### PMSC RISK ASSESSMENT - RISK RANKING

PINISC RISK ASSESSIVIENT - RISK KANKING								
Rank	HazardID	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Hazard Scoring					
1	FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	8.5					
1	FP PMSC RA (F) 16 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	8.5					
3	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 02 - 1.5 Grounding	Grounding	8.375					
3	FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	8.375					
5	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 02 - 1.3 Contact	Contact	8.125					
5	FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.2 Contact	Contact Fire / Explosion	8.125					
7	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	7.625					
9	FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	7.625 7.375					
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.2 Contact  FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.1 Dragging Anchor	Dragging Anchor	7.375					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	7.25					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 16 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	7.25					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	7.25					
14	FP PMSC RA (T) 02 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	7					
15	FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	6.875					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	6.875					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	6.875					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	6.875					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	6.875					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	6.875					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product) FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)  Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	6.75					
	FP PMSC RA (T) 02 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	6.625					
23	FP PMSC RA (1) 02 - 1.5 File / Explosion  FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	6.625					
	FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	6.5					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	6.5					
25	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 02 - 1.1 Capsizing / Flooding	Capsizing / Flooding	6.5					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	6.5					
29	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.7 Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	6.375					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	6.25					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	6.25					
30	FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.3 Grounding  EP PMSC RA (F8 T) 07 - 1.1 Supposing / turbulance / interaction	Grounding	6.25					
30	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 07 - 1.1 - Swamping / turbulence / interaction	Swamping / interaction / turbulence Grounding	6.25					
30	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	6.25 6.25					
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 04 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	6.125					
	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	6					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	5.875					
39	FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	5.75					
39	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	5.75					
39	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 03 - 1.1 Contact Refer Also to FP PMSC RA (F&T) 1	Contact	5.75					
39	FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	5.75					
43	FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	5.625					
43	FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	5.625					
43	FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	5.625					
46	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 06 - 1.3 Fire FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.2 Contact	Dundee - Feb 2018 Contact	5.5 5.5					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	5.5					
46	FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	5.5					
46	FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	5.5					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	5.5					
46	FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	5.5					
53	FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	5.25					
53	FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	5.25					
53	FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.3 Grounding Refer Also to: FP PMSSC RA (F&T)7	Grounding	5.25					
	FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	5.25					
53	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.1 Collision  ER PMSC RA (E) 04 - 1.2 Crounding	Collision Grounding	5.25					
59	FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	5.25 5.125					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	5.125					
	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	5					
60	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	5					
60	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	5					
60	FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	5					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 16 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	5					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	5					
67	FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	4.875					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.2 Contact	Contact Sinking / Consider	4.875					
69	FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F&T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	Sinking / Capsize Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	4.75					
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	4.75 4.75					
69	FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	4.75					
	FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 SINKING / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	4.75					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	4.75					
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 05 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel	vessel	4.625					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	4.625					
77	FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	4.5					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	4.5					
77	FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	4.5					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	4.5					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	4.5					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize	4.5					
	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	4.5					
77								

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	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 04 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel	vessel	4.5
77	FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	4.5
87	FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	4.375
87	FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	4.375
87	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	4.375
87	FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	4.375
	FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.7 Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	4.375
	FP PMSC RA (T) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	4.375
	FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	4.375
	FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	4.375
	FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	
		Contact	4.375
	FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.2 Contact		4.25
	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	4.25
96	TT TIMOG TOTAL TILL THO	Fire	4.25
	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	4.125
	FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	4.125
99	FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	4.125
102	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	4
102	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 02 - 1.4 Collision	Collision	4
102		Contact	4
102	FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product) Refer also to FP PMSC RA (F&T)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	4
	FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	3.875
106		Sinking / Capsize	3.875
106	FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	
106		Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.875
106	FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	,	3.875
	The most in the constraint of the product	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.875
106	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.875
106	Third that (1) of the 2000 of Containing (On Troducto)	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	3.875
106	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	3.875
106	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 08 - 1.1 - Collision / contact	Collision / Contact	3.875
106	FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3.875
116	FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.1 Collision	Collsion	3.75
116	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 05 - 1.3 Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.75
116	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 06 - 1.2 Capsize / Flooding	Capsizing / Flooding	3.75
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 05 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	3.75
	FP PMSC RA (T) 02 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	
			3.75
	FP PMSC RA (T) 02 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.75
	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	3.75
116		Swamping / interaction / turbulence	3.75
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 03 - 1.2 Grounding Refer Also to FP PMSC RA (F&T) 1	Grounding	3.625
	FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	3.625
124	FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.625
124	FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	3.625
128	FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.5
128	FP PMSC RA (F) 16 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.5
128	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	3.5
	FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	3.5
	FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	
			3.5
	FP PMSC RA (T) 02 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding Grounding	3.5
	FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.3 Grounding	ü	3.375
	FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	3.375
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 06 - 1.4 Hull Damage	Hull Damage	3.375
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 05 - 1.4 Fire/Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3.375
134	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 04 - 1.4 Fire/Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3.375
	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.7 Allision	Allision	3.375
140	FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3.25
140		Fire	3.25
140	FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.3 Grounding Refer Also to: FP PMSSC RA (F&T)7	Grounding	3.25
140	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	3.25
140	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.7 Loss of Dock Level	Loss of Dock Level	3.25
140		Grounding	
140	TT T MOO TO TO Grounding	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.25
140	FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	` '	3.25
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3.25
140	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 04 - 1.3 Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.25
140	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 07 - 1.2 - Collision / contact	Collision / Contact	3.25
150	The Mode is the first the Edde of Contaminating (on product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.125
150	FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3.125
150	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 09 - 1.4 Loss of Containment / Power / Communication	Loss of Containment / Power / Communication	3.125
150	FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3.125
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 09 - 1.1 Contact	Contact	3.125
150	FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3.125
150	FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3.125
	FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3.125
			3.125
150	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	
150 150	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.125
150 150 160	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product) FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	
150 150 160 160	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Original Date			
	FP PMSC (R) 1/03	Jul-13			
Risk Ranking	Review Due	Revised Bv /			
	Ongoing	MM / August			

### PMSC RISK ASSESSMENT - RISK RANKING

			Risk s	Most Likely Risk scored at Residual level			Risi	Score	reumie I at Res	idual	
Rank	HazardID	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	People	Property	Environment	Business	People	Property	Environment	Business	Hazard Scoring
1	FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	10	10	Б 5	5	10	10	В 8	10	8.5
1	FP PMSC RA (F) 16 - 1.1 Collision  FP PMSC RA (F&T) 02 - 1.5 Grounding	Collision	10	10	5	5	10	10 10	10	10	8.50 8.375
3	FP PMSC RA (F&I) 02 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.1 Collision	Grounding Collision	6	9	6	6	10	10	10	10	8.375 8.375
5	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 02 - 1.3 Contact	Contact	5	10	5	10	10	10	5	10	8.125
5	FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	5	10	5	5	10	10	10	10	8.125
7	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion Fire / Explosion	3	9	6	3	10	10 10	10	10	7.625 7.625
9	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	5	10	5	5	6	10	8	10	7.625
10	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.1 Dragging Anchor	Dragging Anchor	5	5	5	5	8	10	10	10	7.25
10		Contact	5	5	5	5	10	10	8	10	7.25
10	FP PMSC RA (F) 16 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.1 Collision	Contact Collision	5	5	5	5	10	10 10	8	10 10	7.25 7.25
14	FP PMSC RA (T) 02 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	8	8	4	8	6	6	8	8	7.23
15	FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	3	6	3	3	10	10	10	10	6.875
15 15	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	3	6	6	6	10	10	6	8	6.875
15	FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Sinking / Capsize Fire / Explosion	3	9	6	3	10	6	8	10	6.875 6.875
15	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3	9	6	3	10	6	8	10	6.875
15	FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	3	9	6	3	10	6	8	10	6.875
21	FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	3	6	6	6	10	10	10	6.75
21	FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product) FP PMSC RA (T) 02 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	3	6	6	6	10	10	10	6.75
23	FP PMSC RA (1) 02 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.2 Contact	Fire / Explosion Contact	5	10	5	5	6	8	6	8	6.625 6.625
25	FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	8	8	8	8	5	5	5	5	6.5
25	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 02 - 1.1 Capsizing / Flooding	Capsizing / Flooding	3	3	3	3	10	10	10	10	6.5
25 25	FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion Collision	10	10	5	10	5	5	3	4	6.5
25	FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.1 Collision FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.7 Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	4	4	2	10	10	10	10	10	6.5 6.375
30	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.7 Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)  FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	3	3	3	3	8	10	10	10	6.25
30	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 07 - 1.1 - Swamping / turbulence / interaction	Swamping / interaction / turbulence	9	6	3	6	10	4	2	10	6.25
30	FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	3	6	6	3	6	8	8	10	6.25
30 30	FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding Grounding	3	6	6	3	6	8	8	10	6.25
30	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	10	10	3	5	5	10	10	10	6.25
36	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 04 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	3	6	3	3	8	10	8	8	6.125
37	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	8	8	6	6	5	5	5	5	6
38	FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3	9	6	9	5	5	5	5	5.875
39 39	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)  FP PMSC RA (F&T) 03 - 1.2 Grounding Refer Also to FP PMSC RA (F&T) 1	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	3	3	3	4	10	10	10	5.75 5.75
39	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 05 - 1.2 Globinding Relei Also to FP PMSC RA (F&T) 1	Grounding Sinking / Capsize	8	8	4	8	5	5	3	5	5.75
39	FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	3	3	3	3	10	8	8	8	5.75
43	FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	3	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5.625
43	FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.2 Contact	Contact Contact	5	10	5	5	5	5	5	5	5.625
46	TT T MOOTO TO THE COMMON	Fire	5	10	5 3	5	5	5	5	5	5.625 5.5
46	FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	5.5
46		Grounding	5	10	5	10	3	4	3	4	5.5
46	FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	3	6	6	3	8	6	4	8	5.5
46 46	FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product) FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Sinking / Capsize	3	3	6	6	4	6	8	8	5.5 5.5
46	FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.4 Sillking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	3	6	6	10	6	8	8	5.5
53	FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	4	6	4	4	6	6	6	6	5.25
53	FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	4	2	2	2	10	10	10	6.5	5.25
53 53	FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.3 Grounding Refer Also to: FP PMSSC RA (F&T)7	Grounding	4	2	2	2	8	8	8	5	5.25
53	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.1 Collision FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.2 Contact	Collision Contact	4	8	4	6	5	5	5	5	5.25
	FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	2	4	4	2	6	8	8	8	5.25
59	FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3	9	6	3	5	5	5	5	5.125
60	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 11 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
60 60	11 1 MOO 10 (1) 00 1.2 Contact	Contact Sinking / Capsize	4	4	4	2	10	10	8	6.5	5
60		Fire / Explosion	6	6	3	6	5	5	4	5	5
60	FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	5	5	5	5	4	6	4	6	5
60		Grounding	5	5	5	5	4	6	4	6	5.00
60 67		Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Contact	2	2	4	4	6	6	8	8	5 4.875
	FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.2 Contact  FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	5	10	5	5	4	4	3	3	4.875
69	FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	3	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4.75
69		Contact	4	6	4	4	5	5	5	5	4.75
69		Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	5	5	5	5	3	5	5	5	4.75
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product)				- 3	6	3	- 5	- 4	- 5	4.75 4.75
69 69	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.2 Contact	Contact Sinking / Capsize		9		c			- 2		
69	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.2 Contact	Contact Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize	6	8	4	6 5	3 5	4 5	3 5	4 5	4.75
69 69 69 75	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F&T) 05 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel	6	8 5 6	4 5 3	6 5 3	3 5 4	5 5	3 5 5	5 5	
69 69 69 75	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (FXT) 05 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize	6 3 6 4	8 5 6 4	4 5 3 5	5 3 4	3 5 4 5	5 5 5	3 5 5	5 5 5	4.75 4.625 4.625
69 69 69 75 75	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.2 Contact  FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F8T) 05 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel  FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.3 Grounding	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Grounding	6 3 6 4	8 5 6 4	4 5 3 5	6 5 3 4 6	3 5 4 5	5 5 5 5	3 5 5 5 5	5 5 5	4.75 4.625
69 69 69 75	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.3 Grounding	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Grounding Grounding	6 3 6 4 2 6	8 5 6 4 6 6	4 5 3 5 2 2	6 5 3 4 6 2	3 5 4 5 5 5	4 5 5 5 5 5	3 5 5 5 5	5 5 5 5	4.75 4.625 4.625 4.5
69 69 75 75 77	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.3 Grounding	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Grounding	6 3 6 4 2 6 6	8 5 6 4 6 6 6	4 5 3 5 2 2 2 2	6 5 3 4 6 2 2	3 5 4 5 5 5 5	4 5 5 5 5 5 5	3 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 5 5 5 5	4.75 4.625 4.625
69 69 75 75 77 77 77 77	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.2 Contact.  FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F, 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F, 10 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F, 13 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F, 10 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F, 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Grounding Grounding Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	6 3 6 4 2 6 6 4 2	8 5 6 4 6 6 6 6	4 5 3 5 2 2 2 4 6	6 5 3 4 6 2 2 2 4	3 5 4 5 5 5 5 5	4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 5 5 5 5 4	4.75 4.625 4.625 4.5 4.5
69 69 75 75 77 77 77 77 77	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product) FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Grounding Grounding Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Sinking / Capsize	6 3 6 4 2 6 6 6 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	8 5 6 4 6 6 6 5	4 5 3 5 2 2 2 2 4 6	6 5 3 4 6 2 2 2 4 6 6	3 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4	3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3	5 5 5 5 5 4 4	4.75 4.625 4.625 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
69 69 69 75 75 77 77 77 77 77	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product) FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Grounding Grounding Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Sinking / Capsize Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	6 3 6 4 2 6 6 6 4 2 2 4 2 2 4 2 2 4 2 2 4 2 2 4 2 4	8 5 6 4 6 6 5 4 6	4 5 3 5 2 2 2 4 6 4	6 5 3 4 6 2 2 2 4 6 6 6 6 4 4 4 6 6 4 4 4 4 4	3 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 5	4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4	3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 5 5 5 5 4 5	4.75 4.625 4.625 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
69 69 75 75 77 77 77 77 77	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.2 Contact  FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.3 Grounding  FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)  FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)  FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)  FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Grounding Grounding Grounding Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Sinking / Capsize Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) Sinking / Capsize	6 3 6 4 2 6 6 4 2 2 4 4 2 2 3	9 8 5 6 4 6 6 5 4 6 6	4 5 3 5 2 2 2 4 6 4 4 4	6 5 3 4 6 6 2 2 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	3 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5	3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5	4.75 4.625 4.625 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
69 69 69 75 75 77 77 77 77 77 77	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.2 Contact  FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.3 Grounding  FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.3 Grounding  FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.2 Contact	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Grounding Grounding Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Sinking / Capsize Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	6 3 6 4 2 6 6 6 4 2 2 4 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 3	8 5 6 4 6 6 6 5 4 6 6 6 6	4 5 3 5 2 2 2 4 6 4 4 4 4 3	65 33 44 66 22 24 46 66 44 33 64	3 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5	5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5	4.75 4.625 4.625 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
69 69 69 75 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.2 Contact  FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.3 Grounding  FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)  FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize  FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)  FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)  FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.2 Contact  FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.2 Contact  FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.1 Collision  FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.2 Contact	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Grounding Grounding Grounding Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Sinking / Capsize Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) Sinking / Capsize Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) Sinking / Capsize Contact Collision Contact	6 3 6 4 2 6 6 6 4 2 2 4 4 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3	9 8 6 4 6 6 6 5 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 9	4 5 3 5 2 2 4 6 4 4 4 3 4 3	65 33 44 66 22 44 66 66 44 33 64 33	3 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5	4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 5	4.75 4.625 4.625 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.
69 69 69 75 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.2 Contact  FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F8T) 04 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F8T) 04 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 105 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.2 Contact	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Grounding Grounding Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Sinking / Capsize Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) Sinking / Capsize Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) Sinking / Capsize Contact Contact Contact	66 33 66 44 22 66 64 44 22 33 33 44 33	9 8 8 5 6 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	4 5 3 5 2 2 2 4 6 6 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3	6 5 3 4 6 2 2 4 6 6 4 3 6 4 3 3 3	3 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 5	4.75 4.625 4.625 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.
69 69 69 75 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.1 Collision FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.1 Collision FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.1 Collision	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Grounding Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Sinking / Capsize Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) Sinking / Capsize Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) Contact Contact Contact Contact Collision	66 33 66 44 22 66 66 44 22 22 33 33 33 33 33	9 8 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	4 5 3 5 2 2 2 4 6 6 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 3	66 55 33 44 66 22 22 44 66 44 33 66 44 33 33 33	3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	4.75 4.625 4.625 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.
69 69 69 75 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77	FP PMSC RA (T) 04 - 1.2 Contact  FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F8T) 04 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F8T) 04 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 105 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.2 Contact	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Grounding Grounding Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Sinking / Capsize Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) Sinking / Capsize Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) Sinking / Capsize Contact Contact Contact	66 33 66 44 22 66 66 44 22 23 33 33 33 33 33	9 8 8 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	44 55 33 55 22 22 44 66 44 44 43 33 33 33 33 33	66 55 33 44 66 22 22 44 66 66 44 33 66 44 33 33 33 33	3 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	4.75 4.625 4.625 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.

Fig.				_								
## PPMSC RAPT 11-1 - 1 Powers ## PPMSC RAPT 12-1 Common ## PPMSC RAPT 12-1 Laborate ## PPMSC RAPT 13-1 Lab	87	FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	5	5	10	5	2	2	3	3	4.375
4				4	4	3	4	5	5	5	5	4.375
March   Marc				1	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	4.375
March   Marc				3	6	3	3	5	4	5	5	4.25
PP PRINCE ART 11 - 1.1 confidence				3	6	3	3	- 5	4	5	5	4.25
29   De PRINCE MAT 100   1.4 Statistic Classics   See PRINCE CAR AT 31   1.1 A Statistic Class				4	6	4	4	4	4	2	Δ	4.25 4.125
69 PP PMSC RAFT 10 1-14 Street Contentment (or product)				4	4	3	4	4	4	5	5	4.125
Solver   Company   Compa	99			3	3	6	6	2	3	5	5	4.125
Section	102	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	3	3	3	3	5	5	5	5	4
202	102			2	4	2	4	5	5	5	5	4
Section   Part   Comment	102	FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	2	6	4	2	5	5	4	4	4
Section   Part				3	3	6	3	2	5	5	5	4
100   PRISC RA (FAT) III - 1.1. Collision (contact)			Sinking / Capsize	3	4	3	3	5	5	3	5	3.875
PRINCE RATE   0.1 - 1.5 Fee   Feetiment				3	4	3	3	5	5	3	5	3.88
1985 F PASC RATIO 2-1 E Lose of Contament (of Induct)   1.00				6	2	2	6	5	2	3	5	3.875
PMSC Ref. (19.1 - 16. Loss of Containment (OF Product)				3	4	3	3	5	5	3	5	3.875
Description				3	3	6	6	2	3	4	4	
1990   PMSC RATT 104-11 & Loss of Containment (OI Products)   Loss of Containment (OI Products)   1		FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)		3	3	- 6	6	2	3	4	4	
PARSE BAT 10 6-1 1-1 Collection			` '	3	3	6	6	2	3	4	4	
1995   PMSC RA (F) (12 - 1.5 File / Explosion				2	4	4	4	3	4	3	- 5	3.8/5
11	106			3	3	2	2	5	5	5	5	3.875
111   P.P.MSC RA (FST) 05 - 1.2 Contest	116			2	4	2	2	5	5	5	5	3.75
131 P P PISSC RATES 10 - 1.2 Coloration   132 P PISSC RATES 10 - 1.2 Coloration   133 P PISSC RATES 10 - 1.2 Coloration   134 P PISSC RATES 10 - 1.2 Coloration   135 P PISSC RATES 10 - 1.2 Coloration   135 P PISSC RATES 10 - 1.2 Coloration   136 P PISSC RATES 10 - 1.2 Coloration   137 P PISSC RATES 10 - 1.2 Coloration   138 P PISSC RATES 10 - 1.2 Coloration   139 PISSC RATES 10 - 1.2 Coloration   130 PISSC RATES 10 - 1.2 Coloration   130 PISSC RATES 10 - 1.2 Coloration   131 PISSC RATES 10 - 1.2 Coloration   132 PISSC RATES 10 - 1.2 Coloration   132 PISSC RATES 10 - 1.2 Coloration   133 PISSC RATES 10 - 1.2 Coloration   134 PISSC RATES 10 - 1.2 Coloration   135 PISSC RATES 10 - 1.2 Coloration   135 PISSC RATES 10 - 1.2 Coloration   136 PISSC RATES 10 - 1.2 Coloration   137 PISSC RATES 10 - 1.2 Coloration   138 PISSC RATES 10 - 1.2 Coloration   139 PISSC RATES 10 - 1.3 Coloration   139 PISSC RATES 10 - 1.3 Coloration   139 PISSC RATES 10 - 1.3 Coloration   130 PISSC RATES 10 - 1.4 PISSC RATES 10 - 1.4 PISSC RATES 10 - 1	116		Contact	4	2	2	2	5	5	5	5	3.75
111   P. P. P. M. C. R. A. (F. S. D. 1. 2. Capazar / Flooding   2	116			3	3	3	6	1	4	5	5	3.75
The PASS CRA (T) 02 - 18 colored (colored)	116	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 06 - 1.2 Capsize / Flooding	Capsizing / Flooding	2	2	4	2	5	5	5	5	3.75
11   15   P.P.MSC RA (T) 02 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (Oil Product)   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1		FP PMSC RA (F&T) 08 - 1.2 - Swamping / interaction / turbulence		6	2	2	2	5	5	3	5	3.75
18   F. PRISC RA (T. 04 - 1.3 Genuclien   Grounding		FP PMSC RA (T) 02 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	4	6	2	4	3	4	3	4	3.75
22   PP PMSC RA (FR) 103 -1 1 Contact Refer Also to FP PMSC RA (FAT) 1   Contact   Collision   Colli				3	3	6	3	2	4	4	5	3.75
2   FP PMSC RA (FI 01 - 1.1 Collision				2	4	4	4	2	4	5	5	3.75
126 EP PINSC RA (TI 08 -1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)				3	3	3	3	3	5	4	5	3.625
12				2	4	2	2	5	5	5	4	3.625
128   EP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil Product)   Loss of Containment (oil Product)   4				4	4	8	4	1	2	3	3	3.625
128   FP PMSC RA (F) 16 - 16 Loss of Containment (OI Product)   Loss of Containment			3		4			- 4	5	5	5	3.625
128   EP PMSC RA (FB 10 + -1.3 Grounding   3   3   5   5   5   3   3   5   5   3   3				4	4	4	4	2	2	4	4	3.5
128   FP PMSC RA (FD 1-1.3 Grounding   1.5   2.5   3.5   5.5   4.5   3.5   3.5   3.5   5.5   5.5   4.5   3.5   3.5   3.5   5.5   5.5   4.5   3			,	2	4	2	4	1	5	2 4	5	3.50
128 F. P.MSC. RA. (FD. 161.4. Sinking / Capsize   9	128			1	3	2	3	5	5	5	4	3.5
1	128		Sinking / Capsize	9	6	3	2	6	8	10	6.88	3.5
1	128	FP PMSC RA (T) 02 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	3	3	3	6	2	4	3	4	3.5
1		FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.3 Grounding		1	3	1	4	3	5	5	5	3.375
134 FP PMSC RA (F&T) 05 - 1.4 Fire/Explosion Fire / Explosion Fire / Explosion 2 2 2 2 1 5 5 5 5 5 3375  134 FP PMSC RA (F&T) 05 - 1.4 Fire/Explosion Fire / Explosion 2 2 2 2 1 5 5 5 5 5 3375  136 FP PMSC RA (F&T) 04 - 1.7 Allision Allision Allision 2 1 3 1 2 1 3 3 5 5 5 5 3375  137 FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion Fire / Explosion 2 4 2 2 2 5 4 3 3 4 325  138 FP PMSC RA (F) 16 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion Fire / Explosion 2 4 2 2 2 5 4 3 3 4 325  140 FP PMSC RA (F) 16 - 1.5 Fire Fire Fire Fire Fire Fire Fire / Explosion 2 4 2 2 2 5 4 3 3 4 325  140 FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize 3 2 2 1 5 5 5 5 325  140 FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.7 Loss of Dook Level Loss of Dook Level 1 1 1 2 6 2 2 2 3 5 4 3 3 4 325  140 FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.7 Loss of Dook Level Loss of Dook Level 2 2 2 3 5 5 5 3 325  140 FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.5 Loss of Containment (oil product) Loss of Containment (Oil Product) 2 2 2 2 3 5 5 5 3 325  140 FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.5 Loss of Containment (oil Product) 2 2 2 2 3 5 5 5 3 325  140 FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.5 Loss of Containment (oil Product) 2 2 2 2 3 5 5 5 3 325  140 FP PMSC RA (F&T) 04 - 1.5 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 8 3 325  140 FP PMSC RA (F&T) 04 - 1.5 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3				2	3	1	1	5	5	5	5	3.375
134   FP PMSC RA (F&T) 06 - 1.4 Hull Damage				2	2	2	1	5	5	5	5	3.375
134 EP PMSC RA (F) 104 - 1,7 Allison				2	2	2	1	5	5	5	5	3.375
140   FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion				1	2	1	3	5	5	5	5	3.375
140   FP PMSC RA (F) 16 - 1.5 Fire   Explosion   2   4   2   2   5   5   4   3   4   3.25     140   FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize   5   5   5   5   3.25     140   FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.7 Loss of Dock Level   5   1   1   6   2   5   5   5   3.25     140   FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.7 Loss of Dock Level   5   1   1   6   2   5   5   5   3.25     140   FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.3 Grounding   6   6   7   7   7   7   7   7   7     140   FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.3 Grounding   6   7   7   7   7   7   7   7   7   7				1	3	1	2	5	5	5	5	3.375
140   FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.3 Grounding Refer Also to: FP PMSSC RA (F&T)?   Grounding   2			•	2	4	2	2	5	4	3	4	3.25
140   FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize   Sinking / Caps				2	4	2	2	5	4	3	4	3.25
140   FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.7 Loss of Dock Level   Loss of Dock Level   Loss of Dock Level   1   1   1   6   2   5   5   5   3.25     140   FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.3 Grounding   Groundin				1	4	2	1	4	4	- 4	4	3.25
140   FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.3 Grounding	140			1	1	1	6	2	5	5	5	3.25
Loss of Containment (Oil Product)   2   2   2   2   3   5   5   5   3.25	140			2	4	2	2	1	5	5	5	3.25
140   FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	140		Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	2	2	2	2	3	5	5	5	3.25
140   FP PMSC RA (F&T) O4 - 1.3 Loss of Containment (Oil Products)   Loss of Containment (Oil Product)   3   3   3   3   4   4   5   3.25     140   FP PMSC RA (F&T) O7 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (Oil Product)   Collision / Contact   3   2   1   2   5   5   3   5   3.25     150   FP PMSC RA (F) O7 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (Oil Product)   Loss of Containment (Oil Product)   3   3   3   2   4   4   3   3   3.125     150   FP PMSC RA (F) O7 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (Oil Product)   Fire / Explosion   Fire / Explosion   Sir / Explo	140		Fire / Explosion	2	2	1	1	5	5	5	5	3.25
150 FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)  Loss of Containment (Oil Product)  3 3 3 2 4 4 3 3 3 3.125  150 FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion  Fire / Explosion  5 FP PMSC RA (F3T) 09 - 1.1 Contact  Cont		FP PMSC RA (F&T) 04 - 1.3 Loss of Containment (Oil Products)		3	3	3	3	1	4	4	5	3.25
150   FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion   Fire / Explosion   Fire / Explosion   S   3   3   2   4   4   3   3   3   3   3   3   3   3				3	2	1	2	5	5	3	5	3.25
150 FP PMSC RA (F8T) 09 - 1.1 Contact				3	3	3	2	4	4	3	3	3.125
150 FP PMSC RA (Fb 109 - 1.4 Loss of Containment / Power / Communication			•	3	3	3	2	4	4	3	3	3.125
150 FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion   Fi				2	2	2	2	2	5	5	5	3.125
150 FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion				2	2	2	2	2	5	5	5	3.125
150 FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion       Fire / Explosion       3 3 2 1 4 4 5 3 3 3.125         150 FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.3 Grounding       Grounding       2 2 4 6 1 1 4 5 3.125         150 FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)       Loss of Containment (Oil Product)       2 2 6 4 1 1 4 5 3.125         150 FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.6 Fire / Explosion       Fire / Explosion       3 3 3 3 3 4 4 2 3 3.125         150 FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)       Loss of Containment (Oil Product)       2 2 4 4 2 6 8 8 5 5 3         160 FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.3 Grounding       Grounding       3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 2 2 3 3 3				3	3	3	2	4	4	3	3	3.125
150 FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.3 Grounding		The state of the s		3	3	3	2	4	4	3	3	3.125
150 FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)   Loss of Containment (Oil Product)   2   2   6   4   5   1   1   4   5   5   125     150 FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion   Fire / Explosion   3   3   3   3   4   4   2   3   3   125     150 FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)   Loss of Containment (Oil Product)   2   2   4   2   6   8   8   5   3     150 FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.3 Grounding			,	3	3	2	1	4	4	5	3	3.125
150 FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion     Fire / Explosion     3 3 3 3 4 4 2 3 3 3.125       160 FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)     Loss of Containment (Oil Product)     2 2 4 2 6 8 8 5 3       160 FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.3 Grounding     Grounding     3 3 3 3 3 3 4 2 2 3 3 3				2	2	- 4	ь	1	1	4	5	2 125
160         FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)         Loss of Containment (Oil Product)         2         2         4         2         6         8         8         5         3           160         FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.3 Grounding         Grounding         3         3         3         3         3         3         4         2         3         3	150			3	3	3	3	4	4	2	3	3 125
160 FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.3 Grounding Grounding Grounding 3 3 3 3 4 2 3 3	160			2	2	4	2	6	8	8	5	3
	160			3	3	3	3	3	4	2	3	3
	162	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 09 - 1.3 Fire / Explosion		1	1	1	1	3	5	5	5	2.75

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Original Date
	FP PMSC (R) 2/03	Jul-13
Risk Ranking - Category	Review Due	Revised By / Date
	Ongoing	MM / August 2015



# FORTH PORTS LIMITED Risk Assessment

			INSERT TITLE												
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes  How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risl	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)  Overall Risk					(Wor	cored at Residua level orst Credible) Overall Risk				
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business		
1.1															
1.2															
1.3															
1.4															
1.5															
			Risk Ranking			· <u> </u>				_	_	_			

#### **Risk Assessment Scoring Matrix**

### LIKELIHOOD

- 1 = Extremely unlikely (More than 100 years)
- 2 = Remote (10 99 years)
- 3 = Reasonably likely (1 9 years)
- 4 = Likely (Once per Year)
- 5 = Frequent (More than once per year)

### CONSEQUENCE

### PEOPLE:

- 1 = None
- 2 = Minor, single slight Injury
- 3 = Slight, multiple moderate or single major injury
- 4 = Serious, multiple major injuries or single fatality
- 5 = Major, more than 1 fatality

#### **ENVIRONMENT:**

- 1 = Negligible, No Action required 2 = Minor spill Tier 1 local response,
- 3 = Moderate spill, Tier 2 some outside assistance
- 4 = Moderate spill, Tier 2 greater outside assistance
- 5 = Major spill, Tier 3 national response


#### PROPERTY:

- 1 = negligible < £5000
- 2 = Minor > £5000
- 3 = Moderate >£50,000
- 4 = Serious, > £500,000
- 5 = major, > £2,000,000

#### **BUSINESS:**

- 1 = Negligible impact < £5000
- 2 = Minor impact > £5000
- 3 = Moderate impact > £50,000, bad local publicity, short term reduction of activity.
- 4 = Serious Impact, >£500,000, bad widespread publicity, temporary Port Facility shutdown.

#### OVERALL RISK



RED The Higher numbers(Greater than 10) in the matrix are considered "High-risk", These activities should not be carried out without additional controls being put in place to reduce the

AMBER Hazards with risk factors within these bands (6 - 10) are termed "consider". These lower risk factors are considered acceptable, but still need careful monitoring to ensure that everything has been done to reduce the consequences and likelihood.

GREEN The lower numbers(5 and below) in the matrix are considered "low-risk", but should still be monitored to ensure that controls remain effective.

# **DEF**

CAUSES
System Failure
Human Error / Failure
Environmental Conditions
CONTROLS
Aids to Navigation

Legislation & Guidance
Conservancy
Emergency Plans

## INITIONS

### DEFINITION

A breakdown of any system hardware or operating system. Examples of a system failure include but is not limited to:

- Any technical failure on board a vessel / craft
- Technical failure with the VTS monitoring system
- AtoN failure
- Error with survey data
- Failure with conservancy maintenance & verification process
- Techinical failure with the lock gates
- Techinical failure resulting in loss of dock level

Human failure examples can be:

- Failure of FTNS to follow and execute proper processes and procedures.
- Bridge team Error
- Human error due to lack of care or attention
- Human error due to violation of law, procedure or guidance

Environmental Condition exmples can include, but are not limited to:

- High winds
- Rough Seas
- Restricted visibility
- Strong current / tide
- Siltation

An Aid to Navigation is a device, system or service, external to vessels, designed and operated to enhance safe and efficient navigation of individual vessels and/or traffic.

These can include but are not limited to:

- Buoys
- Lights
- Lighthouses
- Sound signals
- Portable Pilot Unit (PPU)
- AIS
- ECDIS
- RADAR
- GPS
- Port Entry Lights

Legislation and guidance refers to all applicable legislation and guidance related to the navigational safety of vessels, examples of these can include but is not limited to:

- Forth Ports Bye Laws
- General Directions
- Marine Procedures Guidelines and Information
- Towage Guidelines
- All other relevant international and national legislation
- Notice to Mariners
- Surveying and survey programming
- Promulgation of survey data
- Dredging and dredging programme
- Aids to Navigation maintenance and verification
- Forth Ports contingency plans
- Local Authority contingency plans
- National contingency plans



	Forth River Passage - Standard Vessel														
Ref.	Hazard	Causes	Controls	Ris		lev	el	sidual	l Ri		lev			J.	MRFs: 54/21 (Close quarters situation), 66/21 (Mechanical Failure), 05/22 (Mechanical Failure), 11/22 (Mechanical Failure) 32/22 (Mechanical Failure) 01/23 (Mechanical Failure), 05/23 (Mechanical Failure), 25/23
	What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	How can it go wrong	Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)		(M		rall R		t	(W		redible erall Ri	_	Risk Sco	(Mechanical Failure)
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	alacad	Property	Environment	Business	Hazard Ri	
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage	2	6	6 6			2	2 1	0 10		10		Most likely: Collision between 2 commercial vessels around the bridges area resulting in minimal damage.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage	3	3	6	3	3	1		5 5	5	5	4.375	Worst credible: Collision betweenVLCC and cruise vessel resulting in total loss of vessels and loss of life.  Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with buoy resulting in minimal damage.
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error	Pilotage FTNS						L						Worst credible: Large impact allision with bridge resulting in extreme damage to vessel and bridge, and lo of life.
		Environmental Conditions	Aids to Navigation Conservancy Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Notice to Mariners Legislation & Guidance	3	3	3	3	6	1	i	5 5	5	5		Most likely: Vessel touches the bottom and continues on voyage with minimal damage.  Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Emergency Plans Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Notice to Mariners	1	3	3 5	4	4	1	1	5 5	5	5	4.5	damage and loss of contaminent.
															Most likely: Commercial Vessel sinks outwith main shipping areas, all crew safely abandon ship  Worst credible: Cruise vessel sinks resulting in total loss of vessel and loss of life.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Emergency Plans	3	6	6	3	6	2	2 1	0 10	10	10	7.005	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.
1.6	Loss of Containment (oil products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Emergency Plans Weather Forecasting / Tidal predictions Conservancy Vetting (Tankers)	4	4	4	8	8	1		3 5	5	5		Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.  Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

Content	Reviewed	Changes Made	
Overall vessel numbers calling a	REPs reviewed. I Forth, also vessel type and size. ize of ongoing projects.	Risk Scoring updated, Collision - Most Likely + Grounding - Mos Sinking - Most Likely scenarios updated	st Likely +
FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F) 1/08	Revised By / Date CHM, MM, HMFO, HMFI, HMDD, Man Tow&PV / Oct 2012	
Risk Assessment - Forth River	Review Due	Revised By / Date	
Passage (Standard Vessel)	Aug-25	MMT August 23	



	Ро	rt of Leith - Arrival /	Sailing Leith Approach Buoy to Berth with	Out	ter I	Bert	h V	Vork	s						MRFs: 67/21 (Contact), 71/22 (mechanical failure) 01/22 (contact), 12/22 (loses Gangway)14//22
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes  How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Ris	(Mc	leve ost Li	l kely)		(	(Wor	level st Cre	t Resi I edible	)	Risk Score	(disloged coping stone) 26/22 (contact) 29/22 (communication failure), 33/22 (Contact), 51/22 (mechanical failure), 53/22 (contact), 20/23 (Contact), 31/23 (Contact) 35/23 (mechanical failures) 36/23 (Mechanical Failure)
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Hazard	
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Enhanced Pilotage Console Controller FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Additional towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	3	6	9	6	6	2	10	10	10	10	8.375	Most Likely: Collision with small vessel resulting in no damage.  Worst Credible: Collision involving cargo vessel and cruise ship. Resulting in the loss of vessel and loss of life.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Quayside Obstruction	Enhanced Pilotage Console Controller FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Additional towage due to outer berth works Aids to Navigation Conservancy Fendering Quay edge 'cargo clear' demarkation Cranes properly stowed on quayside Swing Bridge Procedure Forth Ports H&S Procedures Aids to Navigation	5	5	10	5	5	2	10	10	10	10	8.125	Most Likely: Slow speed impact with quay resulting in minimal damage to vessel or jetty.  Worst Credible: Large impact resulting in extreme damage to vessel and infrastructure. Quayside no
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Enhanced Pilotage Console Controller FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Additional towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling Regulations)	3	3	6	6	3	2	6	8	8	10	6.25	longer able to operate and vessel requiring repair possible death / loss of containment.  Most Likely: Vessel grounded in soft mud and floats on following tide without damage.  Worst Credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated at the Port enterance. Port is closed indefinatily and major damage to vessel.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage Console Controller FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	1	4	4	5	4	1	5	5	5	5	4.625	Most Likely: Vessel sinks in approach to port, total loss of ship, and crew abandon ship.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Forth Byelaw & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Marine Guidelines & Port Information	1	3	3	3	2	1	5	5	5	5	3.875	Worst Credible: Vessel sinks in approach to port, total loss of ship and crew.  Most Likely: Small fire on-board quickly extinguished.
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Enhanced Pilotage Console Controller FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Additional towage due to outer berth works Aids to Navigation Conservancy	3	3	3	6	6	1	2	3	4	4	3.875	Worst Credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel, crew and cargo.  Most Likely: Small spill of non-persistent product.  Worst Credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closure and extensive environmental impact.
1.7	Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Lockgate operational procedures Port Planned Maintenance system Lock Gates - Interlocks to prevent opening all lock gates simultaneously Training / Auditing of Port Staff	3	3	3	3	9	1	3	5	4	5	4.375	Most Likely: Loss of containment but does not result in significant loss of dock level. Possible impact to large draft movements.  Worst Credible: Large loss of dock level. Deep drafted vessel take the bottom of dock. Possible large scale damage to vessels and infrastructure.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs and POLREPs reviewed.	
Overall vessel numbers calling at Forth, also vessel type and size.	
Number, nature, and size of ongoing projects.	
	Additional controls due to Outer Berth Works, Scoring updated where required

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F) 2/06	Risk Assessment Team / Date MM, HMFO / 3rd Dec2012
Risk Assessment - Port of Leith	Review Due	Revised By / Date
	May-25	MMT -Leith , May 2023

Business	Hazard Risk Score	MRFs: 67/21 (Contact), 71/22 (mechanical failure) 01/22 (contact), 12/22 (loses Gangway)14//22 (disloged coping stone) 26/22 (contact) 29/22 (communication failure), 33/22 (Contact), 51/22 (mechanical failure), 53/22 (contact), 20/23 (Contact), 21/23 (Contact), 35/23 (mechanical failures) 36/23 (Mechanical Failure)
10	8.375	Most Likely: Collision with small vessel resulting in no damage.  Worst Credible: Collision involving cargo vessel and cruise ship. Resulting in the loss of vessel and loss of life.
10	8.125	Most Likely: Slow speed impact with quay resulting in minimal damage to vessel or jetty.  Worst Credible: Large impact resulting in extreme damage to vessel and infrastructure. Quayside no longer able to operate and vessel requiring repair possible death / loss of containment.
10	6.25	Most Likely: Vessel grounded in soft mud and floats on following tide without damage.  Worst Credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated at the Port enterance. Port is closed indefinality and major damage to vessel.
5	4.625	Most Likely: Vessel sinks in approach to port, total loss of ship, and crew abandon ship.  Worst Credible: Vessel sinks in approach to port, total loss of ship and crew.
5	3.875	Most Likely: Small fire on-board quickly extinguished.  Worst Credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel, crew and cargo.
4	3.875	Most Likely: Small spill of non-persistent product.  Worst Credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closure and extensive environmental impact.
5	4.375	Most Likely: Loss of containment but does not result in significant loss of dock level. Possible impact to large draft movements.  Worst Credible: Large loss of dock level. Deep drafted vessel take the bottom of dock. Possible large scale damage to vessels and infrastructure.



		Port of Rosyth -	Arrival / Sailing No1 Rosyth Channel Buoy	to B	Berth	า								
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes  How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Ris	(Mo	cored at Residual level (Most Likely)			le Norst	evel Cred	Residual dible)	sk Score		
				Likelihood	People	Property	ŧ	Business	Likelihood	Т		Environment Business	Hazard Ris	MRFs: 21/22 (Mechanical Failure), 30/22 (communication failure), 43/22 (mechanical failure 67/22 (failure to report defect)
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage	2	4	6	2	2	1	5	5	5 5	4.25	Most likely: Collision between 2 vessels at slow speed resulting in minimal damage and no injuries.  Worst credible: Collision between two cruise vessels resulting in loss of vessels and loss of life.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Quayside Obstruction	Priotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Fendering Quay edge 'cargo clear' demarkation Cranes properly stowed on quayside Aids to Navigation	3	3	6	6	3	1	5	5	5 5	4.75	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with buoy resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: Large cruise vessel contacts quayside at high speed resulting in significant damage to vessel, quayside, and serious injuries / loss of life.
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling	2	2	6	4	6	1	5	5	5 5	4.75	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with minimal damage.  Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage	1	3	5	5	5	1	5	5	5 5	4.75	Most likely: Vessel sinks, all crew / passengers safely abandon ship.  Worst credible: Vessel sinks resulting in total loss of vessel, and loss of life.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance	1	3	3	3	2	1	4	4	3 3	3.125	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.  Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Emercency Plans Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage	3	3	3	6	6	2	4	6	8 8	5.5	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs reviewed - contact.	
Vessel numbers, size, and type in the area.	
Ongoing projects that have an impact.	
	Risk Scoring updated / Collision - Most likely scanrio updated

		Risk Assessment Team / Date MM, HMFO / 9th Jan 2013
Risk Assessment - Port of Rosyth	Review Due	Revised By / Date
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		Port of Me	ethil - Arrival / Sailing Methil Pilot Station to	Ber	rth										
Ref.	Hazard	Causes	Controls	Ris		red a leve	el	sidual			level	Resi		Score	MRF 08/22 (Contact), 61/22 (Contact), 08/23 (Mechanical Failure)
	What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	How can it go wrong	Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)		T	Over						III Ris		Risk S	With 50/22 (Ochlact), 51/22 (Ochlact), 50/25 (Wechlander Fallate)
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Hazard F	
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	3	3	3	3	3	2	10	8	8	8	5.75	Most likely: Vessel collides with small craft resulting in no damage to the larger vessel an no/minor to damage to the smaller vessel. Results in no injuries to persons  Worst credible: Vessel collides heavily with small craft resulting in extensive damage to both vessels and multiple injuries/fatalities
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Quayside Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Conservancy Fendering Cranes properly stowed on quayside Dock Gatemen Procedures	5	5	10	5	5	2	6	8	6	8	6.625	Most likely: Vessel makes light contact with object/quay resulting in no/minor damage to the vessel and quay  Worst credible: Vessel makes heavy contact with object/quay resulting in extensive damage to both vessel and quay and possible injuries
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Aids to Navigation Conservancy Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling Regulations) Dock gate procedure	2	2	4	4	2	2	6	8	8	8	5.25	Most likely: Vessel runs aground with no damage to vessel, no pollution and can be refloated with the tide  Worst credible: Vessel runs aground causing extensive damage to the vessel, major pollution and blocking entrance to ports
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Aids to Navigation Conservancy Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling Regulations) Dock gate procedure	3	3	9	6	3	2	10	G	8	10	6.875	Most likely: Small Vessel sinks/capsizes within harbour with everyone safely evactuated and no loss of life  Worst credible: Vessel sinks/capsizes in entrance of harbour with multiple fatalities and total loss of vessel
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans	1	3	3	3	2	1	4	4	3	3	3.125	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.  Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	3	3	3	6	6	2	4	6	8	8	5.5	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

Content Rev	iewed	Changes Made										
MRF and POLRE Number of vessels calling, other traffic calling.	in the vicinity, and vessel type	Risk Scoring updated, Grounding - Most Likely scenario updated										
FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F) 4/05	Risk Assessment Team / Date HMFO, HMDD, MM / 16th Jan 2013										
Risk Assessment - Port of Methil	Review Due	Revised By / Date										
ĺ	Aug-25	MMT . August 2023										



		Methil Energ	y Park - Arrival/Sailing Methil Pilot Station	to E	Bertl	h									No relevant MRFs since previous review
Ref.	Hazard	Causes	Controls	Ris	k sco	red a	4	idual			level	Resid		core	
	What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	How can it go wrong	Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Г	_	Over		sk				II Risk		Risk Score	
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Hazard R	
1.1	Collision		Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy External standby tugs audited and issued with restricted towage licence for emergencies.	2	4	4	2	2	2	10	10	10	10	6.5	Most likely: Collision between small craft and larger vessel at slow speed resulting in minimal damage and no injuries.  Worst credible: Collision between two commercial vessels resulting in loss of vessels and loss of life.
1.2	Contact	Quayside / Seabed Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Fendering Methil Energy Park Procedures External standby tugs audited and issued with restricted towage licence for emergencies. Fendering	3	3	6	3	3	2	6	6	6	6	4.875	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with buoy resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: Large vessel contacts quayside at high speed resulting in significant damage to vessel, quayside, and serious injuries / loss of life.
1.3	Grounding		Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Survey / dredging Programme / Schedule (By Operator) Methil Energy park Procedures	3	3	6	6	6	2	6	6	6	6	5.625	Most likely: Vessel toches the bottom when manouvring with minimal damage.  Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize		Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Fendering SE Quayside Regulations & Risk Assessment External standby tugs audited and issued with restricted towage licence for emergencies.	3	3	9	6	3	2	10	6	8	10	6.875	Most likely: Vessel sinks, all crew / passengers safely abandon ship.  Worst credible: Vessel sinks in harbour approach resulting in total loss of vessel and loss of life.
	Fire / Explosion		Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	1	3	3	3	2	1	4	4	3	3	3.125	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.  Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)		Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Survey Programme / Schedule (By Operator)	2	2	2	4	4	2	6	6	8	8	5	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs and POLREPs reviewed.	
Overall vessel numbers calling at Forth, also vessel type and size.	
Number, nature, and size of ongoing projects.	
	Likelyhood and Risk Scoring updated, Grounding - Most Likely scenario updated

FORTH PORTS LIMITED		Risk Assessment Team / Date HMFO, HMDD, MM / 23rd Jan 2013
Risk Assessment - Methil	Review Due	Revised By / Date
	Aug-25	MMT, August 2023



		Port of Kirkcald	ly - Arrival / Sailing Close Approaches of D	ock t	to Be	erth	ı								MRF: 17/23 (contact)
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risi	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely) (Worst Credible)  Overall Risk Overall Risk		k Score								
	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,			Likelihood	П		=	Business	Likelihood	Т	Т.	-	Business	Hazard Risk	
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	2	4	4	2	2	2	10	10 1	10	10	6.5	Most likely: Collision between Kirkcaldy vessel and small recreational / commercial vessel resulting in minimal damage  Worst credible: Collision between outbound Kirkcaldy vessel and other vessel in anchorage resulting in extreme damage and loss of life.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Quayside Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Fendering Cranes properly stowed on quayside	4	4	4	4	4	2	8	10 1	10	8		Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with quayside whilst berthing resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: High impact with quayside whilst berthing resulting in extreme damage to vessel and quayside, and loss of life.
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling Regulations)	2	2	4	2	2	2	6	8	8	8	5	Most likely: Vessel touches the bottom on following tide with minimal damage.  Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	3	3	9	6	3	2	10	6	8	10	6.875	Most likely: Vessel sinks outwith main shipping areas, all crew safely abandon ship  Worst credible: Vessel sinks resulting in total loss of vessel and loss of life.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans	1	3	3	3	2	1	5	4	3	5	3.5	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.  Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	2	2	2	4	4	2	6	6	8	8	5	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

Content Revi	ewed	Changes Made
MRFs updated, Vessel call	numbers reviewed	Collision - Most likely scenario updated, Risk Scoring updated,
FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F) 6/06	Risk Assessment Team / Date HMFO, HMDD, MM / 23rd Jan 2013
Risk Assessment - Port of Kirkcaldy	Review Due	Revised By / Date
	Aug-25	MMT. August 2023



		nd - Arrival / Sailing Close Approaches of	Docl	c to	Bert	h							MRFs: 28/22 (Black out)	
Ref.	Hazard	Causes	Controls	Ris		red at		ual		le	evel	Residual	ore	
	What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	How can it go wrong	Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)			Overal			(V	Norst		lible) I Risk	sk Score	
				Likelihood	People	П	<sub>z</sub> l		Likelihood	Т	_	Environment	Hazard Risk	
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	3	3	3	3	3	2	8	10	10 10	6.25	Most likely: Collision at slow speed between large vessel and small commercial, leisure, o fishing vessel resulting in minimal damage  Worst credible: High impact collision between two vessels and resulting in extreme damage and loss of life.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Quayside Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Fendering Cranes properly stowed on quayside Forth Ports H&S Procedures Dock Gatemen Procedures	3	3	6	3	3	1	5	4	5 5	4.25	
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling Regulations) Dock Gate Procedure	3	3	6	6	6	2	10	10	6 8	6.87	Most likely: Vessel touches the bottom with minimal damage.  Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.
	Sinking / Capsize Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions  System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Dock Gate Procedure Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance	2	4			6	1			3 4	4.5	Most likely: Vessel sinks, all crew safely abandon ship  Worst credible: Vessel sinks resulting in total loss of vessel, cargo, and loss of life.
			Emergency Plans	3	3	9	6	3	2	10	6	8 10	6.87	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.  Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	1	3	3	3	2	1	4	4	3 3	3.129	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.
	Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Port Planned Maintenance system Training / Auditing of Port Staff Dockgate Procedure	5	5	5	5	10	2	4	6	8 8	6.37	Most likely: Fault with gates which is repaired before major loss of dock level.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made	ı
MRFs review - contact - likelihood already 5.		ı
Vessels calling at B'island - number, type, size.		ı
Other operatrions in the area		ı
	Risk Scoring updated - Collision worst credible / Grounding most likely scenario	ı
	updated	ı
		ı
		ı
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FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date
	FP PMSC RA (F) 7/05	HMFO, MM / 16th Jan 2013
Risk Assessment - Port of Burntisland	Review Due	Revised By / Date
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		Inverkeithi	ng - Arrival / Sailing Saint David's Beacon	to B	erth	h									MRF: 020/19 (Contact)		
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Ris		lev Most L	at Res			(Wor	red at level st Cre	dible	)	sk Score			
				Likelihood	People	Т	Τŧ	Business	Likelihood	People		Environment	Business	Hazard Risk			
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	2	2	2 6	4	4	1	5	5	5	5	4.5	Most likely: Collision between small craft and larger vessel at slow speed resulting in minimal damage and no injuries.  Worst credible: Collision between two commercial vessels resulting in loss of vessels and loss of life.		
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Quayside Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Fendering Cranes properly stowed on quayside	3	3	3 6	3	3	1	5	4	5	5	4.25	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with the quay resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: Commercial vessel makes a high impact contact with the quay resulting in significant damage to vessel, quayside, and serious injuries / loss of life.		
1.3	3 Grounding Refer also: Risk Assessment (F&T) 7	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	2	2	2 4	2	2	1	4	4	4	4		Most likely: Vessel touches the bottow in soft mud and rcontinues sailing with minimal damage.  Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to port, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.		
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	3	3	3 6	6	3	2	10	4	4	8	5.5	Most likely: Small Vessel sinks, all crew / passengers safely abandon ship.  Worst credible: Small Vessel sinks in harbour approach resulting in total loss of vessel and loss of life.		
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans	3	3	3 9	6	3	2	10	6	8	10	6.875	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.  Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.		
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	3	3	3 3	6	6	2	4	6	8	8	5.5	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.		

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs review	
Vessels calling at B'island - number, type, size.	
Other operatrions in the area	
	Risk Scoring updated

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F) 8/04	Risk Assessment Team / Date HMFO, HMDD, MM / 23rd Jan 2013
Risk Assessment - Inverkeithing	Review Due	Revised By / Date
	Aug-25	MMT August 2023



### Braefoot Jetty - Arrival / Sailing Eastern Limits to Berth

MRFs reviewed: 34/22 (close quarters), 38/22 (infringment of regulations), 21/23

			, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,												(mechanical failure) (mechanical failure)		
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes  How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Ris		leve Most L	el	1	Ris		lev erst C	at Res	e)	Risk Score			
				Likelihood	People	Τ.	Ιź		Likelihood	People	Τ.	Ιź	Business	Hazard Ri			
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	5	5	5 5	5	5	2	10	10		10	7.25	Most likely: Collision between small workboat and larger vessel at slow speed resulting in minimal damage and no injuries.  Worst credible: Collision between tanker and tug / line boat resulting in loss of vessel, loss of life and pollution		
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Jetty Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Jetty Regulations Jetty Supervisor	3	3	3 6	3	3	2	10	10	10	10	6.875	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with terminal resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: Large vessel has a high impact with jetty / tanker alongside resulting in significant damage to vessels, jetty, and serious injuries / loss of life.		
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Jetty Regulations	2	2	2 4	2	2	1	1	5	-5	57	3.25	Most likely: Vessel touchest he bottom in soft mud and continues sailing with minimal damage.  Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major		
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Jetty Regulations	3	3	3 6	4	3	1	5	5	5	5	4.5	disruption to port, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.  Most likely: Small Vessel sinks, all crew / passengers safely abandon ship.  Worst credible: Vessel sinks in approach to jetties resulting in total loss of vessel and loss of life.		
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Conservancy Jetty Regulations	3	3	9	6	3	1	5	5	5	5	5.125	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.  Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, loss of life and large scale pollution		
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage (Within compulsory pilotage Area) FTNS Forth Ports Byelaws & General Directions for Navigation Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Notice to Mariners Marine Guidelines & Port Information Jetty Regulations	3	3	3 3	6	6	2	6	10	10	10	6.75	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.		

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs reviewed	
Vessel numbers consulted, as well as type and size.	
	Risk Scoring updated, Contact - Worst credible scenario / Grounding most likely /
	Sinking + Capsizing most likely scenario updated
	omany + supsizing most many sociatio apacted

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F) 9/05	Risk Assessment Team / Date HMFO, HMD, MM / 23rd Jan 2013
Risk Assessment - Braefoot Jetty	Review Due	Revised By / Date
	Aug-25	MMT, August 2023



## FORTH POI Navigational R

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		Port of Gran	ngemouth - Arrival/Sailing Hen & Chickens	s to E	Bert	h										
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive	Ris		leve		sidual	1	k sco	level			Score	MRFs: 53/21 (contact), 61/21 (Contact), 62/21 (contact) 68/21 (contact) 02/2 (tow Line parted), 04/22 (Bow Thruster Failure) 07/22 (contact), 13/22	
	(Event leading to a consequence)		(What action & how frequent)	Likelihood	People	Property Property	Environment		Likelihood	People	Property Property	Environment Environment	k Business	Hazard Risk	(contact), 15/22 (object in propulsion unit) 16/22 (mechanical failure), 20/2 (contact), 23/22 (Contact), 38/22 (loosse fander weight), 36/22 (contact), 37/23 (Bridle Parted), 52/22 (Bridle parted), 60/22 (contact), 65/22 (Gangway cont with bollard), 68/22 (Mechanical Failure), 04/23 (mechanical failure), 07/2 (Pilot ladder), 09/23 (contact), 10/23 (mechanical failure), 12/23 (contact), 18/23 (contact), 19/23 (lock gates dosed as vessel approached) 28/23 (mechanical failure), 29/23 (mechanical failure)	
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Diversionary Channel Jetty / Terminal Guidelines STS Operations Manual Vessel vetting (tankers)	3	3	6	3		1	5	15	5	Ch	4.375	Most likely: In dock collision between inbound / outbound vessel and small vessel at slow speed resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: Collision between inbound/outbound Grangemouth at high	
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Quayside Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Alds to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Fendering Cranes properly stowed on quayside Dockhead Staff STS Operations Manual Jetty / Terminal Guidelines Vessel vetting (tankers)	5	5	10	5	5	2	6	10	8	10	7.375	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with lead in or fenders resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: Vessel has heavy impact with lock structure resulting in externed damage to vessel, locks, and loss ofbusiness due to potential port	
1.3	Grounding	Technical Failure Human Error Enviornmental Conditions Surveying Omission Failure of Aids to Navigation Unknown Underwater Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Alds to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	3	3	9	3	3	2	2	10	10	10	6.25	dosure.  Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with damage.  Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.	
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling Regulations) Jetty / Terminal Guidelines Vessel vetting (tankers)	1	1	2	2	1	1	5	-50	5	01	3.25	Most likely: workboat sinks, all crew safely abandon ship Worst credible: Vessel sinks between H&C and locks resulting in total loss	
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Emergency Plans / OPRC Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting Jutty/Terminal Guidelines Vessel vetting (tankers)	3	3	9	6	3	2	10	10	10	10	7.625	wessel & cargo, channel closure, and loss of life.  Most likely. Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.  Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire on vessel containing munitions, total los vessel and cargo, and loss of life.	
	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Conservancy Bunkering Procedure Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling Regulations)	3	3	3	6	6	1	2	3	4	4	3.875	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in por	
1.7	Loss of Dock Level	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Lockgate operational procedures Port Planned Maintenance system Lock Gates - Interlocks to prevent opening all lock gates simultaneously Training / Auditing of Port Staff	3	1	1	1	6	1	2	5	5	5	3.25	Most likely: Fault with ompounding pumps which is repaired before major lof dock level.	

Content Rev	iewed	Changes Made			
MRFs reviewed - significant number of	f contacts - one major contact,	Risk Scoring updated. Collision (most likely + worst credible likely + worst credible) / Sinking + Capsizing (worst credible)			
FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F) 10/06	Risk Assessment Team / Date DMM. HMFI / 19th Dec 2012			
Risk Assessment - Port of	Review Due	Revised By / Date			
Grangemouth Hen & Chickens to Berth	Aug-25	MMT, August 2023			

DRTS LIMITED	
Risk Assessment	
urrival/Sailing Hen & Chickens to Berth	_
Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)  Preventative & Reactive (Most Likely)  Overall Risk	
lance ing / Tidal Predictions  inel 3 3 6 3 3 1 5 5 5 4.375  lance inel 4 3 5 5 5 5 4.375  lance inel 5 6 7 7 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7	.375 M Ve
lance ing / Tidal Predictions	Wors speed
towed on quayside 5 5 10 5 5 2 6 10 8 10 7.375 lanual laidelines kkers)	Most likely minimal de Worst cree exreme da closure.
lance ang / Tidal Predictions 3 3 9 3 3 2 2 10 10 10 6.25	
lance sing / Tidal Predictions  procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling uidelines kers)  1 1 2 2 1 1 5 5 5 5 3.25	
	Most likely: workboat sinks, a  Worst credible: Vessel sinks I  vessel & cargo, channel closu
/ OPRC lance and a state of the	Most likely: Small fire on Worst credible: Uncontro vessel and cargo, and lot
lance mg / Tidal Predictions  3 3 3 6 6 1 2 3 4 4 3.875  ure procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling inal procedures tenance system tenance system tenance system tenance system	Most likely: Small spill of n Worst credible: Large scal- closures and extensive env
of Port Staff is	of dock level.  Worst credible: Fault with gates w dock level resulting in vessels agro
Changes Made  updated. Collision (most likely + worst credible) / Contact (most redible) / Sinking + Capsizing (worst credible) scenarios updated	
Team / Date Dec 2012	
3	



	Crombie Berthing/Sailing No :									No significant MRFs during time from previous review.										
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	L	(M	ored a leve lost Li	el ikely)			(Worst Cr		(Worst Credible)			(Worst Credible)			∍)	isk Score	
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environmen	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environmen	Business	Hazard R						
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	2	2	4	2	2	1	5	5	5	5	3.75	Most likely: Collision between vessel and small vessel at slow speed resulting in minimal damage  Worst credible: Collision between Crombie vessel carrying munitions and inbound/outbound  Grangemouth tanker resulting in total loss of vessels and loss of life.					
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Jetty Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Fendering Cranes properly stowed on quayside	3	3	6	3	3	1	5	5	5	5	4.375	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with jetty whilst berthing resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: High impact with jetty whilst berthing resulting in extreme damage to vessel and jetty, and loss of life.					
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Unknown Underwater Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage	2	2	4	2	2	1	4	5	5	5	3.625	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with damage.  Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.					
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	1	1	5	4	5	1	5	5	5	5	4.375	Most likely: Vessel sinks outwith main shipping areas, all crew safely abandon ship  Worst credible: Vessel sinks in main channel near Crombie resulting in total loss of vessel, channel closure, and loss of life.					
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Jetty/Terminal Guidelines	3	3	9	6	3	2	10	) 10	10	10	7.625	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.  Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire on vessel containing munitions, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.					
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Bunkering Procedure Standby vessel for bunkering operations	3	3	3	6	6	1	2	3	5	5	4.125	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.					

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
No MRFs since pervious review.	
Number of vessels calling at Crombie, as well as type and size.	Risk Scoring updated. Collision (most likely), contact (worst credible) Scenario updated

FORTH PORTS LIMITED		Risk Assessment Team / Date DMM, HMFI / 19th Dec2012
Risk Assessment - Crombie	Review Due	Revised By / Date
	Aug-25	MMT, August 2023



		Hound	Point - Arrival/Sailing Eastern Limits to B	erth											MRFs since previous review: 10/22 (mechanical failure), 66/22 (towline parted)
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong	go wrong How can it go wrong Preventative & Reactive		Ris	Risk scored at Residual level level (Worst Credii								e)	isk Score	
	(Event leading to a consequence)		(What action & how frequent)	Likelihood	People	Т	Environmen t	Business	Likelihood	People	Over honordy	c	Business	Hazard Ris	
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage (Within compulsory pilotage Area) - 2 Pilots FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Hound Point Marine Guidelines PPU	4	4	4	4	4	1	5	5		5	4.5	Most likely: Collision between small workboat and larger vessel at slow speed resulting in minimal damage and no injuries.  Worst credible: Collision between two laden tankers resulting in loss of vessels, loss of life and large scale pollution
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Jetty Obstruction	Pilotage (Within compulsory pilotage Area) - 2 Pilots FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Fendering Hound Point Marine Guidelines PPU / Hound Point Docking System	3	3	6	3	3	1	5	5	5	5	4.375	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with jetty resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: Large vessel has a high impact contact with another vessel alongside hound point resulting in significant damage to vessels, jetty, loss of containment and serious injuries / loss of life.
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Unknown Underwater Obstruction	Pilotage (Within compulsory pilotage Area) - 2 Pilots FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Hound Point Marine Guidelines	1	1	3	1	4	1	3	5	5	5	3.375	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with minimal damage.  Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to port, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.
1,4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage (Within compulsory pilotage Area) - 2 Pilots FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Hound Point Marine Guidelines	1	3	5	5	5	1	5	5	5	5	4.75	Most likely: Vessel sinks, all crew / passengers safely abandon ship.  Worst credible: Vessel sinks in approach to jetties resulting in total loss of vessel and loss of life.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage (Within compulsory pilotage Area) - 2 Pilots FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Towage Emergency Plans Hound Point Marine Guidelines	3	3	9	6	9	1	5	5	5	5	5.875	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.  Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, loss of life and large scale pollution
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage (Within compulsory pilotage Area) - 2 Pilots FTNS Forth Ports Byelaws & General Directions for Navigation Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Notice to Mariners Marine Guidelines & Port Information Hound Point Marine Guidelines	3	3	3	6	6	2	6	10	10	10	6.75	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs; No contacts since last review	
Changes to guidelines or procedures affecting HP.	
Number of vessels calling, and other traffic in the vicinity.	
	Risk Scoring updated. Contact (worst credible) scenario
	mon occining aparation contact (notes cleaned) contact

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Risk Assessment Team / Date DMM, HMFI / 19th Dec 2012
Risk Assessment - Houndpoint Arrival / Sailing Eastern Limits to	Revised By / Date MMT, August 2023



		Cruise V	essels at Anchorage (Hound Point / Nev	vhav	/en)										MRF: 18/22 (mechanical failure)
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	What can go wrong How can it go wrong Preventative & Reactive		Ris	(Mo	leve	l kely)			(Wors	level t Cree	dible	:)	k Score	
	(2 Six Gaaing to 2 Six Gaalast,		(**************************************	Likelihood	People	Dverty Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property Property	÷ I	Business	Hazard Risk	
1.	1 Dragging Anchor	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Designated and proven anchorages Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	5	5	5	5	5	1	5	5	5	5	5	Most likely: Vessel drags anchor, then pays out more chain resulting in no further dragging.  Worst credible: Vessel drags anchor resulting in vessel going aground or making contact with bridge/Hound Point Terminal. Vessel suffers extreme damage and possibbilty of loss of life.
1.:	2 Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	5	5	10	5	5	1	5	5	5	5	5.625	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with small vessel resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: Vessel has high speed impact with bridge/jetty resulting in significant damage to vessel and loss of life.
1.:	3 Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Tender pack	2	6	6	2	2	1	5	5	5	5	4.5	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with minimal damage.  Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in majo disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.
1.4	4 Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	1	3	5	5	5	1	5	5	5	5	4.75	Most likely: Vessel sinks, all crew and passengers safely abandon ship Worst credible: Vessel sinks resulting in total loss of vessel, and loss of life
1.3	<sup>5</sup> Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	5	10	10	5	5	1	5	5	5	5	6.25	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel, and loss of life.
1.	5 Loss of Containment (Oil Products) - Refer also to FP PMSC RA (F&T)5	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	3	3	3	6	3	1	2	5	5	5	4	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in por closures and extensive environmental impact.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs review -	
Other traffic in the vicinity - type, size, density	
Cruise specific procedures, forms and guidelines.	
	Risk Scoring updated.

		Risk Assessment Team / Date HMFO, MM, DMM, HMD, MT&PV / 13th Feb 2013
Risk Assessment - Cruise Vessels at	Review Due	Revised By / Date
Anchorage (Hound Point / Newhaven)	Aug-25	MMT August 2023



Risk Assessment - Forth - River Transit + Berthing/Sailing Small Aug-25 Revised By / Date MMT August 2023

Forth - River Transit + Berthing/Sailing Small Commercial Craft (Tugs, Workboats etc)														
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes  How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Ris	(Mc	red at level ost Lik	l kely)		(W	le /orst (	vel		Risk Score	
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Environment	Business	Hazard R	MRFs: 70/21 (Vessel picked up weight in locks) 72/21 (Fouled unit) 02/22 Pated Towline, 09// (Pilot Vessel Engine Alarm), 15/22 (Fouled unit) 35/22 (Fouled Unit), 46/22 (Fouled unit) 47/2 (Faulty unit) 54/22 (Fouled unit) 57/22 (Mechanical Failure) 02/23 MOB Mayday Call / 14/23 (Fouled Propeller) 22/23 (Mechanical Failure) / 30/23 (Fouled Propeller)
1.1 C	ollision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Legislation & Guidance General Directions (GD19) Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Liaison with Local Authorities & Boat Clubs Audit and license procedure	3	3	6	3	3	2	10 8	3 6	10	6.125	Most likely: Collision between two small vessels at slow speed resulting in minimal damage and injuries.  Worst credible: Collision between two small commercial craft at high speed resulting in loss of vessels and loss of life.
1.2 C	ontact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Change to Shore Infrastructure / Obstruction on the Quay Floating Debris	FTNS Legislation & Guidance General Directions (GD19) Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Liaison with Local Authorities & Boat Clubs Audit and license procedure	5	5	10	5	5	2	10 8	3 8	8	7.375	Most likely: Small workboat low impact with floating debris resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: High impact Contact with bridge, quayside, jetty resulting in significant damage aloss of life.
1.3 G	rounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Legislation & Guidance General Directions (GD19) Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Conservancy Liaison with Local Authorities & Boat Clubs Audit and license procedure	3	3	6	3	3	1	4 5	5 4	5	4.125	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with damage.
1.4 Si	inking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Legislation & Guidance General Directions (GD19) Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Conservancy Liaison with Local Authorities & Boat Clubs Audit and license procedure	2	2	10	8	10	2	10 1	0 8	10	8.5	Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.  Most likely: Vessel sinks, all crew safely abandon ship
1.5 Fi	ire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Legislation & Guidance General Directions (GD19) Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Conservancy Liaison with Local Authorities & Boat Clubs Audit and license procedure	4	4	8	4	8	2	10 1	0 8	10	7.75	Worst credible: Vessel sinks resulting in total loss of vessel, and loss of life.  Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.
1.6 Lc	oss of Containment (oil products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Legislation & Guidance General Directions (GD19) Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Conservancy Liaison with Local Authorities & Boat Clubs Audit and license procedure	4	4	4	4	4	2	6 6	8	8	5.5	Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.  Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant prodcut that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensenvironmental impact.
rer	Content Rev		Changes Made						I				-	•
			Risk Scoring updated.											
F	ORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F) 14/07	Risk Assessment Team / Date MT&PV, HMFO, MM, DMM, HMD / 13TH Feb 2013	1										



															MRF: 55/21 (Contact), 56/21 (Contact), 57/21 (contact), 58/21 contact, 17/22 Damage to tender, 31/22 (contact), 24/23 (mechanical failure)
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes  How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)		level (Most Likely)							Resident Res	)	Risk Score	
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environmen t	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environmen t	Business	Hazard	
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Legislation & Guidance FTNS Weather Forecasting, Tidal Predictions & Monitoring Tender Pro-forma & Passage Planning Tender Pack	5	10	10	5	5	2	10	10	8	10	8.5	Most likely: Collision between two tenders at slow speed resulting in minimal damage and no injuries.  Worst credible: Collision between a commercial vessel and tender carrying passengers resulting in loss of tender and loss of life.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Change to Shore Infrastructure / Obstruction on the Quay Floating Debris	FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predications & Monitoring Tender Traffic Control Procedures Tender Proforma and Passage Planning Tender Pack	5	5	5	5	5	2	10	10	8	10	7.25	Most likely: Tender has slow speed impact with pontoon resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: Tender has heavy impact with pontoon resulting in significant damage to tender and loss of life.
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Uncharted Object	FTNS Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Legislation & Guidance Emergency Plans Conservancy Tender Proforma and Passage Planning Pack Tender	5	5	5	5	5	2	4	6	4	6	5	Most likely: Tender grounds in soft mud and continues sailing with minimal damage  Worst credible: Tender hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Legislation & Guidance Emergency Plans Conservancy Tender Proforma and Passage Planning Pack Tender	. 1	3	4	3	3	1	5	5	3	5	3.875	Most likely: Tender sinks, all crew and passengers safely abandon ship Worst credible: Tender sinks resulting in total loss of vessel and loss of life.
1.5	Fire	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Legislation & Guidance Emergency Plans	2	2	4	2	2	1	5	4	3	4	3.25	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.  Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (oil products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Legislation & Guidance Emergency Plans Conservancy Tender Proforma and Passage Planning Pack Tender	. 4	4	4	4	4	1	2	2	4	4	3.5	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: spill which cannot be contained resulting in environmental impact.

Content Rev	iewed	Changes Made	
Greatly reduced amount of cruise training and the amount impacted		Risk Scoring updated.	
FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F) 15/06	Risk Assessment Team / Date MM, DMM, HMFO March 2014	
Risk Assessment - Cruise Vessel Tender Operations (Hound Point /	Review Due Aug-25	Revised By / Date MMT August 2023	



	Port of Leith - Arrival / Sailing Leith Approach Buoy to Berth with Jack-Up Barge on Leith Approaches														
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes  How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Ris	(Mo	ored at level ost Like	ely)			Wors	level st Cre	Residua		k Score	No MRFs
	(Low county of a consequence)		(macasan anamaqan)	Likelihood	People	T T	Environment		Likelihood	People	Property	Environment Business		Hazard Risk	
1.1 C	ollision / Allision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Jack-Up Barge in Approach Channel	Pilotage (Compulsory over 45m) Console Controller FTNS (Notice to Mariners) Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage (compulsory >60m) Aids to Navigation Conservancy Vessel moves assessed on case by case basis with regards to manoeuvrability	4	7	10	6	10	2	6	6	6 6	7.	.125	Most Likely: Collision with small vessel / Jack-up Barge resulting in minor damage.  Worst Credible: Collision involving cargo vessel and Jack-Up Barge. Resulting in the loss of vessel , barge and loss of life.
1.2 C	ontact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Jack-Up barge at Jetty	Pilotage (Compulsory over 45m) Console Controller FTNS (Notice to Mariners) Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage (Compulsory over 60m) Aids to Navigation Onservancy Vessel moves assessed on case by case basis with regards to manoeuvrability	5	7	10	6	10	2	6	6	6 6	7.	.125	Most Likely: Slow speed impact with quay resulting in minimal damage to vessel or jetty.
															Worst Credible: Large impact resulting in extreme damage to vessel and infrastructure. Quayside no longer able to operate and vessel requiring repair possible death / loss of containment.
1.3 G	rounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Change of Approach to due to Jack-Up Barge	Pilotage (Compulsory over 45m) Console Controller FTNS (Notice to Mariners) Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage (compulsory over 60m) Aids to Navigation Conservancy Vessel moves assessed on case by case basis with regards to manoeuvrability	3	3	6	6	3	2	6	8	8 10	6	3.25	Most Likely: Vessel grounded in soft mud and floats on following tide without damage.  Worst Credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated at the Port entrance. Port is closed indefinalt and major damage to vessel.
1.4 S	inking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage Console Controller FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	1	4	4	5	4	1	4	4	5 5	4.	.375	Most Likely: Vessel sinks in approach to port, total loss of ship, and crew abandon ship.
1.5 F	ire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Forth Byelaw & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Marine Guidelines & Port Information	1	3	3	3	2	1	4	4	3 4	3	3.25	Worst Credible: Vessel sinks in approach to port, total loss of ship and crew.  Most Likely: Small fire on-board quickly extinguished.
1.6	oss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage Console Controller FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	3	3	3	6	6	1	2	3	4 4	3.	.875	Worst Credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel, crew and cargo.  Most Likely: Small spill of non-persistent product.  Worst Credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closure and extensive environmental impact.
	oss of Dock Level (Lock Gate perations)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Lockgate operational procedures Porn Planned Maintenance system Lock Gates - Interlocks to prevent opening all lock gates simultaneously Training / Auditing of Port Staff	3	3	3	3	9	1	5	5	4 5	4.	.625	Most Likely. Loss of containment but does not result in significant loss of dock level. Possible impact to large draft movements.  Worst Credible: Large loss of dock level. Deep drafted vessel take the bottom of dock. Possible large scale damage to vessels and infrastructure.

Changes made

	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F) 16	Risk Assessment Team / Date MM, MO / 11th October 2021
Risk Assessment - Port of Leith		Revised By / Date
	Oct-23	



		Та	y River Passage - Arr/Dep Buoy to Bert	h										No MRFs
Ref.	Hazard	Causes	Controls		Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely) (Worst Credible)						level		core	
	What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	How can it go wrong	Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	_	(IVI	Overal		k			Overall		Risk Score	
				Likelihood	People	Property	t t	Business	Likelihood	People	Property Environmen	t Business	Hazard F	
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	1	2		1	1	1	5		5 5	3.375	Most Likely: Collision with small craft.  Worst Credible: Collision between cruise vessel and rig  Most Likely: Light Contact with the quayside.  Worst Credible: Extremly heavy landing structural damage to Quay and vessel  Most Likely: Grounding on soft material, no loss of containment with vessel continuing on.  Worst Credible: Grounding on solid sea bed, loss of containment vessel unable to refloat.  Most Likely: Small craft sinking with no casualties  Worst Credible: Cruise vessel sinking with loss of vessel and fatalities  Most Likely: Small fire onboard, quickly extinguished.  Worst Credible: Vessel uncontrolable fire, vessel total loss.  Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closure and extensive environmental impact.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	5	5	10	5	5	1	5	5 \$	5 5	5.625	
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	2	2	6	2	6	1	5	5 5	5 5	4.5	
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	2	8	8	8	8	1	5	5 5	5 5	6.5	
	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans	3	3	6	3	3	1	5	5 5	5 5	4.375	
1.6	Loss of Containment (oil products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Vetting (Tankers)	2	2	2	2	2	1	3	5 5	5 5	3.25	

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
All content reviewed	Risk Scoring updated.

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date
	FP PMSC RA (T) 01/06	DMM, HMD 13th Dec 2012
Risk Assessment - River Passage Tay	Review Due	Revised By / Date
(General)	Aug-25	CHM/HMFT/MMD/MCM / MODAugust 2023



		Port of Dundee	e - Oil Rigs - Arrival/Sailing Port Li	mits	to	Ber	th								MRF: None
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive	Risi		red a leve	1	idual		Risk s Resid Vorst	ual le	evel		Score	
	(Event leading to a consequence)		(What action & how frequent)	Likelihood	People	Dverity August	Environment III	Business sk	Likelihood		- 1 -	Risk	_	Hazard Risk Score	
1,1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Foreasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Planning meeting Conservancy Towage Audit Declaration / Tug Vetting Large Vessel Movement Notice to Maniners	2	4	4		4	1	5			5	4.5	Most Likely: Collision with small craft while underway.  Worst Credible: Collision with Tug/anchor handler in fairway.
1.2	Contact	System Fallure Human Error Environmental Conditions Change to Shore Infrastructure / Obstruction on the Quay Communication Error	Pilotago / Towmaster FTRS Legislation & Guidance Aldis to Naivgation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plannian Towage Planning meeting Conservancy Additional Fendering (if achievable on berth) Towage Audit Declaration / Tuy Vetting Simulation / Tails	2	2	6	2	6	2	8	10	8 1	10	6.5	Most Likely: Contact with navigational buoy  Worst Credible: Heavy Contact with berthed vessel/rig
1.3	Grounding	System Fallure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Towage Audit Declaration / Tug Vetting Simulation Trials	2	2	2	4	6	1	5	5	5	5	4.25	Most Likely: Tug Grounding on soft material, no loss of containment and vessel continuing Worst Credible: Tug / AHT Grounding on solid sea bed, loss of containment vessel unable to refloat.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	Collision Contact Grounding Technical Failure Bridge Team Error	Pilotage / Towmaster FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Planning meeting Conservancy Towage Audit Declaration / Tug Vetting Simulation Trials	1	5	5	5	5	1	5	5	5	5	5	Most Likely-Sinking of Tug during operation  Worst Credible: Sinking within navigetional channel loss of containment.
	Fire / Explosion	Collision Contact Human Error Technical Failure Loss of Containment	Pilotago / Townaster FTNS Legislation & Guidance Alds to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Planning meeting Towage Audit Declaration / Tug Vetting	3	3	6	3	3	1	5	5	5 5	5	4.375	Most Likely: Small fire on vessel, extinguished on board  Worst Credible: Large fire on rig, complete loss.
1.6	Loss of Containment (oil products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage / Townaster FTTS Legislation & Guidance Alds to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Planning meeting Conservancy Towage Audit Declaration / Tug Vetting Bunkerling Procedure	2	2	2	2	2	1	3	5	5 5	5	3.25	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting i port closure and extensive environmental impact.

Content Rev	lewed	Changes Made	
All content reviewed		Risk Scoring updated.	
FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date DMM, HMD 09th January 2013	
	FP PMSC RA (T) 05/06	Divivi, HiviD Ustil January 2013	
Risk Assessment - Port of Dundee	Review Due	Revised By / Date CHM/HMFT/MMD/MCM / MOD August 2023	



	Tay - Riv	ver Transit + Berth	ing/Sailing Small Commercial Cra	ft (Tu	ugs	s, W	orl	kboa	ats	etc	:.)				MRF: 064/22 (tow rope parted), 62/22 (mechanical failure), 27/23 (contact), 37/23 (c
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes  How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Ris	(M	leve ost L	el ikely			Re: (Wo	sidua rst C	ored al lev redib	el ole)	sk Score	
	(Event leading to a consequence)		(vviiat action oction request)	Likelihood	People	Property	۱×	_	Likelihood			Euvironment	Business	Hazard Risk	
1.1	Collision	Technical Failure Bridge Team Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aufs to Navigation Weather Forcessting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Audits Liaison with Local Authoritys & Boat Clubs	2	2	4	2	2	2	: 10	0 10	10	10	6.25	Most Likely: Collision with another small craft on river.  Worst Credible: Collision with other small vessel causing loss of both vessels.
1.2	Contact	Technical Failure Bridge Team Error Environmental Conditions Change to Shore Infrastructure / Obstruction on the Quay	FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Audits Liaison with Local Authoritys & Boat Clubs	5	5	10	5	5	2	: 10	0 10	8	10	7.875	Most Likely: Light contact with the quayside while berthing.  Worst Credible: Heavy Contact with another berthed small vessel resulting in loss of both vessels
1.3	Grounding	Technical Failure Bridge Team Error Environmental Conditions Surveying Omission	FTNS Logislation & Guidance Alds to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Audits Liaison with Local Authoritys & Boat Clubs Conservancy	2	2	2	2	2	1	4	4	4	4	3	Most Likely: Grounding of smalll vessel on soft silt, which continue on (tidal basin).  Worst Credible: Grounding on hard rock, causing loss of containment, unable to refloat on same tide.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	Collision Contact Grounding Technical Failure Bridge Team Error	FTNS Legislation & Guidance Alds to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Audits Liaison with Local Authoritys & Boat Clubs	2	4	8	6	6	1	4	4	4	4	5	Most Likely: sinking of small vessel outside of navigational channel, with limited loss of containment.  Worst Credible: Sinking of small vessel within navigational channel with loss of containment.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	Collision Contact Grounding Human Error Technical Failure Loss of Containment	FTNS Tay Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Marine Guidelines & Port Information Notice to Mariners Survey / dredging Programme / Schedule Pilot Vessel training & Certification Good Housekeeping Towage Guidelines Small Vessel SMS	3	3	6	3	3	1	5	5	5	5	4.375	Most Likely: small fire which is extinguished by crew.  Worst Credible: Major fire leading to total loss of vessel.
1.6	Loss of Containment (oil products)	Collision Grounding Human Error Contact Technical Failure Sinking / Capsizing Fire / Explosion Environmental Conditions	FTNS Legislation & Guidance Alds to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Audits Liaison with Local Authoritys & Boat Clubs Bunkering Procedure	2	2	2	2	2	1	3	. 5	5	5	3.25	Most Likely: Small loss of non-persistant oil product.  Worst Credible: Large spill of persistant product.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
All content reviewed	Risk Scoring updated.

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Risk Assessment Team / Date DMM, HMD 09th January 2013
Risk Assessment - River Tay Transit + Berthing/Sailing Small	Revised By / Date CHM/HMFT/MMD/MCM / MOD August 2023



			Forth & Tay - Vessels at Anchor												
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes  How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)		(Mc	leve ost Li	1			(Wor	level st Cre	t Resid	)	Risk Score	MRF: 022/22 Loss of Anchor 069/21 (Dragging Anchor) 050/20 (fouled anchor), 049/20(fouled anchor), 017/18 (Dragging Anchor)
				Likelihood	People	Ι.	Environmen t	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	_	Business	Hazard R	
1.1	Dragging Anchor	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	Designated and Proven Anchorages FTNS Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Towage Byelaws & General Directions Pilotage Emergency Plans / OPRC	5	5	5	5	5	2	8	10	10	10	7.25	Most likely: Vessel drags anchor, then pays out more chain resulting in no further dragging.  Worst credible: Vessel drags anchor resulting in vessel going aground or making contact with bridge/jetty. Vessel suffers extreme damage and possibbilty of loss of life.
1.2	Contact	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	Pilotage (typically only Cruise vessels @ Newhaven + South Queensferry) FTNS Towage Byelaws & General Directions Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Designated and Proven Anchorages Notice to Mariners Emergency Plans / OPRC	2	4	6	4	4	1	5	5	5	5	4.75	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with buoy resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: Vessel has high speed impact with bridge/jetty resulting in significant damage to vessel and loss of life.
1.3	Grounding	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	Pilotage (typically only Cruise vessels @ Newhaven + South Queensferry) Passage plan — master / pilot information exchange FTNS Towage Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions & Tidal Monitoring Designated and Proven Anchorages Emergency Plans / OPRC	2	2	4	2	4	1	1	5	5	5	3.5	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with minimal damage.  Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	Pilotage (typically only Cruise vessels @ Newhaven + South Queensferry) FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions	3	3	3	3	3	1	5	5	5	5	4	Most likely: Vessel sinks, all crew safely abandon ship Worst credible: Vessel sinks resulting in total loss of vessel, and loss of life.
	Fire / Explosion	Human Error / Failure System Failure	Pilotage (typically only Cruise vessels @ Newhaven + South Queensferry) FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting	1	2	2	1	1	1	5	5	5	5	3.25	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.  Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	Pilotage (typically only Cruise vessels @ Newhaven + South Queensferry) FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Notice to Mariners Marine Guidelines & Port Information Bunkering Procedure	3	3	3	3	3	2	4	10	10	10	5.75	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
All	Updated Causes to new standard
Controls	Specified that pilotage is only used for Cruise vessels @ Newhaven/ S Queens.
Dragging Anchor	Decrease in Most Likely Property Risk
Contact	Decrease in Most Likely Business Risk
Grounding	Most likely risks reduced
Loss of Containment	Most Likely Risks reduced / Worst Credible Likelihood and risk increased
	·

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 1/06	DMM, HMFO, HMFI, HMD, MT&PV / 11th Jan 2013
Risk Assessment - Vessels at Anchor	Review Due	Revised Bv / Date
	Jul-24	July 2022, MMT



			Forth & Tay - Towage Operations												
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Likelihood		ost L Ove	el ∟ikely) erall R			(Wors	Property Pro	ible) Risk		S	MRF: 29/2022 (Loss ofComms)23/2022 (Contact)20/2022 Contact) 14/2022 (Contact) 13/2022 Contact) 03/2022 (Contact) 03/2022 (Contact) 03/2022 (Contact) 03/2022 (Contact) 03/2021 (Longoruso occurence) 016/2021 (Longoruso bridel) 07/02/(contact), 02/20(collision), 005/20(contact), 002/20(contact), 01/20(Contact), 106/19 (incorrect bridel), 082/19 (potential grounding), 080/19 (parted towline), 074/18 (Grounding), 026/19 (Contact)
1.1	Capsizing / Flooding	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	Towage Guidelines Tug SMS FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Pilotage Crew Training Pre Operations Checks/ Briefings	3		3	Ш		2		10 1				ost Likely: Tug experiences girting but is able to recover with no significant consequence/damage
1.2	Fire	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	FTNS Tug SMS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Marine Guidelines & Port Information Notice to Mariners Crew Training & Certification Good Housekeeping Towage Guidelines	2	4	4	2	4	1	5	5	5 5	4.	. <b>25</b>	ost Likely: Vessel suffers a minor fire which is extinguished quickly and results in no significant damage
1.3	Allision	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predications Marine Guidelines & Port Information Towage Guidelines Notice to Mariners Tue SMS Correct Tables (Cuellifications	5	5	10	5	10	2	10	10	5 10	8.	125 M.ve	ost Likely: Vessel makes minor contact with pier/jetty/object resulting in no significat damage to either th essel or object and no injuries  forst Credible: Vessel makes heavy conact with an object resulting in significant damage to both the essel and object with injuries/fatalities
1.4	Collision	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	By elaws & General Directions Emergency Plans Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predications Marine Guidelines & Port Information Towage Guidelines Notice to Mariners Turs SMS Corput Training (Qualifications)	2	2	4	2	4	1	5	5	5 5		4 M	ost Likely: Tug collides with another vessel at slow speed resulting in no significant damage to either sesel and no injuries  forst Credible: Tug collides with another vessel at high speed resulting in possible loss of the vessels and juries/fatalities
1.5	Grounding	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predications - spelling Marine Guidelines & Port Information Towage Guidelines Notice to Mariners  The State Communication (Challifications)  Changes Made	3	6	9	3	9	2	10	10 1	10 10	8.	375 Mid	ost Likely: Vessel reuns aground but suffers no significant damage and is able to be refloated with the

Content Reviewed	Changes Made								
General	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions								
Grounding	Increase in likelihood - Grounding								
Man Overboard / Personal injury	Removed - RA included in Towage Risk assesments								
Fire	Removed - Control - Latest sounding chart availiable								
Contact	Changed to Allision								
Allision									

MT&PV, MM, HMFO, DMM, HMD / 13th Feb 2013
Revised By / Date
July 2022, MMT



	Forth & Tay - Immobilised Vessels (at Anchor or Alongside)												MRF 015/15 (Fire) 072/19 (Fire)		
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Ris	(Mc	level st Lil				(Wors	level	dible	e)	Risk Score	
	(= oncode ing to a sensequence)		(,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	Likelihood	People		Environmen t	Business	Likelihood		Property	_	Business	Hazard Ri	
1.1	Allision Refer also to FP PMSC RA (F&T) 1	Human Error Technical Failure Enviromental Conditions	Byelaws & General Directions Weather Forecasting & Monitoring Marine Guidelines & Port Information Standby Tug at Anchor FTNS Extra Moorings	2	4	6	4	2	2	6	8	8	8	5.75	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with buoy resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: Vessel has high speed impact with bridge/jetty resulting in significant damage to vessel and loss of life.
1.2	Grounding Refer also to FP PMSC RA (F&T) 1	Human Error Technical Failure Enviromental Conditions	FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting & Monitoring Marine Guidelines & Port Information Notice to Mariners Standby Tug at Anchor	3	3	3	3	3	1	3	5	4	5	3.625	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with minimal damage.  Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.
1.3	Fire / Explosion Refer also to FP PMSC RA (F&T) 1	Human Error Technical Failure	Pilotage FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting	3	6	9	3	6	1	5	5	5	5	5.5	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel, and loss of life.

Full review	
	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions
Contact - Changed to Allision	Most Likely Business Risk reduced
	Worst Case Likelihood and People risk increased
Grounding	Most Likelly Likelihood increased + All risks increased
·	Worst Case Business risk increased
Fire/Explosion	Most Likely People Risk increased / Environmental risk decreased

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 3/06	MM, DMM / 26th Feb 2013
Risk Assessment - Immobilised	Review Due	Revised By / Date
Vessels	Jul-24	July 2022, MMT



		Fo	rth & Tay - Bunkering Operations In Dock												POLREP (Leith) 07/18 - 97/19 (Gmth bunker without permission)
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes  How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)		(Me	ored a level ost Li	l kely)			(Wo	lev orst C	at Res rel rediblerall Ri	e)	Risk Score	
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environmen t	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environmen	Business	Hazard R	
1.1	Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel	Human Error Technical Failure Enviromental Conditions	Pilotage Passage plan / berthing plan – master / pilot information exchange FTNS - Scheduling,VTS Bylaws & General Directions Notice To Maniners Weather Parameters Emergency Plans / OPRC Tugs Fenders Mooring/Unmooring Procedures Terminal Procedures Lock Gates Bunkering Procedures	2	6	6		2	1	5	5		5	4.5	Most likely: Slow speed collision between both vessels resulting in minimal damage and no loss of containment  Worst credible: Heavy collision between both vessels resulting in extreme damage, loss of life and loss of con
1.2	Contact	Human Error Technical Failure Enviromental Conditions	Pilotage Passage plan / berthing plan – master / pilot information exchange FTNS - Scheduling,VTS Bylaws & General Directions Notice To MannerS Weather Parameters Emergency Plans / OPRC Tugs Fenders Mooring Procedures	3	3	6	3	3	2	8	10	8	8	6.125	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with buoy resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: Vessel has high speed impact with quayside resulting in significant damage to vessel and loss of life.
	Loss of Conrainment (Oil Products)	Human Error Technical Failure Enviromental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS - Scheduling, VTS Forth Bylaws & General Directions N To M Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Weather Parameters Fenders either side of manifold Mooring Procedures Bunkering Procedure Vetting (Bunker Vessel) Bunkering Procedures Lock Gates Port Traffic Managment	3	3	3	3	3	1	1	4	4	5	3.25	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.
1.4	Fire/Explosion	Human Error Technical Failure	Pilotage FTNS - Scheduling, VTS Bylaws & General Directions Notices To Mariners Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Weather Forecasting Weather Parameters Bunkering Procedure. Mooring Procedures Vetting (Bunker Vessel)	1	2	2	2	1	1	5	5	5	5	3.375	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel, and loss of life.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
General	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions
Collision	Worst Case - Env risk increased
Contact - Changed to Allision	Most Likelihood increased
	Worst Case People Risk increased
Loss of containment	Most Likely Environ / Business increased
	Worst Case People/ property risk decreased + Business risk decreased
Fire/Explosion	Most likely All risks decreased

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 4/06	HMFO, HMFI, MM, HMD, DMM 20th Feb 2013
Risk Assessment - Bunkering	Review Due	Revised By / Date
Operations In Dock	Jul-24	July 2022, MMT



	Forth & Tay - Bunkering Operations Tidal Waters										MRF: 05/2022 (Mooring Line Parting) 04/2022 (Mechanical fail				
Ref.	Hazard	Causes	Controls  Preventative & Reactive	Ris	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely) (Worst Credible)		Score								
	What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	How can it go wrong	(What action & how frequent)	В	_	Overa		sk		ì	Over	all Ris	_	Risk	
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environmen t	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environmen t	Business	Hazard	
1.	Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel	Human Error Technical Failure Enviromental Conditions	Pilotage Passage plan / berthing plan — master / pilot information exchange FTNS - Scheduling,VTS Bylaws & General Directions Notice To Mariners Weather Parameters Emergency Plans / OPRC Tugs Fenders Mooring/Unmooring Procedures Bunkering Procedure	3	6	6	3	3	1	4		5	5	4.625	Most likely: Slow speed collision between both vessels resulting in minimal damage and no loss of containment  Worst credible: Heavy collision between both vessels resulting in extreme damage, loss of life and loss of containment
1.2	Contact	Human Error Technical Failure Enviromental Conditions	Pilotage Passage plan / berthing plan – master / pilot information exchange FTNS - Scheduling,VTS Bylaws & General Directions Notice To Mariners Weather Parameters Emergency Plans / OPRC Tugs Fenders Mooring Procedures Bunkering Procedure	2	4	2	2	2	1	5	5	5	5	3.75	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with buoy resulting in minimal damage.  Worst credible: Vessel has high speed impact with quayside resulting in significant damage to vessel and loss of life.
1.5	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	Human Error Technical Failure	Pilotage FTNS - Scheduling, VTS Bylaws & General Directions N To M Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Weather Parameters Fenders either side of manifold Mooring Procedures Bunkering Procedure Vetting (Bunker Vessel) Oil Pollution response standby vessel	3	3	3	3	6	1	1	4	5	5	3.75	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally.  Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.
1	Fire/Explosion	Human Error Technical Failure	Pilotage FTNS - Scheduling, VTS Bylaws & General Directions Notices To Mariners Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Weather Parameters Tugs Bunkering Procedure. Mooring Procedures Vetting (Bunker Vessel) Bunkering Procedure	1	2	2	2	1	1	5	5	5	5	3.375	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel, and loss of life.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
General	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions
Collision	Most Likely All Risks decreased
Contact - Changed to Allision	Most Likely - Likelihood decreased and people / property decreased
	Worst Case - People/ Env / Business risk increased
Loss of Containment	Most Likely - All risks increased
	Worst Case - People / Env / Business Risks increased Property risk decreased
Fire / Explosion	Most Likely All Riskd increased

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 5/06	HMFO, HMFI, MM, HMD, DMM 20th Feb 2013
Risk Assessment - Bunkering	Review Due	Revised By / Date
Operations Tidal Waters	.lul-24	July 2022 MMT



	Forth & Tay - NAABSA Berths											No relevant MRF's since previous review			
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Ris	(Me	leve ost Li	nt Res el ikely)			(Wors	red at level at Cree	dible	)	Risk Score	
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People		Environment	Business	Hazard Ris	
1.:	<sup>2</sup> Capsize/Flooding	Human Error Technical Failure Enviromental Conditions	FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions NAABSA Berth Procedure NAABSA Berth Inspections Survey Programme	2	2	2	4	2	1	5	5	5	5	3.75	Most likely: Vessel takes on water which is contained resulting in no long term damage to the vessel and no injury  Worst credible: Vessel capsizes resulting in total loss of vessel and multiple fatalities
1.	3 Fire	Human Error Technical Failure Enviromental Conditions	NAABSA Berth Procedures Emergency Procedures Welcome Pack	3	6	9	3	6	1	5	5	5	5	5.5	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished.  Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel, and loss of life.
1.	Hull Damage	Human Error Enviromental Conditions	NAABSA Berth Procedures Emergency Procedures Welcome Pack NAABSA Inspections Survey Programme Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions & Monitoring Byelaws & General Directions	1	1	2	1	3	1	5	5	5	5	3.375	Most likely: Vessel suffers minor hull damage which can be easily repiaired and no injuries occur.  Worst credible: Vessel suffers extensive hull damage resulting in flooding

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
General	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions
Lack of Containment	Removed
Contact	Removed
Capsize / Flooding	Most Likely - Likelihood and Risks reduced
Fire	Most Likely - Likelihood increased and Property risk reduced
	Worst Case - Likelihood decreased, Environment Risk increased
Hull Damaged	Most Likely - Likelihood decreased, Property and env risk decreased
	Worst Case - Likelihood decreased, all risks increased

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 06/06	DMM, HMFO, HMFI, HMD, MT&PV / 11th Jan 2013
Risk Assessment - NAABSA Berths	Review Due	Revised By / Date
	Jul-24	July 2022 MMT



	Forth & Tay - Diving Operations								No relevant MRFs since previous review						
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong	Causes  How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive	Ris		red at level ost Lik		dual			ed at I level at Cred	Residua lible)		Score	
	(Event leading to a consequence)		(What action & how frequent)	Likelihood	People	Dvera https://doi.org/10.000/10.0000	Environment III	k Business	Likelihood	People	P.	Risk Business		Hazard Risk	
1.1	Swamping / turbulence / interaction	Human Error Enviromental Conditions	Forth Ports Dive Procedure (Permit) Dive Signals displayed Established Communications FTNS Exclusion Zones Speed Restrictions Notice to Mariners Dive Supervisor Local Monitoring	3	9	6	3	6	2	10	4	2 10	6		Most Likely: Passing vessel comes too close or passes at speed which will alarm divers and possibly result n minor injury.  Worst Credible: Passing vessel comes too close or passes at speed which results in fatality to diver.
1.2		Human Error Enviromental Conditions	Forth Ports Dive Procedure (Permit) Established Communications FTNS Exclusion Zones Notice to Mariners	1	3	2	1	2	1	5	5	3 5	3	.25	Most Likely: Vessel makes contact with diver / dive boat resulting in minor injuries.  Worst Credible: Vessel makes contact with diver / dive boat resulting in fatalities and loss of dive boat.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
General	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions
Swamping	Most Likely - People, Property and Buisness Risks increased
	Worst Credible Likelihood and buisness risk increased, Property and Environment Risk increased
Contact	Most Likely - Business Risk increased

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date							
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 7/04	HMFI/HMFO/HMD/MM/CHM 03rd Sep 14							
Risk Assessment - Diving Operations	Review Due	Revised By / Date							
	Jul-24	July 2022 MMT							



	Forth & Tay - Recreational Events (e.g.swim events)											MRF 068/2018 - Swim Event			
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes  How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Ris	(M	leve lost Li	el			(Wor	red at level st Cre	dible)		Risk Score	
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Hazard Ri	
1.	1 Collision / contact	Human Error Enviromental Conditions	Event Notification Form Notice to Mariners Exclusion Zones (as considered appropriate) FTNS Planning Meetings (Where appropriate) Appropriate Safety Craft Established Communications Localised monitoring by Event Organisers	2	6	2	2	6	1	5	2	3	5	3.875	Most Likely: Contact between participant and other water user resulting in alarm or minor inury.  Worst Credible: Contact between participant and other water user resulting in fatality.
1.	Swamping / interaction / turbulence	Human Error Enviromental Conditions	Event Notification Form Notice to Mariners Exclusion Zones (as considered appropriate) FTNS Planning Meetings (Where appropriate) Appropriate Safety Craft Established Communications Localised monitoring by Event Organisers	2	6	2	2	2	1	5	5	3	5	3.75	Most Likely: Passing vessel comes too close or passes at speed causing alarm and possibly result in minor injury.  Worst Credible: Passing vessel comes too close or passes at speed which results in falality.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
General	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions
Collision	Most Likely - Property Risk increased
	Worst Credible - Property and Environment Risk decreased / Buisness risk increased
	Most Likely - People Risk increased
Swamping	Worst Credible - Property, Environment and business risk increased

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 8/04	HMFI/HMFO/HMD/MM/CHM 03rd Sep 14
Risk Assessment - Recreational	Review Due	Revised By / Date
Events	Jul-24	July 2022, MMT



	Forth & Tay - Underwater Cables & Pipelines											No relevant MRFs since previous review		
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Ris	k scor	Risk scored at Residu level (Worst Credible)					k Score			
	(Etain leading to a consequence)		(maracion a non negatiny	Likelihood		Property	Business	Likelihood			ent	Business	Hazard Risk	
1.1	Contact	Human Error Technical Failure Enviromental Conditions	FTNS Emergency Procedures (Pipeline Damage Procedure) Pilotage Marine Guidelines & Port Information Byelaws & General Directions Exclusion Zone Survey Programme and Schedule Weather Forecast / Tidal Information & Monitoring Aids to Navigation	2	2		2 2	1	2		5	5	3.125	Most Likely: Minor contact is made with a pipeline/cable resulting in no significant damage  Worst Credible: Pipleine/Cable receives heavy contact resulting in substantial damage causing widespread pollution or major loss of supply from cables
1.2	Fire / Explosion	Human Error Technical Failure Enviromental Conditions	FTNS Emergency Procedures (Pipeline Damage Procedure) Pilotage Marine Guidelines & Port Information Byelaws & General Directions Exclusion Zone Survey Programme and Schedule Weather Forecast / Tidal Information & Monitoring Aids to Navigation	1	1	1	1 1	1	3	5	5	5	2.75	Most Likely: Small fire at production end resulting in minimal impact to pipeline  Worst Credible: Major fire/explosion at production end resulting in severe damage to a pipeline and extensive widespread pollution
1.3	Loss of Containment / Power / Communication	Human Error Technical Failure Enviromental Conditions	FTNS Emergency Procedures (Pipeline Damage Procedure) Pilotage Marine Guidelines & Port Information Byelaws & General Directions Exclusion Zone Survey Programme and Schedule Weather Forecast / Tidal Information & Monitoring Aids to Navigation	2	2	2	2 2	1	2	5	5	5	3.125	Most Likely: Minor loss of containment/supply which is rectified quickly and results in no widespread pollution/effects  Worst Credible: Major loss of containment resulting in extensive and widespread pollution/loss of powere, data

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
General	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions
Pipeline Damage	Removed as similar to other hazards
Contact - changed to Allision	Most Likely - Property and Business risk increased
	Worst Credible - People risk decreased / Environment risk increased
Fire / Explosion	Most Likely - All risks reduced
	Worst Credible People Risk Reduced
Loss of Containment	Most Likely All risks reduced
	Worst Credible People risk reduced / Environment risk increased

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date							
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 9/03	CHM/MM 18th Feb 2015							
Risk Assessment - Underwater Cables & Pipelines	Review Due	Revised By / Date							
	Jul-24	July 2022, MMT							

	Marine Pollution (Tidal Waters)												POLREP: 05/2022 (Leaking Gangway Seal) 08/2021 (Cruise Tender)07/2021 (Oil sheen) 05/21 (Oil Sheen) 02/2021 (Cruise tender) Limekilns (19/2/19), N. Queensferry (12/8/19), Bridges (09/3/20), Pittenweem(15.11.20),	
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive	Ris	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)						ed at Ro level t Credil	esidual	Score	
	(Event leading to a consequence)	Them can it go mong	(What action & how frequent)			Overall Risk				Overall Risk			Risk S	
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Business	Hazard R	
4.4	Loss of Containment (oil product)	Human Error Technical Failure	FTNS Bunkering Procedure Byelaws & General Directions Pilotage Survey Programme / Schedule Marine Guidelines & Port Information Emergency Plans - OPRC Towage Guidelines Oil Terminal Guidelines Weather / tidal Forecasting & Monitoring Oil Spill Prediction Software Notice to Mariners	5	5	5	5	5	1	3	5 5	5		Most Likely: Minor pollution consisting of a light product which has no adverse effects on the marine environment and dissipates naturally  Worst Credible: Major widespread pollution consisting of a heavy product which results in extensive adverse effects to the marine environment/wildlife requiring significant resource to tackle

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
General	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions
Loss of Containment	Most Likely EnvironmentRisk Decreased

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 10/03	CHM, MM, DMM, HMD / 12th August 2015
		•
Risk Assessment - Marine Pollution	Review Due	Revised By / Date
(Tidal Waters)	.lul-24	July 2022 MMT

	Marine Pollution (Enclosed Dock)													01/2021 (Oil Sheen) 03/2021 (Oil Sheen) 04/2021 (Black Soot)06/2021 (Oil Sheen) Leith (19/219) (1/9/19), (07.04.20), (21.10.20) (27.1.21) Gmth - (17.6.20), (21.7.20), (9.12.20), (15.1.21)(18.3.21) Burntisland - (27.1.21)			
Ref.	Hazard  What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes  How can it go wrong	Controls  Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk		Risk scored at Residu level (Most Likely)			level Most Likely)			level (Worst Credible)			sk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)		
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Business	Hazard Risk				
1.	Loss of Containment (oil product)		FTNS Bunkering Procedure Byelaws & General Directions Pilotage Survey Programme / Schedule Marine Guidelines & Port Information Emergency Plans - OPRC Towage Guidelines Oil Terminal Guidelines Notice to Mariners Lock Gates	5	5	5	5	5	1	5	5 5	5	5	Most Likely: Small scale pollution consisting of a light product which is contained within a dock and dissipates naturally  Worst Credible: Major pollution consisting of a heavy product which cannot be contained with the dock and results in extensive damage to the marine environment requiring extensive resources to tackle			

Changes Made
Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date
	FP PMSC RA (F) 11/03	CHM, MM, DMM, HMD / 12th August 2015
Risk Assessment - Marine Pollution	Review Due	Revised By / Date
(Encolsed Docks)	.lul-24	July 2022 MMT