3	4	4	4	5	5	4.125
56	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	6	6	3	6	5	5	4	5	5
150	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	2	2	6	4	1	1	4	5	3.125
38	FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	3	6	6	3	8	6	4	8	5.5
48	FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	5	5	5	3	6	6	4	6	5.25
160	FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	3	3	3	3	3	4	2	3	3
66	FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	6	8	4	6	3	4	3	4	4.75
150	FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3	3	3	3	4	4	2	3	3.125
129	FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	4	4	8	4	1	2	3	3	3.625

FORTH PORTS LIMITED		Document ID	Original Date
Risk Ranking - Category		FP PMSC (R) 2/03	Jul-13
		Review Due	Revised By / Date
		Ongoing	MM / August 2015



**FORTH PORTS LIMITED  
Risk Assessment**

INSERT TITLE														
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes  How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)					
				Likelihood	Overall Risk				Likelihood	Overall Risk				
					People	Property	Environment	Business		People	Property	Environment	Business	
1.1														
1.2														
1.3														
1.4														
1.5														
				<b>Risk Ranking</b>										

**Risk Assessment Scoring Matrix**

**LIKELIHOOD**

- 1 = Extremely unlikely (More than 100 years)
- 2 = Remote (10 - 99 years)
- 3 = Reasonably likely (1 - 9 years)
- 4 = Likely (Once per Year)
- 5 = Frequent (More than once per year)

**CONSEQUENCE**

- PEOPLE:**
- 1 = None
  - 2 = Minor, single slight Injury
  - 3 = Slight, multiple moderate or single major injury
  - 4 = Serious, multiple major injuries or single fatality
  - 5 = Major, more than 1 fatality

- PROPERTY:**
- 1 = negligible < £5000
  - 2 = Minor > £5000
  - 3 = Moderate >£50,000
  - 4 = Serious, > £500,000
  - 5 = major, > £2,000,000

- ENVIRONMENT:**
- 1 = localised spill < £5000,
  - 2 = Minor spill Tier 1 local response,
  - 3 = Moderate spill, Tier 2 some outside assistance
  - 4 = Moderate spill, Tier 2 greater outside assistance
  - 5 = Major spill, Tier 3 national response

- BUSINESS:**
- 1 = Negligible impact < £5000
  - 2 = Minor impact > £5000
  - 3 = Moderate impact > £50,000, bad local publicity, short term reduction of activity.
  - 4 = Serious Impact, >£500,000, bad widespread publicity, temporary Port Facility shutdown.

**OVERALL RISK**

	5	10	15	20	25
Likelihood	4	8	12	16	20
	3	6	9	12	15
	2	4	6	8	10
	1	2	3	4	5
	1	2	3	4	5

**RED** The Higher numbers(Greater than 10) in the matrix are considered "High-risk", These activities should not be carried out without additional controls being put in place to reduce the risk.

**AMBER** Hazards with risk factors within these bands (6 - 10) are termed "consider". These lower risk factors are considered acceptable, but still need careful monitoring to ensure that everything has been done to reduce the consequences and likelihood.

**GREEN** The lower numbers(5 and below) in the matrix are considered "low-risk", but should still be monitored to ensure that controls remain effective.

# DEF

<b>CAUSES</b>
System Failure
Human Error / Failure
Environmental Conditions
<b>CONTROLS</b>
Aids to Navigation



Legislation & Guidance

Conservancy

Emergency Plans

# DEFINITIONS

DEFINITION
<p>A breakdown of any system hardware or operating system. Examples of a system failure include but is not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Any technical failure on board a vessel / craft</li><li>- Technical failure with the VTS monitoring system</li><li>- AtoN failure</li><li>- Error with survey data</li><li>- Failure with conservancy maintenance &amp; verification process</li><li>- Technical failure with the lock gates</li><li>- Technical failure resulting in loss of dock level</li></ul>
<p>Human failure examples can be:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Failure of FTNS to follow and execute proper processes and procedures.</li><li>- Bridge team Error</li><li>- Human error due to lack of care or attention</li><li>- Human error due to violation of law, procedure or guidance</li></ul>
<p>Environmental Condition examples can include, but are not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- High winds</li><li>- Rough Seas</li><li>- Restricted visibility</li><li>- Strong current / tide</li><li>- Siltation</li></ul>
<p>An Aid to Navigation is a device, system or service, external to vessels, designed and operated to enhance safe and efficient navigation of individual vessels and/or traffic. These can include but are not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Buoys</li><li>- Lights</li><li>- Lighthouses</li><li>- Sound signals</li><li>- Portable Pilot Unit (PPU)</li><li>- AIS</li><li>- ECDIS</li><li>- RADAR</li><li>- GPS</li><li>- Port Entry Lights</li></ul>

Legislation and guidance refers to all applicable legislation and guidance related to the navigational safety of vessels, examples of these can include but is not limited to:

- Forth Ports Bye Laws
- General Directions
- Marine Procedures Guidelines and Information
- Towage Guidelines
- All other relevant international and national legislation
- Notice to Mariners

- Surveying and survey programming
- Promulgation of survey data
- Dredging and dredging programme
- Aids to Navigation maintenance and verification

- Forth Ports contingency plans
- Local Authority contingency plans
- National contingency plans



**FORTH PORTS LIMITED**  
**Navigational Risk Assessment**

Forth River Passage - Standard Vessel															
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)					Hazard Risk Score	
				Overall Risk					Overall Risk						
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business		
1.1	Collision / Allision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage	3	9	9	9	9	2	10	10	10	8	9.25	MRFs: 064/19 (engine failure), 051/19 (Technical failure), 034/19 (blackout), 091/19 (non compliance with VTS), 094/19( Close quarters), POLREPs: 15.11.20.  Most likely: Collision between small vessel and larger vessel around the bridges area resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: Collision between VLCC and cruise vessel resulting in total loss of vessels and loss of life.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage	3	3	6	3	6	1	5	5	4	5	4.625	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with buoy resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: High speed impact with bridge resulting in extreme damage to vessel and bridge, and loss of life.
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Aids to Navigation Conservancy Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Notice to Mariners Legislation & Guidance	3	3	9	9	6	1	5	5	5	5	5.875	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with damage.  Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of contaminant.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Emergency Plans Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Aids to Navigation Conservancy Notice to Mariners	1	5	5	4	4	1	5	5	5	4	4.625	Most likely: Vessel sinks outwith main shipping areas, all crew safely abandon ship  Worst credible: Cruise vessel sinks resulting in total loss of vessel and loss of life.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Emergency Plans Weather Forecasting	3	6	9	6	9	2	10	10	10	10	8.75	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.  Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (oil products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Emergency Plans Weather Forecasting / Tidal predictions Conservancy Vetting (Tankers)	4	8	8	8	8	1	3	5	5	5	6.25	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistent product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs and POLREPs reviewed. Overall vessel numbers calling at Forth, also vessel type and size. Number, nature, and size of ongoing projects.	References to FCBC removed. Causes simplified - definitions tab added for greater detail.

<b>FORTH PORTS LIMITED</b>	<b>Document ID</b> FP PMSC RA (F) 1/07	<b>Revised By / Date</b> CHM, MM, HMFO, HMF1, HMDD, Man Tow&PV / Oct 2012
<b>Risk Assessment - Forth River Passage (Standard Vessel)</b>	<b>Review Due</b> Aug-23	<b>Revised By / Date</b> AMM / August 2021



FORTH PORTS LIMITED  
Navigational Risk Assessment

Port of Leith - Arrival / Sailing Leith Approach Buoy to Berth															
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)					Hazard Risk Score	
				Overall Risk					Overall Risk						
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business		
1.1	Collision / Allision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage Console Controller FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	4	6	9	6	6	2	6	6	6	6	6.375	MRFs: 23/21 (Contact), 12/21 (contact), 081/20 (Contact), 075/20(Allision), 044/20 (Contact), 043/20 (Contact), 031/20 (Contact), 020/20 (Contact), 21/20 (Contact), 41/19 (Allision), 74/19 (technical malfunction), 81/19 (contact), 084/19 (contact)
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Quayside Obstruction	Pilotage Console Controller FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Fendering Quay edge 'cargo clear' demarkation Cranes properly stowed on quayside Swing Bridge Procedure Forth Ports H&S Procedures Aids to Navigation	5	5	10	10	10	2	6	8	6	8	7.875	Most Likely: Collision with small vessel resulting in no damage. Worst Credible: Collision involving cargo vessel and cruise ship. Resulting in the loss of vessel and loss of life.
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage Console Controller FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling Regulations)	3	3	6	6	3	2	6	8	8	10	6.25	Most Likely: Vessel grounded in soft mud and floats on following tide without damage. Worst Credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated at the Port entrance. Port is closed indefinitely and major damage to vessel.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage Console Controller FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	1	4	4	5	4	1	4	4	5	5	4.375	Most Likely: Vessel sinks in approach to port, total loss of ship, and crew abandon ship. Worst Credible: Vessel sinks in approach to port, total loss of ship and crew.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Forth Byelaw & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Marine Guidelines & Port Information	1	3	3	3	2	1	4	4	3	4	3.25	Most Likely: Small fire on-board quickly extinguished. Worst Credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel, crew and cargo.
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage Console Controller FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	3	3	3	6	6	1	2	3	4	4	3.875	Most Likely: Small spill of non-persistent product. Worst Credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closure and extensive environmental impact.
1.7	Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Lockgate operational procedures Port Planned Maintenance system Lock Gates - Interlocks to prevent opening all lock gates simultaneously Training / Auditing of Port Staff	3	3	3	3	9	1	5	5	4	5	4.625	Most Likely: Loss of containment but does not result in significant loss of dock level. Possible impact to large draft movements. Worst Credible: Large loss of dock level. Deep drafted vessel take the bottom of dock. Possible large scale damage to vessels and infrastructure.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs and POLREPs reviewed. Overall vessel numbers calling at Forth, also vessel type and size. Number, nature, and size of ongoing projects.	Causes simplified - definitions tab added for greater detail.

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSA RA (F) 2/05	Risk Assessment Team / Date MM, HMFO / 3rd Dec2012
Risk Assessment - Port of Leith	Review Due Aug-23	Revised By / Date AMM, August 2021



**FORTH PORTS LIMITED**  
**Navigational Risk Assessment**

Port of Rosyth - Arrival / Sailing No1 Rosyth Channel Buoy to Berth															
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)					Hazard Risk Score	
				Likelihood	Overall Risk				Likelihood	Overall Risk					
					People	Property	Environment	Business		People	Property	Environment	Business		
1.1	Collision / Allision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	2	4	6	4	4	1	5	5	4	4	4.5	MRFs: 077/19 (Contact) 065/19 (potential contact), Most likely: Collision between small workboat and larger vessel at slow speed resulting in minimal damage and no injuries. Worst credible: Collision between two cruise vessels resulting in loss of vessels and loss of life.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Quayside Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Fendering Quay edge 'cargo clear' demarkation Cranes properly stowed on quayside Swing Bridge Procedure Forth Ports H&S Procedures Aids to Navigation	3	6	9	6	3	1	5	5	4	4	5.25	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with buoy resulting in minimal damage. Worst credible: Large cruise vessel contacts quayside at high speed resulting in significant damage to vessel, quayside, and serious injuries / loss of life.
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling)	2	2	6	4	6	1	4	4	4	4	4.25	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with damage. Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of contaminant.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	1	4	4	5	4	1	4	4	5	5	4.375	Most likely: Vessel sinks, all crew / passengers safely abandon ship. Worst credible: Vessel sinks resulting in total loss of vessel, and loss of life.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans	1	3	3	3	2	1	4	4	3	3	3.125	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage	3	3	3	6	6	2	4	6	8	8	5.5	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistent product that dissipates naturally. Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs reviewed - contact. Vessel numbers, size, and type in the area. Ongoing projects that have an impact.	Causes simplified - definitions tab added for greater detail. References to FCBC removed.

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F) 03/06	Risk Assessment Team / Date MM, HMFO / 9th Jan 2013
Risk Assessment - Port of Rosyth	Review Due Aug-23	Revised By / Date AMM, August 2021



**FORTH PORTS LIMITED**  
**Navigational Risk Assessment**

Port of Methil - Arrival / Sailing Methil Pilot Station to Berth															
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)					Hazard Risk Score	
				Overall Risk					Overall Risk						
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business		
1.1	Collision with Small Commercial Vessel / Leisure vessel	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	2	4	4	2	4	2	10	6	6	6	5.25	Most likely: Vessel collides with small craft resulting in no damage to the larger vessel and no/minor to damage to the smaller vessel. Results in no injuries to persons  Worst credible: Vessel collides heavily with small craft resulting in extensive damage to both vessels and multiple injuries/fatalities
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Quayside Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Fendering Cranes properly stowed on quayside Forth Ports H&S Procedures Dock Gatemens Procedures Barge proforma	5	5	10	5	5	2	6	8	6	6	6.375	Most likely: Vessel makes light contact with object/quay resulting in no/minor damage to the vessel and quay  Worst credible: Vessel makes heavy contact with object/quay resulting in extensive damage to both vessel and quay and possible injuries
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling Regulations) Dock gate procedure	2	2	4	4	2	2	4	6	6	6	4.25	Most likely: Vessel runs aground with no damage to vessel, no pollution and can be refloated with the tide  Worst credible: Vessel runs aground causing extensive damage to the vessel, major pollution and blocking entrance to ports
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Dockgate operational procedures Port Planned Maintenance system Training / Auditing of Port Staff Dock gate procedure Aids to Navigation	1	4	3	2	3	1	5	3	4	4	3.5	Most likely: Vessel sinks/capsizes outwith entrance of harbour with everyone safely evacuated and no loss of life  Worst credible: Vessel sinks/capsizes in entrance of harbour with multiple fatalities and total loss of vessel
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans	1	3	3	3	2	1	4	4	3	3	3.125	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.  Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	3	3	3	6	6	1	2	3	3	3	3.625	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistent product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.
1.7	Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Dockgate operational procedures Port Planned Maintenance system Training / Auditing of Port Staff Dock gate procedure	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	6	6	6	4	Most Likely: Loss of containment but does not result in significant loss of dock level. Possible impact to large draft movements.  Worst Credible: Large loss of dock level. Deep drafted vessel take the bottom of dock. Possible large scale damage to vessels and infrastructure.

MRF 01/21 (contact),021/20 (Contact),

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs; likelihood of contact in light of submitted MRF, other MRF types considered. Changes to guidelines or procedures affecting Methil Number of vessels calling, other traffic in the vicinity, and vessel type calling.	Causes simplified - definitions tab added for greater detail.

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP_PMSC_RA (F) 4/04	Risk Assessment Team / Date HMFO, HMDD, MM / 16th Jan 2013
Risk Assessment - Port of Methil	Review Due Aug-23	Revised By / Date AMM, August 2021



FORTH PORTS LIMITED  
Navigational Risk Assessment

Methil Energy Park - Arrival/Sailing Methil Pilot Station to Berth															
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)					Hazard Risk Score	
				Overall Risk					Overall Risk						
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business		
1.1	Collision / Allision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy External standby tugs audited and issued with restricted towage licence for emergencies.	2	4	4	4	4	2	6	6	6	6	5	No relevant MRFs since previous review
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Quayside / Seabed Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Fendering SE Quayside Regulations & Risk Assessment External standby tugs audited and issued with restricted towage licence for emergencies.	4	8	8	4	4	2	6	6	6	6	6	Most likely: Collision between small craft and larger vessel at slow speed resulting in minimal damage and no injuries. Worst credible: Collision between two commercial vessels resulting in loss of vessels and loss of life.
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Survey / dredging Programme / Schedule (By Operator) SE Quayside Regulations & Risk Assessment	3	3	6	6	6	2	6	6	6	8	5.875	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with buoy resulting in minimal damage. Worst credible: Large vessel contacts quayside at high speed resulting in significant damage to vessel, quayside, and serious injuries / loss of life.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Fendering SE Quayside Regulations & Risk Assessment External standby tugs audited and issued with restricted towage licence for emergencies.	1	4	4	5	4	1	4	4	5	5	4.375	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with minimal damage. Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of containment.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	2	4	4	2	2	1	4	4	3	3	3.25	Most likely: Vessel sinks, all crew / passengers safely abandon ship. Worst credible: Vessel sinks in harbour approach resulting in total loss of vessel and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Survey Programme / Schedule (By Operator)	2	2	4	4	4	1	2	3	3	3	3.125	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.
															Most likely: Small spill of non-persistent product that dissipates naturally. Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
Changes to guidelines or procedures affecting Methil Number of vessels calling, other traffic in the vicinity, and vessel type calling.	Causes simplified - definitions tab added for greater detail.

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F) 5/03	Risk Assessment Team / Date HMFO, HMDD, MM / 23rd Jan 2013
Risk Assessment - Methil SE Berth	Review Due Aug-23	Revised By / Date AMM, August 2021





FORTH PORTS LIMITED  
Navigational Risk Assessment

Port of Kirkcaldy - Arrival / Sailing Close Approaches of Dock to Berth										MRF: 083/20 (Near Miss grounding),					
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)				Hazard Risk Score		
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood		People	Property		Environment	Business
1.1	Collision / Allision with Small Commercial Vessel / Leisure vessel / other Kirkcaldy vessel	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	2	4	4	2	4	2	10	6	6	6	5.25	Most likely: Collision between Kirkcaldy vessel and small commercial, leisure, or fishing vessel resulting in minimal damage  Worst credible: Collision between outbound Kirkcaldy vessel and other vessel in anchorage resulting in extreme damage and loss of life.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Quayside Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Fendering Cranes properly stowed on quayside Forth Ports H&S Procedures Additional fenders on West breakwater Fixed Lighting on East Pier	4	4	4	4	4	2	6	6	6	6	5	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with quayside whilst berthing resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: High speed impact with quayside whilst berthing resulting in extreme damage to vessel and quayside, and loss of life.
1.3	Grounding Refer also to: Risk Assessment (F&T) 7	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling Regulations)	2	2	4	4	2	2	6	8	8	8	5.25	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with damage.  Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of containment.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	1	4	3	2	3	1	5	3	4	4	3.5	Most likely: Vessel sinks outwith main shipping areas, all crew safely abandon ship  Worst credible: Vessel sinks resulting in total loss of vessel and loss of life.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans	1	3	3	3	2	1	4	4	3	3	3.125	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.  Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	3	2	2	4	4	1	2	3	3	4	3	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistent product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
No change to vessel traffic and only one MRF.	Causes simplified - definitions tab added for greater detail.

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F) 6/06	Risk Assessment Team / Date HMFO, HMDD, MM / 23rd Jan 2013
Risk Assessment - Port of Kirkcaldy	Review Due Aug-23	Revised By / Date AMM, August 2021



FORTH PORTS LIMITED  
Navigational Risk Assessment

Port of Burntisland - Arrival / Sailing Close Approaches of Dock to Berth															
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)					Hazard Risk Score	
				Likelihood	Overall Risk				Likelihood	Overall Risk					
					People	Property	Environment	Business		People	Property	Environment	Business		
1.1	Collision / Allision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Dock gate procedure	3	4	9	6	6	2	8	8	6	8	6.875	Most likely: Collision at slow speed between large vessel and small commercial, leisure, or fishing vessel resulting in minimal damage Worst credible: Collision and high speed between two large vessels and resulting in extreme damage and loss of life.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Quayside Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Fendering Cranes properly stowed on quayside Forth Ports H&S Procedures Dock Gatemmen Procedures	5	5	10	5	5	2	4	8	6	6	6.125	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with quayside whilst berthing resulting in minimal damage. Worst credible: High speed impact with quayside whilst berthing resulting in extreme damage to vessel and quayside, and loss of life.
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling Regulations) Dock Gate Procedure	3	3	6	6	6	2	6	6	6	6	5.625	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with damage. Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of containment.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Dock Gate Procedure	2	4	6	4	6	1	5	4	3	4	4.5	Most likely: Vessel sinks, all crew safely abandon ship Worst credible: Vessel sinks resulting in total loss of vessel, cargo, and loss of life.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans	2	4	4	4	4	1	4	4	3	3	3.75	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	4	4	4	8	8	2	4	6	6	6	5.75	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistent product that dissipates naturally. Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.
1.7	Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Port Planned Maintenance system Training / Auditing of Port Staff Dockgate Procedure	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	6	6	6	4	Most likely: Fault with gates which is repaired before major loss of dock level. Worst credible: Fault with gates which cannot be repaired before major loss of dock level resulting in vessels aground with extreme damage.

MRFs: 04/21 (Contact),

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs review - contact - likelihood already 5. Vessels calling at B'island - number, type, size. Other operations in the area i.e. rigs.	Causes simplified - definitions tab added for greater detail.

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F) 7/05	Risk Assessment Team / Date HMFO, MM / 16th Jan 2013
Risk Assessment - Port of Burntisland	Review Due Aug-23	Revised By / Date AMM, August 2021



**FORTH PORTS LIMITED**  
**Navigational Risk Assessment**

Inverkeithing - Arrival / Sailing Saint David's Beacon to Berth															
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)					Hazard Risk Score	
				Likelihood	Overall Risk				Likelihood	Overall Risk					
					People	Property	Environment	Business		People	Property	Environment	Business		
1.1	Collision / allision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	2	4	6	4	4	1	5	5	4	4	4.5	Most likely: Collision between small craft and larger vessel at slow speed resulting in minimal damage and no injuries.  Worst credible: Collision between two commercial vessels resulting in loss of vessels and loss of life.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Quayside Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Fendering Cranes properly stowed on quayside Forth Ports H&S Procedures	3	6	9	9	9	2	6	8	6	6	7.375	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with buoy or quay resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: Large vessel contacts quayside at high speed resulting in significant damage to vessel, quayside, and serious injuries / loss of life.
1.3	Grounding Refer also: Risk Assessment (F&T) 7	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling Regulations)	2	2	4	4	2	2	4	6	6	8	4.5	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with minimal damage.  Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to port, extreme damage and loss of containment.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	1	4	3	2	3	1	5	3	4	4	3.5	Most likely: Vessel sinks, all crew / passengers safely abandon ship.  Worst credible: Vessel sinks in harbour approach resulting in total loss of vessel and loss of life.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans	2	6	6	4	4	1	4	4	3	4	4.375	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.  Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	2	2	2	4	4	1	2	3	3	4	3	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistent product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

MRF: 020/19 (Contact)

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs submitted considered; increase in amount of contact related MRF's. Traffic numbers and vessel type, as well as other movements in the vicinity of Inverkeithing.	Causes / controls simplified - definitions tab added for greater detail.

<b>FORTH PORTS LIMITED</b>	<b>Document ID</b> FP PMSC RA (F) 8/04	<b>Risk Assessment Team / Date</b> HMFO, HMDD, MM / 23rd Jan 2013
<b>Risk Assessment - Inverkeithing</b>	<b>Review Due</b> Aug-23	<b>Revised By / Date</b> AMM, August 2021



FORTH PORTS LIMITED  
Navigational Risk Assessment

Braefoot Jetty - Arrival / Sailing Eastern Limits to Berth															
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)					Hazard Risk Score	
				Likelihood	Overall Risk				Likelihood	Overall Risk					
					People	Property	Environment	Business		People	Property	Environment	Business		
1.1	Collision / Allision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	2	6	6	2	4	1	5	5	5	5	4.75	MRFs reviewed: No relevant MRF since last review  Most likely: Collision between small workboat and larger vessel at slow speed resulting in minimal damage and no injuries.  Worst credible: Collision between two laden tankers resulting in loss of vessels, loss of life and large scale pollution
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Jetty Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Jetty Regulations Jetty Supervisor	3	3	6	3	6	2	6	10	10	10	6.75	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with buoy resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: Large vessel contacts jetty at high speed resulting in significant damage to vessel, jetty, and serious injuries / loss of life.
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Jetty Regulations	2	2	6	2	6	1	1	5	4	5	3.875	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with minimal damage.  Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to port, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Jetty Regulations	1	3	5	5	5	1	3	5	5	5	4.5	Most likely: Vessel sinks, all crew / passengers safely abandon ship.  Worst credible: Vessel sinks in approach to jetties resulting in total loss of vessel and loss of life.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Jetty Regulations	2	6	6	2	6	1	5	5	5	5	5	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.  Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, loss of life and large scale pollution
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage (Within compulsory pilotage Area) FTNS Forth Ports Byelaws & General Directions for Navigation Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Notice to Mariners Marine Guidelines & Port Information Jetty Regulations	2	4	4	6	6	1	3	3	5	5	4.5	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistent product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs reviewed -bow thruster failure for a vessel calling the Jetty Vessel numbers consulted, as well as type and size.	Causes / controls simplified - definitions tab added for greater detail.

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F) 9/05	Risk Assessment Team / Date HMFO, HMD, MM / 23rd Jan 2013
Risk Assessment - Braefoot Jetty	Review Due Aug-23	Revised By / Date AMM, August 2021



FORTH PORTS LIMITED  
Navigational Risk Assessment

Port of Grangemouth - Arrival/Sailing Hen & Chickens to Berth															
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)					Hazard Risk Score	
				Overall Risk					Overall Risk						
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business		
1.1	Collision / Allision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Diversionary Channel Jetty / Terminal Guidelines STS Operations Manual Vessel vetting (tankers)	2	6	6	6	6	1	5	5	5	5	5.5	MRFs: 18/21 (steering failure), 086/20 (Contact), 071/20(Contact), 068/20(Contact), 065/20 (Contact), 062/20 (Contact), 060/20 (Contact), 051/20 (Contact), 040/20(Contact), 039/20 (contact), 033/20(contact), 027/20 (blackout), 028/20 (contact), 024/20 (engine failure), 012/20 (contact), 002/20(contact), 001/20(contact), [009/19, 011/19, 012/19, 029/19, 044/19, 048/19, 052/19, 055/19, 073/19, 079/19, 102/19, 103/19 (Contact)]  Most likely: Collision between inbound / outbound vessel and small vessel at slow speed resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: Collision between inbound/outbound Grangemouth tankers at higher speed resulting in total loss of vessels and loss of life.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Quayside Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Fendering Restricted Air Draft Procedures Cranes properly stowed on quayside Dockhead Staff Ship Specific Towage Requirements (IPOS Entries) STS Operations Manual Jetty / Terminal Guidelines Vessel vetting (tankers)	5	5	10	5	5	2	6	10	8	10	7.375	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with lead in or fenders resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: Vessel has high speed impact with lock structure resulting in extreme damage to vessel, locks, and loss of business due to potential port closure.
1.3	Grounding	Technical Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Surveying Omission Failure of Aids to Navigation Unknown Underwater Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling Regulations)	3	3	6	3	6	2	2	10	6	10	5.75	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with damage.  Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of containment.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling Regulations) Jetty / Terminal Guidelines Vessel vetting (tankers)	1	4	3	4	5	1	5	5	5	5	4.5	Most likely: Vessel sinks, all crew safely abandon ship  Worst credible: Vessel sinks between H&C and locks resulting in total loss of vessel & cargo, channel closure, and loss of life.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Emergency Plans / OPRC Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting Jetty/Terminal Guidelines Vessel vetting (tankers)	2	4	4	4	4	2	10	10	8	10	6.75	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire on vessel containing munitions, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Conservancy Bunkering Procedure Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling Regulations)	3	3	3	6	3	1	3	3	5	5	3.875	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistent product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.
1.7	Loss of Dock Level	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Lockgate operational procedures Port Planned Maintenance system Lock Gates - Interlocks to prevent opening all lock gates simultaneously Training / Auditing of Port Staff Impounding Pumps	2	4	4	4	4	1	3	5	3	5	4	Most likely: Fault with gates which is repaired before major loss of dock level.  Worst credible: Fault with gates which cannot be repaired before major loss of dock level resulting in vessels aground with extreme damage.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs reviewed - significant number of contacts - one major contact.	Causes / controls simplified - definitions tab added for greater detail.

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F) 10/06	Risk Assessment Team / Date DMM, HMF1 / 19th Dec 2012
Risk Assessment - Port of Grangemouth Hen & Chickens to Berth	Revised By / Date Aug-23	AMM, August 2021



FORTH PORTS LIMITED  
Navigational Risk Assessment

Crombie Berthing/Sailing										No significant MRFs during time from previous review.					
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)				Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)				Hazard Risk Score			
				Likelihood	Overall Risk				Likelihood	Overall Risk					
					People	Property	Environment	Business		People	Property		Environment	Business	
1.1	Collision / Allision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	2	4	6	6	6	1	5	5	4	4	5	Most likely: Collision between Crombie vessel and small vessel at slow speed resulting in minimal damage  Worst credible: Collision between Crombie vessel carrying munitions and inbound/outbound Grangemouth tanker resulting in total loss of vessels and loss of life.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Jetty Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Fendering Restricted Air Draft Procedures Cranes properly stowed on quayside	3	6	6	3	3	2	6	8	8	8	6	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with jetty whilst berthing resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: High speed impact with jetty whilst berthing resulting in extreme damage to vessel and jetty, and loss of life.
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Unknown Underwater Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	2	2	4	2	2	1	3	4	4	4	3.125	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with damage.  Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	1	4	5	3	5	1	4	5	3	5	4.25	Most likely: Vessel sinks outwith main shipping areas, all crew safely abandon ship  Worst credible: Vessel sinks in main channel near Crombie resulting in total loss of vessel, channel closure, and loss of life.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Jetty/Terminal Guidelines	3	6	6	3	6	1	5	5	4	5	5	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.  Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire on vessel containing munitions, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Bunkering Procedure Standby vessel for bunkering operations	2	2	4	6	6	1	3	3	4	4	4	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistent product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
No MRFs since previous review.  Number of vessels calling at Crombie, as well as type and size.	Causes / controls simplified - definitions tab added for greater detail.

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F) 11/06	Risk Assessment Team / Date DMM, HMF1 / 19th Dec2012
Risk Assessment - Crombie	Review Due Aug-23	Revised By / Date AMM, August 2021



**FORTH PORTS LIMITED**  
**Navigation Risk Assessment**

Hound Point - Arrival/Sailing Eastern Limits to Berth														
Ref.	Hazard <small>What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)</small>	Causes <small>How can it go wrong</small>	Controls <small>Preventative &amp; Reactive (What action &amp; how frequent)</small>	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)				Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)				Hazard Risk Score		
				Likelihood	Overall Risk				Likelihood	Overall Risk				
					People	Property	Environment	Business		People	Property		Environment	Business
1.1	Collision / Allison	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage (Within compulsory pilotage Area) - 2 Pilots FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Hound Point Marine Guidelines	2	2	6	2	6	1	3	5	5	5	4.25
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Jetty Obstruction	Pilotage (Within compulsory pilotage Area) - 2 Pilots FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Fendering Hound Point Marine Guidelines	3	3	6	3	6	2	6	10	8	10	6.5
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Unknown Underwater Obstruction	Pilotage (Within compulsory pilotage Area) - 2 Pilots FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Hound Point Marine Guidelines	2	2	8	2	6	1	1	5	3	5	4
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage (Within compulsory pilotage Area) - 2 Pilots FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Hound Point Marine Guidelines	1	3	5	5	5	1	3	5	5	5	4.5
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage (Within compulsory pilotage Area) - 2 Pilots FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Towage Emergency Plans Hound Point Marine Guidelines	3	6	9	3	9	1	5	5	5	5	5.875
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage (Within compulsory pilotage Area) - 2 Pilots FTNS Forth Ports Byelaws & General Directions for Navigation Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Notice to Mariners Marine Guidelines & Port Information Hound Point Marine Guidelines	2	4	4	6	6	1	3	3	5	5	4.5

MRFs since previous review: 0

Most likely: Collision between small workboat and larger vessel at slow speed resulting in minimal damage and no injuries.

Worst credible: Collision between two laden tankers resulting in loss of vessels, loss of life and large scale pollution

Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with buoy resulting in minimal damage.

Worst credible: Large vessel contacts jetty at high speed resulting in significant damage to vessel, jetty, and serious injuries / loss of life.

Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with minimal damage.

Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to port, extreme damage and loss of containment.

Most likely: Vessel sinks, all crew / passengers safely abandon ship.

Worst credible: Vessel sinks in approach to jetties resulting in total loss of vessel and loss of life.

Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.

Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, loss of life and large scale pollution

Most likely: Small spill of non-persistent product that dissipates naturally.

Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs; No contacts since last review Changes to guidelines or procedures affecting HP. Number of vessels calling, and other traffic in the vicinity.	<b>Causes / controls simplified - definitions tab added for greater detail.</b>

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F) 12/05	Risk Assessment Team / Date DMM, HMF1 / 19th Dec 2012
Risk Assessment - Houndpoint Arrival / Sailing Eastern Limits to	Review Due Aug-23	Revised By / Date AMM, August 2021





**FORTH PORTS LIMITED**  
**Navigation Risk Assessment**

Cruise Vessels at Anchorage (Hound Point / Newhaven)											MRF: 050/20(Fouled anchor), 057/20 (fouled anchor), 043/19 (fouled anchor), 76/19 (engine failure),				
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)					Hazard Risk Score	
				Likelihood	Overall Risk				Likelihood	Overall Risk					
					People	Property	Environment	Business		People	Property	Environment	Business		
1.1	Dragging Anchor	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Designated and proven anchorages Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	5	5	10	5	5	1	4	5	5	5	5.5	Most likely: Vessel drags anchor, then pays out more chain resulting in no further dragging.  Worst credible: Vessel drags anchor resulting in vessel going aground or making contact with bridge/Hound Point Terminal. Vessel suffers extreme damage and possibility of loss of life.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	2	6	6	4	6	1	5	5	5	5	5.25	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with buoy resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: Vessel has high speed impact with bridge/jetty resulting in significant damage to vessel and loss of life.
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Tender pack	3	6	9	6	9	1	5	5	5	5	6.25	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with damage.  Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be reloaded resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of contaminant.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	1	5	5	5	5	1	5	5	5	5	5	Most likely: Vessel sinks, all crew and passengers safely abandon ship  Worst credible: Vessel sinks resulting in total loss of vessel, and loss of life.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	3	6	6	6	6	1	5	5	5	5	5.5	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel, and loss of life.
1.5	Loss of Containment (Oil Products) - Refer also to FP PMSC RA (F&T)5	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	3	3	6	6	3	1	2	4	4	4	4	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistent product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs review -3 fouled anchor incidents, subject anchorage area has since been dredged. Other traffic in the vicinity - type, size, density Cruise specific procedures, forms and guidelines.	Causes / controls simplified - definitions tab added for greater detail.

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F) 13/06	Risk Assessment Team / Date HMFO, MM, DMM, HMD, MT&PV / 13th Feb 2013
Risk Assessment - Cruise Vessels at Anchorage (Hound Point / Newhaven)	Review Due Aug-23	Revised By / Date AMM, August 2021





**FORTH PORTS LIMITED**  
**Navigational Risk Assessment**

Forth - River Transit + Berthing/Sailing Small Commercial Craft (Tugs, Workboats etc)															
Ref.	Hazard <small>What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)</small>	Causes <small>How can it go wrong</small>	Controls <small>Preventative &amp; Reactive (What action &amp; how frequent)</small>	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)					Hazard Risk Score	
				Likelihood	Overall Risk				Likelihood	Overall Risk					
					People	Property	Environment	Business		People	Property	Environment	Business		
1.1	Collision / Allision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Legislation & Guidance General Directions (GD19) Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Liaison with Local Authorities & Boat Clubs Audit and license procedure	5	5	10	10	5	2	8	8	6	8	7.5	MRFs: 045/19 (engine failure), 22/21 (grounding), 10/21(contact), 09/21 (contact), 08/21 (contact), 070/20 (contact), 059/20(blackout), 058/20 (contact), 052/20 (collision with buoy), 023/20 (towline parted), 022/20 (collision), 005/20 (contact), 002/20(contact), 001/20 (contact), 101/19 (engine failure) 086/19 (technical failure), 78/19 technical failure), 033/19 (collision),  Most likely: Collision between two small workboats at slow speed resulting in minimal damage and no injuries.  Worst credible: Collision between two small commercial craft at high speed resulting in loss of vessels and loss of life.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Change to Shore Infrastructure / Obstruction on the Quay Floating Debris	FTNS Legislation & Guidance General Directions (GD19) Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Liaison with Local Authorities & Boat Clubs Audit and license procedure	5	5	10	5	5	2	10	8	8	6	7.125	Most likely: Small workboat slow speed impact with floating debris resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: Contact with bridge, quayside, jetty at high speed resulting in significant damage and loss of life.
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Legislation & Guidance General Directions (GD19) Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Conservancy Liaison with Local Authorities & Boat Clubs Audit and license procedure	3	6	6	6	6	2	6	8	6	8	6.5	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with damage.  Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of containment.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Legislation & Guidance General Directions (GD19) Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Conservancy Liaison with Local Authorities & Boat Clubs Audit and license procedure	1	5	5	4	5	1	5	5	4	5	4.75	Most likely: Vessel sinks, all crew safely abandon ship  Worst credible: Vessel sinks resulting in total loss of vessel, and loss of life.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Legislation & Guidance General Directions (GD19) Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Conservancy Liaison with Local Authorities & Boat Clubs Audit and license procedure	4	4	4	4	8	2	6	6	4	6	5.25	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.  Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (oil products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Legislation & Guidance General Directions (GD19) Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Conservancy Liaison with Local Authorities & Boat Clubs Audit and license procedure	5	5	5	5	5	2	6	4	6	6	5.25	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistent product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
Several contact incidents with one major incident resulting in a large cost to company.	Causes / controls simplified - definitions tab added for greater detail. Pilot Vessels removed as they have own SMS & Ras

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F) 14/06	Risk Assessment Team / Date MT&PV, HMFO, MM, DMM, HMD / 13TH Feb 2013
Risk Assessment - Forth - River Transit + Berthing/Sailing Small	Review Due Aug-23	Revised By / Date AMM, August 2021



FORTH PORTS LIMITED  
Navigational Risk Assessment

Cruise Vessel Tender Operations (Newhaven / Hound Point)											MRF: 067/19 (Contact)				
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)				Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)				Hazard Risk Score			
				Likelihood	Overall Risk				Likelihood	Overall Risk					
					People	Property	Environment	Business		People	Property			Environment	Business
1.1	Collision / Allision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Legislation & Guidance FTNS Weather Forecasting, Tidal Predictions & Monitoring Tender Pro-forma & Passage Planning Tender Pack Ruling Depth and UKC document	3	6	3	3	3	2	8	8	4	8	5.375	Most likely: Collision between two tenders at slow speed resulting in minimal damage and no injuries.  Worst credible: Collision between large vessel and tender carrying passengers resulting in loss of tender and loss of life.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Change to Shore Infrastructure / Obstruction on the Quay Floating Debris	FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions & Monitoring Tender Traffic Control Procedures Tender Proforma and Passage Planning Tender Pack	5	5	5	5	5	2	8	8	4	6	5.75	Most likely: Tender has slow speed impact with buoy resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: Tender has high speed impact with pontoon resulting in significant damage to tender and loss of life.
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Uncharted Object	FTNS Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Legislation & Guidance Emergency Plans Conservancy Tender Proforma and Passage Planning Pack Tender	4	4	4	4	4	2	4	4	4	4	4	Most likely: Tender grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with damage.  Worst credible: Tender hard aground, cannot be refloats resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of containment.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Legislation & Guidance Emergency Plans Conservancy Tender Proforma and Passage Planning Pack Tender	1	5	5	2	5	1	5	5	3	5	4.375	Most likely: Tender sinks, all crew and passengers safely abandon ship  Worst credible: Tender sinks resulting in total loss of vessel and loss of life.
1.5	Fire	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Legislation & Guidance Emergency Plans	3	3	3	3	6	2	8	8	4	8	5.375	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.  Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (oil products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Legislation & Guidance Emergency Plans Conservancy Tender Proforma and Passage Planning Pack Tender	3	3	3	3	3	2	6	6	6	4	4.25	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistent product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
Greatly reduced amount of cruise traffic due to COVID which has impacted the amount of incidents.	Causes / controls simplified - definitions tab added for greater detail.

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F) 15/05	Risk Assessment Team / Date MM, DMM, HMFO March 2014
Risk Assessment - Cruise Vessel Tender Operations (Hound Point /	Review Due Aug-23	Revised By / Date AMM, August 2021



FORTH PORTS LIMITED  
Navigational Risk Assessment

Port of Leith - Arrival / Sailing Leith Approach Buoy to Berth with Jack-Up Barge on Leith Approaches															
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)					Hazard Risk Score	
				Overall Risk					Overall Risk						
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business		
1.1	Collision / Allision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Jack-Up Barge in Approach Channel	Pilotage (Compulsory over 40m) Console Controller FTNS (Notice to Mariners) Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage ( Additional Towage assessed on case by case basis) Aids to Navigation Conservancy Vessel moves assessed on case by case basis with regards to manoeuvrability	4	7	10	6	10	2	6	6	6	6	7.125	MRFs: 23/21 (Contact), 12/21 (contact), 081/20 (Contact), 075/20(Allision), 044/20 (Contact), 043/20 (Contact), 031/20 (Contact), 020/20 *(Contact), 21/20 (Contact), 41/19 (Allision), 74/19 (technical malfunction), 81/19 (contact), 084/19 (contact)  Most Likely: Collision with small vessel / Jack-up Barge resulting in minor damage.  Worst Credible: Collision involving cargo vessel and Jack-Up Barge. Resulting in the loss of vessel , barge and loss of life.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Jack-Up barge at Jetty	Pilotage (Compulsory over 40m) Console Controller FTNS (Notice to Mariners) Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage ( Additional Towage assessed on case by case basis) Aids to Navigation Conservancy Vessel moves assessed on case by case basis with regards to manoeuvrability	5	7	10	6	10	2	6	6	6	6	7.125	  Most Likely: Slow speed impact with quay resulting in minimal damage to vessel or jetty.  Worst Credible: Large impact resulting in extreme damage to vessel and infrastructure. Quayside no longer able to operate and vessel requiring repair possible death / loss of containment.
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Change of Approach to due to Jack-Up Barge	Pilotage (Compulsory over 40m) Console Controller FTNS (Notice to Mariners) Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage ( Additional Towage assessed on case by case basis) Aids to Navigation Conservancy Vessel moves assessed on case by case basis with regards to manoeuvrability	3	3	6	6	3	2	6	8	8	10	6.25	  Most Likely: Vessel grounded in soft mud and floats on following tide without damage.  Worst Credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated at the Port entrance. Port is closed indefinitely and major damage to vessel.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage Console Controller FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	1	4	4	5	4	1	4	4	5	5	4.375	  Most Likely: Vessel sinks in approach to port, total loss of ship, and crew abandon ship.  Worst Credible: Vessel sinks in approach to port, total loss of ship and crew.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Forth Byelaw & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Marine Guidelines & Port Information	1	3	3	3	2	1	4	4	3	4	3.25	  Most Likely: Small fire on-board quickly extinguished.  Worst Credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel , crew and cargo.
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage Console Controller FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	3	3	3	6	6	1	2	3	4	4	3.875	  Most Likely: Small spill of non-persistent product.  Worst Credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closure and extensive environmental impact.
1.7	Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Lockgate operational procedures Port Planned Maintenance system Lock Gates - Interlocks to prevent opening all lock gates simultaneously Training / Auditing of Port Staff	3	3	3	3	9	1	5	5	4	5	4.625	  Most Likely: Loss of containment but does not result in significant loss of dock level. Possible impact to large draft movements.  Worst Credible: Large loss of dock level. Deep drafted vessel take the bottom of dock. Possible large scale damage to vessels and infrastructure.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs and POLREPs reviewed. Overall vessel numbers calling at Forth, also vessel type and size. Number , nature, and size of ongoing projects.	Causes simplified - definitions tab added for greater detail.

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F) 16	Risk Assessment Team / Date MM, MO / 11th October 2021
Risk Assessment - Port of Leith	Review Due Oct-23	Revised By / Date



**FORTH PORTS LIMITED**  
**Navigational Risk Assessment**

Tay River Passage - Standard Vessel															
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes  How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)					Hazard Risk Score	
				Likelihood	Overall Risk				Likelihood	Overall Risk					
					People	Property	Environment	Business		People	Property	Environment	Business		
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	1	2	4	2	2	1	5	5	5	4	3.625	Most Likely: Collision with small leisure craft. Worst Credible: Collision with cruise vessel.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	3	3	6	3	3	1	5	5	4	4	4.125	Most Likely: Contact with ATON's while underway in fairway. Worst Credible: Extremely heavy landing structural damage to Quay and vessel
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	2	2	6	4	6	2	10	10	10	10	7.25	Most Likely : Grounding on soft material, no loss of containment and vessel able to float off on following tide Worst Credible: Grounding on solid sea bed, loss of containment vessel unable to refloat.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	1	4	5	4	4	2	10	10	10	8	6.875	Most Likely : slow sinking Worst Credible: fast sinking
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans	3	6	6	6	3	1	5	5	5	5	5.125	Most Likely : Small fire onboard, quickly extinguished . Worst Credible: Tanker uncontrollable fire, vessel total loss.
1.6	Loss of Containment (oil products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Vetting (Tankers)	1	1	2	3	3	1	3	5	5	5	3.375	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistent product that dissipates naturally. Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closure and extensive environmental impact.
1.7	Allision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	1	1	3	1	2	1	5	5	5	5	3.375	Most Likely: Allision with small leisure vessel. Worst Credible: Allision with large cruise vessel.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
All content reviewed	Causes / controls simplified - definitions tab added for greater detail.

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP.PMSC.RA (T) 1/05	Risk Assessment Team / Date DMM, HMD 13th Dec 2012
Risk Assessment - River Passage Tay (General)	Review Due Aug-23	Revised By / Date AMM, August 2021



**FORTH PORTS LIMITED**  
**Navigational Risk Assessment**

Port of Dundee - Arrival/Sailing Close Approaches to River Berths															
Ref.	Hazard <small>What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)</small>	Causes <small>How can it go wrong</small>	Controls <small>Preventative &amp; Reactive (What action &amp; how frequent)</small>	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)				Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)				Hazard Risk Score			
				Overall Risk				Overall Risk							
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property		Environment	Business	
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	2	4	6	2	4	1	3	4	3	4	3.75	Most Likely: Collision with small leisure craft. Worst Credible: Collision with berthed cruise vessel
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Change to Shore Infrastructure / Obstruction on the Quay	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Quayside Clear from Obstructions Port Assistant AIS Beacon on Horseshoe Buoy	4	8	8	4	8	2	6	6	8	8	7	Most Likely: Heavy landing on Quay with minor damage Worst Credible: Extremely heavy landing structural damage to Quay and vessel
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	3	3	3	3	6	1	2	4	3	4	3.5	Most Likely : Grounding on soft material, no loss of containment and vessel able to float off on following tide Worst Credible: Grounding on solid sea bed, loss of containment vessel unable to refloat.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	1	4	4	3	4	1	5	5	5	5	4.375	Most Likely : slow sinking Worst Credible: fast sinking
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	3	9	9	6	6	1	5	5	5	8	6.625	Most Likely : Small fire onboard, quickly extinguished . Worst Credible: Tanker uncontrollable fire, vessel total loss.
1.7	Allision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	1	1	3	1	2	1	5	5	5	5	3.375	Most Likely: Allision with berthed vessel or rig with minor damage. Worst Credible: Allision with berthed cruise vessel significant damage.
1.8	Loss of Containment (oil products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	3	3	3	6	3	1	2	4	4	5	3.75	Most Likely : Ballast water contaminated and discharged causing minimal pollution. Worst Credible: Full loss of cargo .

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
All content reviewed	Causes / controls simplified - definitions tab added for greater detail.

<b>FORTH PORTS LIMITED</b>	<b>Document ID</b> FP PMSC RA(T) 2/05	<b>Risk Assessment Team / Date</b> DMM, HMD 13th Dec 2012
<b>Risk Assessment - Dundee</b>	<b>Review Due</b> June 23	<b>Revised By / Date</b> AMM August 2014
<b>Arrival/Sailing Post Approaches to</b>		



FORTH PORTS LIMITED  
Navigational Risk Assessment

Port of Dundee - Large Vessel - Arrival/Sailing Port Limits to Berth															
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Overall Risk					Overall Risk					Hazard Risk Score	
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business		
11	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	2	4	3	4	6	1	3	3	3	3	5.25	Most Likely: Collision with small leisure craft. Worst Credible: Collision with berthed cruise vessel.
12	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Change to Shore Infrastructure / Obstruction on the Quay	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	3	3	3	3	6	1	3	5	4	3	4.75	Most Likely: Heavy landing on Quay with minor damage Worst Credible: Extremely heavy landing structural damage to Quay and vessel
13	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	2	2	4	4	4	1	2	4	5	5	3.75	Most Likely: Grounding on soft material, no loss of containment and vessel able to float off on following tide Worst Credible: Grounding on solid sea bed, loss of containment vessel unable to refloat.
14	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	1	5	5	5	5	1	5	5	5	5	5	Most Likely: Slow sinking Worst Credible: Fast sinking
15	Fire / Explosion	Collision/Allision Contact Grounding Human Error Technical Failure Loss of Containment	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	2	6	6	6	6	1	3	3	5	3	6	Most Likely: Small fire onboard, quickly extinguished Worst Credible: Tanker uncontrollable fire, vessel unstable.
16	Loss of Containment (oil products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Vetting (Tankers)	2	2	4	4	4	1	3	4	5	5	3.875	Most Likely: Ballast water contaminated and discharged causing minimal pollution. Worst Credible: Full loss of cargo.
17	Allision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	1	1	3	1	2	1	5	5	5	5	3.375	Most Likely: contact with anchored vessel causing minimal damage. Worst Credible: Allision with berthed cruise vessel causing significant damage.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
All content reviewed	Causes / controls simplified - definitions tab added for greater detail.

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (T) 4/05	Risk Assessment Team / Date DMM, HMD 13th Dec 2012
Risk Assessment - Large Tanker Arrival/Sailing Port Limits to Berth	Review Due Aug-23	Revised By / Date AMM, August 2021



FORTH PORTS LIMITED  
Navigational Risk Assessment

Port of Dundee - Oil Rigs - Arrival/Sailing Port Limits to Berth																
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)				Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)				Hazard Risk Score				
				Overall Risk				Overall Risk								
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property		Environment	Business		
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Planning meeting Conservancy Towage Audit Declaration / Tug Vetting	2	4	4	4	4	4	1	4	5	2	4	3.875	Most Likely: Collision with small leisure craft while underway. Worst Credible: Collision with standard vessel in fairway.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Change to Shore Infrastructure / Obstruction on the Quay Communication Error	Pilotage / Towmaster FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Planning meeting Conservancy Additional Fendering (if achievable on berth) Towage Audit Declaration / Tug Vetting Simulation Trials	3	3	9	3	6	6	1	3	5	3	4	4.5	Most Likely: Contact with navigational buoy Worst Credible: Contact with berthed vessel/rig
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Towage Audit Declaration / Tug Vetting Simulation Trials Horseshoe Buoy Identified by AIS Unit Port Entry Light/Virtual Buoys	2	2	2	4	6	6	1	1	1	4	5	3.125	Most Likely: Grounding on soft material, no loss of containment and vessel able to float off on following tide Worst Credible: Grounding on solid sea bed, loss of containment vessel unable to refloat.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	Collision Contact Grounding Technical Failure Bridge Team Error	Pilotage / Towmaster FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Planning meeting Conservancy Towage Audit Declaration / Tug Vetting Simulation Trials	1	4	4	3	4	4	1	4	4	5	5	4.125	Most Likely: Sinking of rig outside of navigational channel no loss of containment. Worst Credible: Sinking within navigational channel loss of containment.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	Collision Contact Human Error Technical Failure Loss of Containment	Pilotage / Towmaster FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Planning meeting Conservancy Towage Audit Declaration / Tug Vetting	3	6	6	3	6	6	1	5	5	4	5	5	Most Likely: Small fire on vessel, extinguished on board Worst Credible: Large fire on rig, complete loss.
1.6	Loss of Containment (oil products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage / Towmaster FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Planning meeting Conservancy Towage Audit Declaration / Tug Vetting Bunkering Procedure	2	2	2	6	4	4	1	1	1	4	5	3.125	Most Likely: Small loss of non-persistent oil product Worst Credible: Large spill of persistent product

MRF: 048/20 (contact)

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
All content reviewed	Causes / controls simplified - definitions tab added for greater detail.

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (T) 5/05	Risk Assessment Team / Date DMM, HMD 09th January 2013
Risk Assessment - Port of Dundee Oil Rigs - Arrival/Sailing Port	Review Due Aug-23	Revised By / Date AMM, August 2021



**FORTH PORTS LIMITED**  
**Navigational Risk Assessment**

Tay - River Transit + Berthing/Sailing Small Commercial Craft (Tugs, Workboats etc.)							MRF:								
Ref.	Hazard <small>What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)</small>	Causes <small>How can it go wrong</small>	Controls <small>Preventative &amp; Reactive (What action &amp; how frequent)</small>	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)				Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)				Hazard Risk Score			
				Overall Risk				Overall Risk							
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property		Environment	Business	
1.1	Collision	Technical Failure Bridge Team Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Audits Liaison with Local Authorities & Boat Clubs	3	3	6	6	3	2	8	6	4	8	5.5	Most Likely: Collision with leisure user on river.  Worst Credible: Collision with other small vessel causing loss of both vessels.
1.2	Contact	Technical Failure Bridge Team Error Environmental Conditions Change to Shore Infrastructure / Obstruction on the Quay	FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Audits Liaison with Local Authorities & Boat Clubs	5	5	5	5	5	2	6	6	4	6	5.25	Most Likely: Light contact with the quayside while berthing.  Worst Credible: Contact with another berthed small vessel.
1.3	Grounding	Technical Failure Bridge Team Error Environmental Conditions Surveying Omission	FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Audits Liaison with Local Authorities & Boat Clubs Conservancy	3	3	3	3	3	1	3	4	2	3	3	Most Likely: Grounding of small vessel on soft silt, refloated on same tide (tidal basin).  Worst Credible: Grounding on hard rock, causing loss of containment, unable to refloat on same tide.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	Collision Contact Grounding Technical Failure Bridge Team Error	FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Audits Liaison with Local Authorities & Boat Clubs	2	6	8	4	6	1	3	4	3	4	4.75	Most Likely: sinking o small vessel outside of navigational channel, no loss of containment.  Worst Credible: Sinking of small vessel within navigational channel with loss of containment.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	Collision Contact Grounding Human Error Technical Failure Loss of Containment	FTNS Tay Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Marine Guidelines & Port Information Notice to Mariners Survey / dredging Programme / Schedule Pilot Vessel training & Certification Good Housekeeping Towage Guidelines Small Vessel SMS	3	3	3	3	3	1	4	4	2	3	3.125	Most Likely: small fire which is extinguished by crew.  Worst Credible: Major fire leading to total loss of vessel.
1.6	Loss of Containment (oil products)	Collision Grounding Human Error Contact Technical Failure Sinking / Capsizing Fire / Explosion Environmental Conditions	FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Audits Liaison with Local Authorities & Boat Clubs Bunkering Procedure	4	4	4	8	4	1	1	2	3	3	3.625	Most Likely: Small loss of non-persistent oil product.  Worst Credible: Large spill of persistent product.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
All content reviewed	Causes / controls simplified - definitions tab added for greater detail. Pilot Vessels removed as they have own SMS & Ras

<b>FORTH PORTS LIMITED</b>	<b>Document ID</b> FP PMSC RA (T) 6/04	<b>Risk Assessment Team / Date</b> DMM, HMD 09th January 2013
<b>Risk Assessment - River Tay Transit + Berthing/Sailing Small</b>	<b>Review Due</b> Aug-23	<b>Revised By / Date</b> AMM, August 2021





**FORTH PORTS LIMITED**  
**Navigational Risk Assessment**

Forth & Tay - Vessels at Anchor															
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes  How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)					Hazard Risk Score	
				Likelihood	Overall Risk				Likelihood	Overall Risk					
					People	Property	Environment	Business		People	Property	Environment	Business		
1.1	Dragging Anchor	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	Designated and Proven Anchorages FTNS Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Towage Byelaws & General Directions Pilotage Emergency Plans / OPRC	5	5	5	5	5	2	8	10	10	10	7.25	Most likely: Vessel drags anchor, then pays out more chain resulting in no further dragging. Worst credible: Vessel drags anchor resulting in vessel going aground or making contact with bridge/jetty. Vessel suffers extreme damage and possibility of loss of life.
1.2	Contact	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	Pilotage (typically only Cruise vessels @ Newhaven + South Queensferry) FTNS Towage Byelaws & General Directions Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Designated and Proven Anchorages Notice to Mariners Emergency Plans / OPRC	2	4	6	4	4	1	5	5	5	5	4.75	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with buoy resulting in minimal damage. Worst credible: Vessel has high speed impact with bridge/jetty resulting in significant damage to vessel and loss of life.
1.3	Grounding	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	Pilotage (typically only Cruise vessels @ Newhaven + South Queensferry) Passage plan – master / pilot information exchange FTNS Towage Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions & Tidal Monitoring Designated and Proven Anchorages Emergency Plans / OPRC	2	2	4	2	4	1	1	5	5	5	3.5	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with minimal damage. Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloat resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of contaminant.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	Pilotage (typically only Cruise vessels @ Newhaven + South Queensferry) FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions	3	3	3	3	3	1	5	5	5	5	4	Most likely: Vessel sinks, all crew safely abandon ship Worst credible: Vessel sinks resulting in total loss of vessel, and loss of life.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	Human Error / Failure System Failure	Pilotage (typically only Cruise vessels @ Newhaven + South Queensferry) FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting	1	2	2	1	1	1	5	5	5	5	3.25	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	Pilotage (typically only Cruise vessels @ Newhaven + South Queensferry) FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Notice to Mariners Marine Guidelines & Port Information Bunkering Procedure	3	3	3	3	3	2	4	10	10	10	5.75	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistent product that dissipates naturally. Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

MRF: 022/22 Loss of Anchor 069/21 (Dragging Anchor) 050/20 (fouled anchor), 049/20(fouled anchor), 017/18 (Dragging Anchor)

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
All Controls Dragging Anchor Contact Grounding Loss of Containment	Updated Causes to new standard Specified that pilotage is only used for Cruise vessels @ Newhaven/ S Queens. Decrease in Most Likely Property Risk Decrease in Most Likely Business Risk Most likely risks reduced Most Likely Risks reduced / Worst Credible Likelihood and risk increased

<b>FORTH PORTS LIMITED</b>	<b>Document ID</b> FP PMSC RA (F&T) 1/06	<b>Risk Assessment Team / Date</b> DMM, HMFO, HMEI, HMD, MT&PV / 11th Jan 2013
<b>Risk Assessment - Vessels at Anchor</b>	<b>Review Due</b> Jul-24	<b>Revised By / Date</b> July 2022, MMT



**FORTH PORTS LIMITED  
Navigational Risk Assessment**

Forth & Tay - Towage Operations															
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes  How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)					Hazard Risk Score	
				Likelihood	Overall Risk				Likelihood	Overall Risk					
					People	Property	Environment	Business		People	Property	Environment	Business		
1.1	Capsizing / Flooding	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	Towage Guidelines Tug SMS FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Pilotage Crew Training Pre Operations Checks/ Briefings	3	3	3	3	3	2	10	10	10	10	<b>6.5</b>	Most Likely: Tug experiences girting but is able to recover with no significant consequence/damage  Worst Credible: Tug experiences girting causing the tug to capsize with total loss of life and vessel
1.2	Fire	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	FTNS Tug SMS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Marine Guidelines & Port Information Notice to Mariners Crew Training & Certification Good Housekeeping Towage Guidelines	2	4	4	2	4	1	5	5	5	5	<b>4.25</b>	Most Likely: Vessel suffers a minor fire which is extinguished quickly and results in no significant damage  Worst Credible: Vessel suffer an extensive fire which results in loss of life and total loss of the vessel
1.3	Allision	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Marine Guidelines & Port Information Towage Guidelines Notice to Mariners Tug SMS - Crew Training/Qualifications	5	5	10	5	10	2	10	10	5	10	<b>8.125</b>	Most Likely: Vessel makes minor contact with pier/jetty/object resulting in no significant damage to either the vessel or object and no injuries  Worst Credible: Vessel makes heavy contact with an object resulting in significant damage to both the vessel and object with injuries/fatalities
1.4	Collision	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Marine Guidelines & Port Information Towage Guidelines Notice to Mariners Tug SMS - Crew Training/Qualifications	2	2	4	2	4	1	5	5	5	5	<b>4</b>	Most Likely: Tug collides with another vessel at slow speed resulting in no significant damage to either vessel and no injuries  Worst Credible: Tug collides with another vessel at high speed resulting in possible loss of the vessels and injuries/fatalities
1.5	Grounding	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions - spelling Marine Guidelines & Port Information Towage Guidelines Notice to Mariners Tug SMS - Crew Training/Qualifications	3	6	9	3	9	2	10	10	10	10	<b>8.375</b>	Most Likely: Vessel runs aground but suffers no significant damage and is able to be refloated with the tide  Worst Credible: Vessel runs aground in the entrance to a port resulting and cannot be refloated resulting in loss of the vessel, possible injuries/fatalities and loss of business

MRF: 29/2022 (Loss ofComms)23/2022 (Contact)20/2022 Contact 14/2022 (Contact) 13/2022 (Contact)07/2022 (Contact) 03/2022 (Contact)02/2022 (Tow line parted)06/2021 (Towrope fouled in prop) 037/2021 (Dangerous occurrence) 016/2021 (Uncontrolled release of bridle)070/20(contact), 022/20(collison), 005/20(contact), 002/20(contact), 001/20(Contact), 106/19 (incorrect bridle), 082/19 (potential grounding), 080/19 (parted topline), 074/18 (Grounding), 026/19 (Contact)

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
General Grounding Man Overboard / Personal injury Fire Contact Allision	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions Increase in likelihood - Grounding Removed - RA included in Towage Risk assessments Removed - Control - Latest sounding chart available Changed to Allision

<b>FORTH PORTS LIMITED</b>	<b>Document ID</b> FP PMSC RA (F&T) 2/06	<b>Risk Assessment Team / Date</b> MT&PV, MM, HMFO, DMM, HMD / 13th Feb 2013
<b>Risk Assessment - Towage Operations</b>	<b>Review Due</b> Jul-24	<b>Revised By / Date</b> July 2022, MMT



**FORTH PORTS LIMITED**  
**Navigational Risk Assessment**

Forth & Tay - Immobilised Vessels (at Anchor or Alongside)															
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes  How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)				Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)				Hazard Risk Score			
				Likelihood	Overall Risk			Likelihood	Overall Risk						
					People	Property	Environment		Business	People	Property		Environment	Business	
1.1	Allision Refer also to FP PMSC RA (F&T) 1	Human Error Technical Failure Environmental Conditions	Byelaws & General Directions Weather Forecasting & Monitoring Marine Guidelines & Port Information Standby Tug at Anchor FTNS Extra Moorings	2	4	6	4	2	2	6	8	8	8	<b>5.75</b>	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with buoy resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: Vessel has high speed impact with bridge/jetty resulting in significant damage to vessel and loss of life.
1.2	Grounding Refer also to FP PMSC RA (F&T) 1	Human Error Technical Failure Environmental Conditions	FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting & Monitoring Marine Guidelines & Port Information Notice to Mariners Standby Tug at Anchor Extra Moorings	3	3	3	3	3	1	3	5	4	5	<b>3.625</b>	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with minimal damage.  Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloats resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of containment.
1.3	Fire / Explosion Refer also to FP PMSC RA (F&T) 1	Human Error Technical Failure	Pilotage FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting	3	6	9	3	6	1	5	5	5	5	<b>5.5</b>	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.  Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel, and loss of life.

MRF 015/15 (Fire) 072/19 (Fire)

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
Full review Contact - Changed to Allision  Grounding  Fire/Explosion	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions Most Likely Business Risk reduced Worst Case Likelihood and People risk increased Most Likely Likelihood increased + All risks increased Worst Case Business risk increased Most Likely People Risk increased / Environmental risk decreased

<b>FORTH PORTS LIMITED</b>	<b>Document ID</b> FP PMSC RA (F&T) 3/06	<b>Risk Assessment Team / Date</b> MM, DMM / 26th Feb 2013
<b>Risk Assessment - Immobilised Vessels</b>	<b>Review Due</b> Jul-24	<b>Revised By / Date</b> July 2022, MMT



**FORTH PORTS LIMITED**  
**Navigational Risk Assessment**

Forth & Tay - Bunkering Operations In Dock														
Ref.	Hazard <small>What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)</small>	Causes <small>How can it go wrong</small>	Controls <small>Preventative &amp; Reactive (What action &amp; how frequent)</small>	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)				Hazard Risk Score	
				Likelihood	Overall Risk				Likelihood	Overall Risk				
					People	Property	Environment	Business		People	Property	Environment		Business
1.1	Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel	Human Error Technical Failure Environmental Conditions	Pilotage Passage plan / berthing plan – master / pilot information exchange FTNS - Scheduling,VTS Bylaws & General Directions Notice To Mariners Weather Parameters Emergency Plans / OPRC Tugs Fenders Mooring/Unmooring Procedures Terminal Procedures Lock Gates Bunkering Procedures	2	6	6	2	2	1	5	5	5	5	4.5
1.2	Contact	Human Error Technical Failure Environmental Conditions	Pilotage Passage plan / berthing plan – master / pilot information exchange FTNS - Scheduling,VTS Bylaws & General Directions Notice To MarinerS Weather Parameters Emergency Plans / OPRC Tugs Fenders Mooring Procedures	3	3	6	3	3	2	8	10	8	8	6.125
1.3	Loss of Conainment (Oil Products)	Human Error Technical Failure Enviromental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS - Scheduling, VTS Forth Bylaws & General Directions N To M Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Weather Parameters Fenders either side of manifold Mooring Procedures Bunkering Procedure Vetting (Bunker Vessel) Bunkering Procedures Lock Gates Port Traffic Managment	3	3	3	3	3	1	1	4	4	5	3.25
1.4	Fire/Explosion	Human Error Technical Failure	Pilotage FTNS - Scheduling, VTS Bylaws & General Directions Notices To Mariners Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Weather Parameters Bunkering Procedure. Mooring Procedures Vetting (Bunker Vessel)	1	2	2	2	1	1	5	5	5	5	3.375

POLREP (Leith) 07/18 - 97/19 (Gmth bunker without permission)

Most likely: Slow speed collision between both vessels resulting in minimal damage and no loss of containment

Worst credible: Heavy collision between both vessels resulting in extreme damage, loss of life and loss of containment

Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with buoy resulting in minimal damage.

Worst credible: Vessel has high speed impact with quayside resulting in significant damage to vessel and loss of life.

Most likely: Small spill of non-persistent product that dissipates naturally.

Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.

Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel, and loss of life.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
General Collision Contact - Changed to Allision  Loss of containment  Fire/Explosion	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions Worst Case - Env risk increased Most Likelihood increased Worst Case People Risk increased Most Likely Environ / Business increased Worst Case People/ property risk decreased + Business risk decreased Most likely All risks decreased

<b>FORTH PORTS LIMITED</b>	<b>Document ID</b> FP PMSC RA (F&T) 4/06	<b>Risk Assessment Team / Date</b> HMFO, HMFI, MM, HMD, DMM 20th Feb 2013
<b>Risk Assessment - Bunkering Operations In Dock</b>	<b>Revised Due</b> Jul-24	<b>Revised By / Date</b> July 2022, MMT



**FORTH PORTS LIMITED**  
**Navigation Risk Assessment**

MRF: 05/2022 (Mooring Line Parting) 04/2022 (Mechanical fail

Forth & Tay - Bunkering Operations Tidal Waters															
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)					Hazard Risk Score	
				Likelihood	Overall Risk				Likelihood	Overall Risk					
					People	Property	Environment	Business		People	Property	Environment	Business		
1.1	Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel	Human Error Technical Failure Environmental Conditions	Pilotage Passage plan / berthing plan – master / pilot information exchange FTNS - Scheduling,VTS Bylaws & General Directions Notice To Mariners Weather Parameters Emergency Plans / OPRC Tugs Fenders Mooring/Unmooring Procedures Bunkering Procedure	3	6	6	3	3	1	4	5	5	5	4.625	Most likely: Slow speed collision between both vessels resulting in minimal damage and no loss of containment  Worst credible: Heavy collision between both vessels resulting in extreme damage, loss of life and loss of containment
1.2	Contact	Human Error Technical Failure Environmental Conditions	Pilotage Passage plan / berthing plan – master / pilot information exchange FTNS - Scheduling,VTS Bylaws & General Directions Notice To Mariners Weather Parameters Emergency Plans / OPRC Tugs Fenders Mooring Procedures Bunkering Procedure	2	4	2	2	2	1	5	5	5	5	3.75	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with buoy resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: Vessel has high speed impact with quayside resulting in significant damage to vessel and loss of life.
1.3	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	Human Error Technical Failure	Pilotage FTNS - Scheduling, VTS Bylaws & General Directions N To M Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Weather Parameters Fenders either side of manifold Mooring Procedures Bunkering Procedure Vetting (Bunker Vessel) Oil Pollution response standby vessel	3	3	3	3	6	1	1	4	5	5	3.75	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistent product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.
1.4	Fire/Explosion	Human Error Technical Failure	Pilotage FTNS - Scheduling, VTS Bylaws & General Directions Notices To Mariners Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Weather Parameters Tugs Bunkering Procedure. Mooring Procedures Vetting (Bunker Vessel) Bunkering Procedure	1	2	2	2	1	1	5	5	5	5	3.375	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.  Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel, and loss of life.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
General Collision Contact - Changed to Allision  Loss of Containment  Fire / Explosion	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions Most Likely All Risks decreased Most Likely - Likelihood decreased and people / property decreased Worst Case - People/ Env / Business risk increased Most Likely - All risks increased Worst Case - People / Env / Business Risks increased Property risk decreased Most Likely All Riskd increased

<b>FORTH PORTS LIMITED</b>	<b>Document ID</b> FP PMSC RA (F&T) 5/06	<b>Risk Assessment Team / Date</b> HMFO, HMF1, MM, HMD, DMM 20th Feb 2013
<b>Risk Assessment - Bunkering Operations Tidal Waters</b>	<b>Review Due</b> Jul-24	<b>Revised By / Date</b> July 2022 MMT



**FORTH PORTS LIMITED**  
**Navigational Risk Assessment**

Forth & Tay - NAABSA Berths														
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes  How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)					Hazard Risk Score
				Likelihood	Overall Risk				Likelihood	Overall Risk				
					People	Property	Environment	Business		People	Property	Environment	Business	
1.2	Capsize/Flooding	Human Error Technical Failure Environmental Conditions	FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions NAABSA Berth Procedure NAABSA Berth Inspections Survey Programme	2	2	2	4	2	1	5	5	5	5	<b>3.75</b>
1.3	Fire	Human Error Technical Failure Environmental Conditions	NAABSA Berth Procedures Emergency Procedures Welcome Pack	3	6	9	3	6	1	5	5	5	5	<b>5.5</b>
1.4	Hull Damage	Human Error Environmental Conditions	NAABSA Berth Procedures Emergency Procedures Welcome Pack NAABSA Inspections Survey Programme Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions & Monitoring Byelaws & General Directions	1	1	2	1	3	1	5	5	5	5	<b>3.375</b>

No relevant MRF's since previous review

Most likely: Vessel takes on water which is contained resulting in no long term damage to the vessel and no injury  
Worst credible: Vessel capsizes resulting in total loss of vessel and multiple fatalities

Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.  
Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel, and loss of life.

Most likely: Vessel suffers minor hull damage which can be easily repaired and no injuries occur.  
Worst credible: Vessel suffers extensive hull damage resulting in flooding and loss of life

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
General Lack of Containment Contact Capsize / Flooding Fire  Hull Damaged	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions Removed Removed Most Likely - Likelihood and Risks reduced Most Likely - Likelihood increased and Property risk reduced Worst Case - Likelihood decreased, Environment Risk increased Most Likely - Likelihood decreased, Property and env risk decreased Worst Case - Likelihood decreased, all risks increased

<b>FORTH PORTS LIMITED</b>	<b>Document ID</b> FP PMSC RA (F&T) 06/06	<b>Risk Assessment Team / Date</b> DMM, HMFO, HMF1, HMD, MT&PV / 11th Jan 2013
<b>Risk Assessment - NAABSA Berths</b>	<b>Review Due</b> Jul-24	<b>Revised By / Date</b> July 2022, MMT



**FORTH PORTS LIMITED**  
**Navigational Risk Assessment**

Forth & Tay - Diving Operations														
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes  How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)					Hazard Risk Score
				Likelihood	Overall Risk				Likelihood	Overall Risk				
					People	Property	Environment	Business		People	Property	Environment	Business	
1.1	Swamping / turbulence / interaction	Human Error Environmental Conditions	Forth Ports Dive Procedure (Permit) Dive Signals displayed Established Communications FTNS Exclusion Zones Speed Restrictions Notice to Mariners Dive Supervisor Local Monitoring	3	9	6	3	6	2	10	4	2	10	6.25
1.2	Contact / Collision	Human Error Environmental Conditions	Forth Ports Dive Procedure (Permit) Established Communications FTNS Exclusion Zones Notice to Mariners	1	3	2	1	2	1	5	5	3	5	3.25

No relevant MRFs since previous review

Most Likely: Passing vessel comes too close or passes at speed which will alarm divers and possibly result in minor injury.

Worst Credible: Passing vessel comes too close or passes at speed which results in fatality to diver.

Most Likely: Vessel makes contact with diver / dive boat resulting in minor injuries.

Worst Credible: Vessel makes contact with diver / dive boat resulting in fatalities and loss of dive boat.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
General Swamping	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions Most Likely - People, Property and Business Risks increased
Contact	Worst Credible Likelihood and business risk increased, Property and Environment Risk increased Most Likely - Business Risk increased

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F&T) 7/04	Risk Assessment Team / Date HMFI/HMFO/HMD/MM/CHM 03rd Sep 14
Risk Assessment - Diving Operations	Review Due Jul-24	Revised By / Date July 2022 - MMT



**FORTH PORTS LIMITED**  
**Navigational Risk Assessment**

**Forth & Tay - Recreational Events (e.g. swim events)**

MRF 068/2018 - Swim Event

Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)					Hazard Risk Score	
				Likelihood	Overall Risk				Likelihood	Overall Risk					
					People	Property	Environment	Business		People	Property	Environment	Business		
1.1	Collision / contact	Human Error Environmental Conditions	Event Notification Form Notice to Mariners Exclusion Zones (as considered appropriate) FTNS Planning Meetings (Where appropriate) Appropriate Safety Craft Established Communications Localised monitoring by Event Organisers	2	6	2	2	6	1	5	2	3	5	<b>3.875</b>	<p>Most Likely: Contact between participant and other water user resulting in alarm or minor injury.</p> <p>Worst Credible: Contact between participant and other water user resulting in fatality.</p>
1.2	Swamping / interaction / turbulence	Human Error Environmental Conditions	Event Notification Form Notice to Mariners Exclusion Zones (as considered appropriate) FTNS Planning Meetings (Where appropriate) Appropriate Safety Craft Established Communications Localised monitoring by Event Organisers	2	6	2	2	2	1	5	5	3	5	<b>3.75</b>	<p>Most Likely: Passing vessel comes too close or passes at speed causing alarm and possibly result in minor injury.</p> <p>Worst Credible: Passing vessel comes too close or passes at speed which results in fatality.</p>

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
General Collision	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions Most Likely - Property Risk increased Worst Credible - Property and Environment Risk decreased / Business risk increased
Swamping	Most Likely - People Risk increased Worst Credible - Property, Environment and business risk increased

<b>FORTH PORTS LIMITED</b>	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F&T) 8/04	Risk Assessment Team / Date HMF/HMFO/HMD/MM/CHM 03rd Sep 14
Risk Assessment - Recreational Events	Review Due Jul-24	Revised By / Date July 2022 MMT





**FORTH PORTS LIMITED**  
**Navigational Risk Assessment**

Forth & Tay - Underwater Cables & Pipelines														
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes  How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)					Hazard Risk Score
				Likelihood	Overall Risk				Likelihood	Overall Risk				
					People	Property	Environment	Business		People	Property	Environment	Business	
1.1	Contact	Human Error Technical Failure Environmental Conditions	FTNS Emergency Procedures (Pipeline Damage Procedure) Pilotage Marine Guidelines & Port Information Byelaws & General Directions Exclusion Zone Survey Programme and Schedule Weather Forecast / Tidal Information & Monitoring Aids to Navigation	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	5	5	5	<b>3.125</b>
1.2	Fire / Explosion	Human Error Technical Failure Environmental Conditions	FTNS Emergency Procedures (Pipeline Damage Procedure) Pilotage Marine Guidelines & Port Information Byelaws & General Directions Exclusion Zone Survey Programme and Schedule Weather Forecast / Tidal Information & Monitoring Aids to Navigation	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	5	5	5	<b>2.75</b>
1.3	Loss of Containment / Power / Communication	Human Error Technical Failure Environmental Conditions	FTNS Emergency Procedures (Pipeline Damage Procedure) Pilotage Marine Guidelines & Port Information Byelaws & General Directions Exclusion Zone Survey Programme and Schedule Weather Forecast / Tidal Information & Monitoring Aids to Navigation	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	5	5	5	<b>3.125</b>

No relevant MRFs since previous review

Most Likely: Minor contact is made with a pipeline/cable resulting in no significant damage

Worst Credible: Pipeline/Cable receives heavy contact resulting in substantial damage causing widespread pollution or major loss of supply from cables

Most Likely: Small fire at production end resulting in minimal impact to pipeline

Worst Credible: Major fire/explosion at production end resulting in severe damage to a pipeline and extensive widespread pollution

Most Likely: Minor loss of containment/supply which is rectified quickly and results in no widespread pollution/effects

Worst Credible: Major loss of containment resulting in extensive and widespread pollution/loss of power, data

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
General Pipeline Damage Contact - changed to Allision  Fire / Explosion  Loss of Containment	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions Removed as similar to other hazards Most Likely - Property and Business risk increased Worst Credible - People risk decreased / Environment risk increased Most Likely - All risks reduced Worst Credible People Risk Reduced Most Likely All risks reduced Worst Credible People risk reduced / Environment risk increased

<b>FORTH PORTS LIMITED</b>	<b>Document ID</b> FP PMSC RA (F&T) 9/03	<b>Risk Assessment Team / Date</b> CHM/MM 18th Feb 2015
<b>Risk Assessment - Underwater Cables &amp; Pipelines</b>	<b>Review Due</b> Jul-24	<b>Revised By / Date</b> July 2022, MMT

**FORTH PORTS LIMITED  
Navigational Risk Assessment**

Marine Pollution (Tidal Waters)														
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)				Hazard Risk Score	
				Overall Risk					Overall Risk					
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environment		Business
1.1	Loss of Containment (oil product)	Human Error Technical Failure	FTNS Bunkering Procedure Byelaws & General Directions Pilotage Survey Programme / Schedule Marine Guidelines & Port Information Emergency Plans - OPRC Towage Guidelines Oil Terminal Guidelines Weather / tidal Forecasting & Monitoring Oil Spill Prediction Software Notice to Mariners	5	5	5	5	5	1	3	5	5	5	4.75

POLREP: 05/2022 (Leaking Gangway Seal) 08/2021 (Cruise Tender) 07/2021 (Oil sheen)  
05/21 (Oil Sheen) 02/2021 (Cruise tender) Limekilns (19/2/19), N. Queensferry (12/8/19),  
Bridges (09/3/20), Pittenweem(15.11.20).

Most Likely: Minor pollution consisting of a light product which has no adverse effects on the marine environment and dissipates naturally  
Worst Credible: Major widespread pollution consisting of a heavy product which results in extensive adverse effects to the marine environment/wildlife requiring significant resources to tackle

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
General Loss of Containment	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions Most Likely Environment Risk Decreased

<b>FORTH PORTS LIMITED</b>	<b>Document ID</b> FP PMSC RA (F&T) 10/03	<b>Risk Assessment Team / Date</b> CHM, MM, DMM, HMD / 12th August 2015
<b>Risk Assessment - Marine Pollution (Tidal Waters)</b>	<b>Review Due</b> Jul-24	<b>Revised By / Date</b> July 2022 MMT

**FORTH PORTS LIMITED  
Navigational Risk Assessment**

Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes  How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)					Hazard Risk Score
				Overall Risk					Overall Risk					
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	
1.1	Loss of Containment (oil product)	Human Error Technical Failure	FTNS Bunkering Procedure Byelaws & General Directions Pilotage Survey Programme / Schedule Marine Guidelines & Port Information Emergency Plans - OPRC Towage Guidelines Oil Terminal Guidelines Notice to Mariners Lock Gates	5	5	5	5	5	1	5	5	5	5	5

01/2021 (Oil Sheen) 03/2021 (Oil Sheen) 04/2021 (Black Soot)06/2021 (Oil sheen) Leith (19/2/19) (1/9/19), (07.04.20), (21.10.20) (27.1.21) Gmth - (17.6.20), (21.7.20), (9.12.20), (15.1.21)(18.3.21) Burntisland - (27.1.21)

Most Likely: Small scale pollution consisting of a light product which is contained within a dock and dissipates naturally

Worst Credible: Major pollution consisting of a heavy product which cannot be contained with the dock and results in extensive damage to the marine environment requiring extensive resources to tackle

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
General	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions

<b>FORTH PORTS LIMITED</b>	<b>Document ID</b> FP PMSC RA (F) 11/03	<b>Risk Assessment Team / Date</b> CHM, MM, DMM, HMD / 12th August 2015
<b>Risk Assessment - Marine Pollution (Enclosed Docks)</b>	<b>Review Due</b> Jul-24	<b>Revised By / Date</b> July 2022- MMT