LIST OF PMSC RISK ASSESSMENTS

Name
Forth River Passage - Standard Vessel
Port of Leith - Arrival / Sailing Leith Approach Buoy to Berth with Outer Berth works
Port of Rosyth - Arrival/Sailing No.1 Rosyth Channel Buoy to Berth
Port of Methil - Arrival/Sailing Methil Pilot Station to Berth
Methil Energy Park - Arrival/Sailing Methil Pilot Station to Berth
Port of Kirkcaldy - Arrival/Sailing Close Approaches of Dock to Berth
Port of Burntisland - Arrival/Sailing Close Approaches of Dock to Berth
Inverkeithing - Arrival/Sailing Saint Davids Beacon to Berth
Braefoot Jetty - Arrival/Sailing Eastern Limits to Berth
Port of Grangemouth - Arrival/Sailing Hen & Chickens to Berth
Crombie Berthing/Sailing
Hound Point - Arrival/Sailing Eastern Limits to Berth
Cruise Vessels at Anchorage
Forth - River Transit and Berthings/Sailings small comerical craft (tugs, workboats etc.)
Cruise Vessel Tender Operations (Hound Point / Newhaven)
Tay River Passage - Standard Vessels (Arrival/Sailing Port Approaches to Berth)
Port of Dundee - Oil Rigs - Arrival/Sailing Port Limits to Berth
Tay - River Transit and Berthings/Sailings small comerical craft (tugs, workboats etc.)
Tay Tuvor Transit and Bortiningorodining officine contential orall (lago, workboate cte.)
Forth & Tay - Vessel at Anchor
Forth & Tay - Towage Operations
Forth & Tay - Immobilised Vessels
Forth & Tay - Bunkering Operations in Dock
Forth & Tay - Bunkering Operations in Tidal Waters
Forth & Tay - NAABSA Berths
Forth & Tay - Diving Operations
Forth & Tay - Recreational Events
Forth & Tay - Underwater Cables & Pipelines
Forth & Tay - Marine Pollution (Tidal Waters)
Forth & Tay - Marine Pollution (Enclosed Dock)

PMSC RISK ASSESSMENT - RISK RANKING

Rank	HazardiD	Hazard	Hazard Scoring
		What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	
1	ED DMOO DA (E) AA AA Girlian (Oppoint		
1	FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	8.5
3		Collision Grounding	8.375
3		Collision	8.375
5	TTT MEG TOTAL TOTAL COMMON	Allison	8.125
5	TTT MEG TOT (FOLT) SEE THOUSE	Contact	8.125
7		Contact	7.875
8	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Fire / Explosion	7.75
9	FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	7.625
9		Fire / Explosion	7.625
9		Fire / Explosion	7.625
12	FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	7.5
13	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	7.37
13	FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	7.37
15		Dragging Anchor	7.2
15	TTT MEG TOTAL TO THE COMMON	Collision	7.2
15	TT T WOO TA (T) 13-1.2 CONTACT	Contact	7.2
18	11 Time of the Control of the Contro	Sinking / Capsize	6.87
18		Sinking / Capsize	6.87
18	TT TIMO TO	Sinking / Capsize	6.87
18	TT T MOOTOT (T / OT 1.0 Croamang	Grounding	6.875
18	11 THEO TOTAL TOTAL CONTROL EXPRESSION	Fire / Explosion	6.875
18	TT T MEG TOTAL TO THE T EXPLOSION	Fire / Explosion	6.875
18		Contact	6.875
25	11 Time of the (17 control 2000 of Contaminating (on product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	6.7
25	TT T MOOTOT (T) TE 1.0 E000 of Contamination (on product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	6.75
27	11 1 WOC NA (1) 04 - 1.2 CONTACT	Contact	6.625
28	11 Time of the Country of the Countr	Capsizing / Flooding	6.5
28	THE CHARLES TO THE COMMON	Collision Collision	6.5
28	TT TWO TO THE OWNER OF		6.5
28	TT TWO TO THE SOMEON	Contact	6.5
28	TTT WOOT VY (T) OT = 1.4 ORINING / Outsize	Sinking / Capsize	6.5
	TT T WOOT VY(T) 60 - 1.2 CONTACT	Contact Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	6.5
34 35	11 1 Mod 14 (17 07 1.7 Edda at Back Edita (Edda Cata Operationa)		6.375
35		Swamping / interaction / turbulence Grounding	6.25
35	11 Timoc Tut (1702 Tito Greathaing	Collision	6.25
35	TT T WOC TA (T) 07 - 1.1 Collision	Grounding	6.25
35	11 Time of the Control of Control	Fire / Explosion	6.25
35	TTT MEG TOTAL TO THE TEXPLOSION		6.25
41		Contract	6.25
41	TT T MOOTOT (TOT) OT THE COMMON	Contact Collision	6.125
43	TTT MOOTOT(T) 14-1.1 Complete	Fire / Explosion	6.125
44	11 THEO TOTAL TILE TRANSPORTED	-	5.875
44	11 Time of the Control of the Contro	Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Allison	5.75
44	TTT WCCTCT(TAT) CC-1.1 COMMENTAGE TOTAL TWCCTCT(TAT)	Collision	5.75
47	TT T MOC TOTAL TO COMMON	Grounding	5.625
47		Contact	5.625
47		Contact	5.625
50	11 THEOTOTICS	Fire	5.5
50		Fire	5.5
50		Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	5.5
50		Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	5.5
50	FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	5.5
50		Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	5.5
50		Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	5.5
57		Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	5.25
57		Grounding	5.25
59		Fire / Explosion	5.125
60		Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	
60		Grounding	
60		Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	
60	FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.1 Dragging Anchor	Dragging Anchor	
60		Grounding	
60		Sinking / Capsize	
60		Sinking / Capsize	
67	FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	4.87
68	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	4.7
68		Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	4.7
68	FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	4.7
68	FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	4.7
68	FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	4.7
68	FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	4.7
68	FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	4.7
75		vessel	4.62
75		Sinking / Capsize	4.62
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 04 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel	vessel	4.
77		Sinking / Capsize	4.!
77 77	FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize		4
	TT T MOO TO (1) OT = 1.4 Officing / Oupsize	Sinking / Capsize	
77	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize		4.5
77 77	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 14 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.1 Collision	Sinking / Capsize	4.5 4.5
77 77 77	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 14 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.1 Collision FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize Collision	4.5 4.5 4.5
77 77 77 77	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.1 Collision FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.1 Collision	Sinking / Capsize Collision Sinking / Capsize	4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5

		I	
	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	4.5
	FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	4.375
	FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	4.375
	FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.7 Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	4.375
	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	4.375
	FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	4.375
	FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	4.375
	FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	4.375
86	FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	4.375
86	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	4.375
86	FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	4.375
96	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 02 - 1.2 Fire	Fire	4.25
96	FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	4.25
	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	4.25
	FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	4.25
	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	4.25
	FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	4.125
	FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	4.125
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	4.123
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.4 Collision	Collision	4
		Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	4
	FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product) Refer also to FP PMSC RA (F&T FP PMSC RA (F&T) 08 - 1.1 - Collision / contact		4
		Collision / Contact Fire / Explosion	3.875
	FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion		3.875
	FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.875
	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.875
	FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	3.875
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 05 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	3.75
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 05 - 1.3 Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.75
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 06 - 1.2 Capsize / Flooding	Capsizing / Flooding	3.75
111	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 08 - 1.2 - Swamping / interaction / turbulence	Swamping / interaction / turbulence	3.75
111	FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.1 Collision	Collsion	3.75
116	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 03 - 1.2 Grounding Refer Also to FP PMSC RA (F&T) 1	Grounding	3.625
116	FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	3.625
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	3.5
	FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3.5
	FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.5
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 04 - 1.4 Fire/Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3.375
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 05 - 1.4 Fire/Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3.375
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 06 - 1.4 Hull Damage	Hull Damage	3.375
	FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	
		Collision	3.375
	FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.1 Collision		3.375
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3.25
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 04 - 1.3 Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.25
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 07 - 1.2 - Collision / contact	Collision / Contact	3.25
	FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.3 Grounding Refer Also to: FP PMSSC RA (F&T)7	Grounding	3.25
	FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	3.25
	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	3.25
	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.7 Loss of Dock Level	Loss of Dock Level	3.25
126	FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire	3.25
126	FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.25
	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.25
	FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.25
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 09 - 1.1 Contact	Contact	3.125
137		Loss of Containment / Power / Communication	
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 09 - 1.4 Loss of Containment / Power / Communication	Sing / Symbolics	3.125
	FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion Fire / Explosion	3.125 3.125
	FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3.125
	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3.125
	FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	3
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 09 - 1.3 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	2.75

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Original Date
	FP PMSC (R) 1/03	Jul-13
Risk Ranking	Review Due	Revised By /
	Ongoing	MM / August

PMSC RISK ASSESSMENT - RISK RANKING

			Most Likely Risk scored at Residual level		Risk scored at Residual						
Rank	Hazard ID Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)		People	Property	Environment	Business	People	Property	Environment	Business	Hazard Scoring
1	FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	3	4	3	3	5	5	3	5	8.5
3	<u>FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.1 Collision</u> <u>FP PMSC RA (F&T) 02 - 1.5 Grounding</u>	Collision Grounding	10	10	5	5 9	10	10	10	10	8.5 8.375
3	FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	6	9	6	6	10	10	10	10	8.375
5	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 02 - 1.3 Contact	Contact	5	10	5	10	10	10	5	10	8.125
7	FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	5	10	5	5	10 10	10	10	10	8.125 7.875
8	FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	2	4	2	2	5	4	3	4	7.75
9	FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	6	6	3	6	10	10	10	10	7.625
9	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion Fire / Explosion	3	9	6	3	10 10	10	10	10	7.625 7.625
12	FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	6	6	6	2	10	10	10	10	7.5
13 13	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.2 Contact	Contact Contact	5	10	5	5	6	10	8	10	7.375
	FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.1 Dragging Anchor	Dragging Anchor	5	5	5 5	5	10 8	10	10	10 10	7.375 7.25
15	FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	5	5	5	5	10	10	8	10	7.25
15 18	FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Contact Sinking / Capsize	5	5	5	5	10	10	8	10	7.25
18	FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.4 SINKING / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	3	9	6	3	10	6	8	10	6.875 6.875
	FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	3	9	6	3	10	6	8	10	6.875
	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	3	6	6	6	10	10	6	8	6.875
	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion Fire / Explosion	3	9	6	3	10 10	6	8	10	6.875 6.875
18	FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	3	6	3	3	10	10	10	10	6.875
25	FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	3	6	6	6	10	10	10	6.75
25 27	FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product) FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.2 Contact	Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Contact	3	10	6	6	6	10	10	10	6.75 6.625
28	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 02 - 1.1 Capsizing / Flooding	Capsizing / Flooding	3	3	3	3	10	10	10	10	6.5
28	FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	4	4	2	2	10	10	10	10	6.5
28 28	FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.2 Contact	Collision Contact	4	4	2	2	10	10 10	10 10	10	6.5 6.5
	FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.2 COTIACU	Sinking / Capsize	8	8	8	8	5	5	5	5	6.5
28	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	2	6	2	6	8	10	8	10	6.5
34 35	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.7 Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations) FP PMSC RA (F&T) 07 - 1.1 - Swamping / turbulence / interaction	Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	5	5	5	10	4	6	8	8	6.375
35	FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.3 Grounding	Swamping / interaction / turbulence Grounding	9	6	6	6 3	10 6	8	8	10	6.25 6.25
35	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	3	3	3	3	8	10	10	10	6.25
35 35	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	3	9	3	3	2	10	10	10	6.25
	FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.1 Collision	Fire / Explosion Collision	10	10	5 2	2	10	5 10	10	10	6.25 6.25
41	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 04 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	3	6	3	3	8	10	8	8	6.125
41	FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	10	10	5	5	10	10	8	10	6.125
43 44	FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Fire / Explosion Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	9	6	9	5	10	10	10	5.875 5.75
44	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 03 - 1.2 Grounding Refer Also to FP PMSC RA (F&T) 1	Grounding	4	6	4	2	6	8	8	8	5.75
44	FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	Collision	3	3	3	3	10	8	8	8	5.75
	FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.2 Contact	Grounding Contact	3	10	6	6	6	6	6	6	5.625 5.625
47	FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	5	10	5	5	5	5	5	5	5.625
50	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 06 - 1.3 Fire	Fire	6	9	3	6	5	5	5	5	5.5
50 50	FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product) FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	3	6	6	4	6	8	8	5.5 5.5
	FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.0 Loss of Containment (oil product) FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	3	6	6	3	10	4	4	8	5.5
50	FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	3	6	6	4	6	8	8	5.5
50 56	FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	4	4	4	4	2	2	4	4	5.5
56	FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product) FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	2	4	4	2	6	8	8	8	5.25 5.25
	FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3	9	6	3	5	5	5	5	5.125
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 11 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product) FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.3 Grounding Refer Also to: FP PMSSC RA (F&T)7	Grounding	2	2 4	4 2	4 	6	6 8	8	8	5
59	FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	2	2	4	4	6	6	8	8	5
59								6	4	6	5
	FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	5	5	5	5	4	- 0			
59 59	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	5 5	5	5 5	5 5	5 6	5	5	5	5
59 59 66	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.2 Contact	- v	5 5 4 3	5 5 8 6	5 5 6 3	5 5 6 3	4 5 4 6	5 4 6	5 4 6	5 4 6	5 5 4.875
59 59 66 67	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F8 T) 01 - 1.2 Contact	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Contact Contact	5 5 4 3 4	5 8 6 6	5 5 6 3	5 5 6 3 4	4 5 4 6	5 4 6	5 4 6 5	5 4 6 5	4.75
59 59 66	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Contact	5 5 4 3 4 5	5 8 6 5	5 6 3 4 5	5 5 6 3 4 5	4 5 4 6 5 3	5 4 6 5	5 4 6 5	5 4 6 5	4.75 4.75
59 59 66 67 67 67	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F8 T) 01 - 1.2 Contact	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Contact Contact Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Contact Grounding	5 5 4 3 4 5 3	5 8 6 6 5	5 6 3 4 5 6	5 6 3 4 5 3	4 5 4 6 5 3 5	5 4 6 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5	4.75
59 59 66 67 67 67 67	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F8T) 01 - 1.1 Contact FP PMSC RA (F8T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F8T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.3 Conunding FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Contact Contact Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Contact Grounding Sinking / Capsize	5 5 4 3 4 5 3 2	5 8 6 6 5 6 5	5 6 3 4 5 6 4	5 6 3 4 5 3 6	4 5 4 6 5 3 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5	4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75
59 59 66 67 67 67 67 67	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F&T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Contact Contact Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Contact Grounding Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize	5 4 3 4 5 3 2 3 3	5 8 6 6 5 6 5	5 6 3 4 5 6 4 5	5 6 3 4 5 3 6 5 5	4 5 4 6 5 3 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5	4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75
59 59 66 67 67 67 67	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F8T) 01 - 1.1 Contact FP PMSC RA (F8T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F8T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.3 Conunding FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Contact Contact Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Contact Grounding Sinking / Capsize	5 4 3 4 5 3 2 3 3 3 6	5 8 6 5 6 5 5	5 6 3 4 5 6 4 5 5	5 6 3 4 5 3 6 5 5 5	4 6 5 3 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 6 5 5 5 5	4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75
59 59 66 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 74	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Contact Contact Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Contact Grounding Sinking / Capsize	5 4 3 4 5 3 2 3 3 3 3 6	5 8 6 6 5 6 5 5 5	5 6 3 4 5 6 4 5 5 5	5 6 3 4 5 3 6 5 5 5 3 4	4 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 5 5 5 5 5	4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75
59 59 66 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 74	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F8T) 01 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F8T) 01 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F8T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F8T) 05 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F8T) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F8T) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Contact Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Contact Grounding Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize	5 5 4 3 4 5 3 2 3 3 6 4 4 6	5 8 6 6 5 6 5 5 5 4	5 5 6 3 4 5 6 4 5 5 5 3	5 6 3 4 5 3 6 5 5 5 5 3 4 4 2	4 5 4 6 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.625
59 59 66 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 74 74 76	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F8T) 01 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F8T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Contact Contact Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Contact Grounding Sinking / Capsize	5 5 4 3 4 5 3 3 2 3 3 3 6 6 4 6 6 3 3 4 4 6 6 7 8 7 8 7 8 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7	5 8 6 5 6 5 5 5 5 6	5 5 6 3 4 5 6 4 5 5 5 5 3 5 2 4	5 6 3 4 5 3 6 5 5 5 3 4 4 2	4 5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.625
59 59 66 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 74 74 76 76	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F&T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Contact Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Contact Grounding Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	5 5 4 3 4 5 3 2 3 3 3 3 6 6 4 6 6 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 6 4 6 4 6 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 6 4 6	5 5 8 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 6 4 6 6	5 6 3 4 5 6 4 5 5 5 5 5 2 4 4 4 4 5	5 6 3 3 4 5 3 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 2 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7	4 5 4 6 5 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.625
59 59 66 67 67 67 67 67 67 74 74 76 76 76	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F8T) 01 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F8T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F8T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F8T) 05 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F8T) 05 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F8T) 04 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F8T) 04 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F0 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Contact Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Contact Grounding Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Collision (Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Collision (Fighing/Leisure Vessel) Sinking / Capsize	5 5 4 4 5 3 3 3 3 3 4 6 6 6 6 3 3 4 4 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	5 8 8 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 6 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	5 6 3 4 5 6 4 5 5 5 5 5 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	5 6 3 4 5 3 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	4 5 4 6 5 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.625
59 59 66 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 74 74 76 76 76	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F8T) 01 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F8T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.1 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F8T) 05 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F8T) 04 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F8T) 04 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F0 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Contact Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Contact Grounding Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel)	5 5 4 4 3 3 4 4 5 5 3 3 3 3 6 6 4 4 6 6 3 3 4 4 5 6 6 6 6 6 7 3 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6	5 8 6 6 5 5 6 6 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	5 6 3 4 5 6 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	5 6 3 4 5 3 6 5 5 5 5 3 4 4 2 2 4 4 6 6 6 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 6 6 6 6	4 5 4 6 5 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75
59 59 66 67 67 67 67 67 67 74 74 76 76 76 76	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F8T) 01 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F8T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F8T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F8T) 05 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F8T) 05 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F8T) 04 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F8T) 04 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F8T) 04 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.3 Grounding	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Contact Contact Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Contact Grounding Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Collision (Capsize Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) Sinking / Capsize Collision	5 5 4 3 4 5 3 3 3 3 3 6 4 4 6 6 3 3 4 4 6 6 6 7 8 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8	5 5 8 8 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	5 6 3 4 5 6 4 5 5 5 5 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2	5 6 3 4 5 3 6 5 5 5 5 3 4 4 4 6 6 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	4 6 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75
59 59 66 67 67 67 67 67 67 74 74 76 76 76 76 76	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F8T) 01 - 1.1 Contact FP PMSC RA (F8T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.1 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.1 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.1 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.1 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.1 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.1 Collision FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.1 Collision FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.1 Collision	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Contact Contact Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Contact Grounding Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) Sinking / Capsize Collision Grounding Grounding Grounding Collision	5 5 4 3 4 5 3 3 3 3 3 4 6 6 3 4 4 6 6 3 4 4 6 6 6 6	5 8 8 6 6 6 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	5 6 3 4 5 6 4 5 5 5 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	5 5 6 6 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 6 6 6 4 4 3 3 4 4 2 6 6 6 4 4 4 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	4 5 4 6 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75
59 59 66 67 67 67 67 67 67 74 74 76 76 76 76 76 76	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F&T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F&T) 05 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F&T) 04 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.1 Collision FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.1 Collision FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.2 Contact	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Contact Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Contact Grounding Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) Sinking / Capsize Collision Grounding Grounding Grounding Collision Collision	5 5 4 3 4 5 3 3 3 3 6 6 4 4 6 6 3 3 4 4 6 6 6 2 2 3 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7	5 8 8 6 6 6 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	5 6 3 4 5 6 4 5 5 5 5 5 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	5 5 6 6 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 4 4 6 6 4 4 3 3 4 4 2 2 6 6 6 4 4 3 3 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	4 5 4 6 6 5 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75
59 59 66 67 67 67 67 67 67 74 74 76 76 76 76 76	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F8T) 01 - 1.1 Contact FP PMSC RA (F8T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.1 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.1 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.1 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.1 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.1 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.1 Collision FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.1 Collision FP PMSC RA (F) 09 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.1 Collision	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Contact Contact Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Contact Grounding Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) Sinking / Capsize Collision Grounding Grounding Grounding Collision	5 5 4 3 4 5 3 3 3 3 6 6 4 4 6 6 3 3 4 4 6 6 2 3 3 4 4 6 6 6 6 7 8 7 8 8 7 8 8 7 8 8 7 8 8 7 8 8 7 8	5 8 8 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	5 6 3 4 5 6 4 5 5 5 5 5 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	5 5 6 6 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 7 5 5 5 5 5 7 5 7 5 7 5 7 5 7	4 5 4 6 5 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75
599 599 599 599 599 599 599 599 599 599	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F&T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Collision FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Collision FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Collision FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Collision FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Collision	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Contact Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Contact Grounding Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) Sinking / Capsize Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) Sinking / Capsize Collision Grounding Grounding Collision Contact Grounding Contact Grounding Contact Grounding Contact Grounding Contact	5 5 4 3 4 5 3 3 3 3 3 4 6 6 4 6 2 3 4 4 2 3 3 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7	5 5 8 8 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	5 6 3 4 5 6 4 5 5 5 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	5 5 5 3 3 4 4 2 2 6 6 4 4 3 3 6 6 9 9 3 3	4 4 6 5 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.625 4.625 4.53 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
593 593 596 677 677 677 677 677 677 744 766 766 76	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F8T) 01 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F8T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F8T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F8T) 05 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F8T) 05 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F8T) 04 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F8T) 04 - 1.1 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F0T) 04 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F0T) 04 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F0T) 04 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F0T) 04 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.1 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.1 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Collision FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.1 Collision FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.1 Collision FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.1 Collision FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.1 Collision FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.1 Collision	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Contact Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Contact Grounding Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) Sinking / Capsize Collision Grounding Grounding Grounding Grounding Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations) Collision Collision Collision Contact	5 5 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 6 6 3 3 4 4 6 6 2 2 3 3 4 4 6 6 6 6 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8	5 5 8 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	5 6 3 4 5 6 4 5 5 5 5 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 4 4 3 3 6 6 6 4 4 3 3 6 6 6 9 9 3 3 3 3	4 4 6 5 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75
595 599 599 666 677 677 677 677 677 744 766 766 766	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F&T) 10 - 1.1 Loss of Containment (Oil Product) FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.2 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.1 Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.1 Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Sinking / Capsize FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Collision FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Collision FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Grounding FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Collision FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Collision FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 01 - 1.1 Collision	Sinking / Capsize Sinking / Capsize Contact Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Contact Grounding Sinking / Capsize Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel Sinking / Capsize Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) Sinking / Capsize Collision (Fishing/Leisure Vessel) Sinking / Capsize Collision Grounding Grounding Collision Contact Grounding Contact Grounding Contact Grounding Contact Grounding Contact	5 5 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 6 6 3 3 4 4 6 6 2 2 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3	5 5 8 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	5 5 6 6 4 4 5 5 5 5 3 3 5 5 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	5 5 5 3 3 4 4 2 2 4 4 3 3 6 6 9 9 3 3 3 3 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 3 3 3 3 3	4 5 5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75

85	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3	6	3	3	5	5	5	5	4.375
85	FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3	6	3	3	5	5	5	5	4.375
95	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 02 - 1.2 Fire	Fire	4	4	2	4	5	5	5	5	4.25
95	FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	4	6	2	2	5	5	5	5	4.25
95	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	3	6	3	3	5	4	5	5	4.25
95	FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	3	6	3	3	5	4	5	5	4.25
95	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	2	2	4	6	5	5	5	5	4.25
100	FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	3	6	6	2	3	5	5	4.125
100	FP PMSC RA (F) 14 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	5	5	5	5	4	6	4	6	4.125
102	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	3	3	3	3	5	5	5	5	4
102	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 02 - 1.4 Collision	Collision	2	4	2	4	5	5	5	5	4
102	FP PMSC RA (F) 13 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product) Refer also to FP PMSC RA (F&T)5	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	3	6	3	2	5	5	5	4
105	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 08 - 1.1 - Collision / contact	Collision / Contact	6	2	2	6	5	2	3	5	3.875
105	FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3	3	3	2	5	5	5	5	3.875
105	FP PMSC RA (F) 02 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	3	6	6	2	3	4	4	3.875
105	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	3	6	6	2	3	4	4	3.875
105	FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Sinking / Capsize	3	4	3	3	5	5	3	5	3.875
110	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 05 - 1.2 Contact	Contact	4	2	2	2	5	5	5	5	3.75
110	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 05 - 1.3 Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	3	3	6	1	0	5	5	3.75
110	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 06 - 1.2 Capsize / Flooding	Capsizing / Flooding	2	2	4	2	5	5	5	5	3.75
110	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 08 - 1.2 - Swamping / interaction / turbulence	Swamping / interaction / turbulence	6	2	2	2	5	5	3	5	3.75
110	FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.1 Collision	Collsion	2	4	2	2	5	5	5	5	3.75
115	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 03 - 1.1 Contact Refer Also to FP PMSC RA (F&T) 1	Contact	-	,	2	,	2		4	-	3.625
115	FP PMSC RA (F) 11 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	2	J	2	2	4		- "		3.625
117	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	2	4	2	4	1	- 5	- 3	- 5	3.5
117	FP PMSC RA (F) 06 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	2	- 4	2	- 4		2	2		3.5
117	FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	- 3	- 4	3	4	2	- 4	- 3	- 4	3.5
120	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 04 - 1.4 Fire/Explosion	Fire / Explosion			- 7	- 1			- 7	-	3.375
120	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 05 - 1.4 Fire/Explosion	Fire / Explosion	- 2	2	2	- 1	- 5	- 5	- 2		3.375
120	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 06 - 1.4 Hull Damage	Hull Damage		2		- 1		- 5	- 3		3.375
120	FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding		2	1	3	5	5	5	5	
	FP PMSC RA (F) 12 - 1.3 Grounding FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.1 Collision	Collision	1	3	1	4	- 3	5	- 5	- 5	3.375 3.375
125	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion			3		- 1	- 5	5	- 5	- 5	
125	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 01 - 1.3 Fire / Explosion FP PMSC RA (F&T) 04 - 1.3 Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	Fire / Explosion			1	1	- 5	- 5	- 5	- 5	3.25
125	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 04 - 1.3 Loss of Containment (Oil Products) FP PMSC RA (F&T) 07 - 1.2 - Collision / contact	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	3	3	3	1	4	4	- 5	3.25
125	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 07 - 1.2 - Collision / Contact FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.3 Grounding Refer Also to: FP PMSSC RA (F&T)7	Collision / Contact Grounding	3	2	1	2	5	5	3	5	3.25
125	FP PMSC RA (F) 08 - 1.3 Grounding Refer Also to: FP PMSSC RA (F&T)/	Grounding	2	4	2	2	4	4	4	4	3.25
125		Sinking / Capsize	2	4	2	2	1	5	5	5	3.25
125	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.4 Sinking / Capsize	Loss of Dock Level	1	2	2	1	5	5	5	5	3.25
125	FP PMSC RA (F) 10 - 1.7 Loss of Dock Level		1	1	1	6	2	5	5	5	3.25
125	FP PMSC RA (F) 15 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	2	4	2	2	5	4	3	4	3.25
	FP PMSC RA (T) 01 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	, , ,	2	2	2	2	3	5	5	5	3.25
125	FP PMSC RA (T) 05 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	2	2	2	2	3	5	5	5	3.25
136	FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product) Contact	2	2	2	2	3	5	5	5	3.25
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 09 - 1.1 Contact	Loss of Containment / Power / Communication	2	2	2	2	2	5	5	5	3.125
136	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 09 - 1.4 Loss of Containment / Power / Communication	Fire / Explosion	2	2	2	2	2	5	5	5	3.125
	FP PMSC RA (F) 03 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion		3	3	3	2	4	4	3	3	3.125
	FP PMSC RA (F) 04 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3	3	3	2	4	4	3	3	3.125
136	FP PMSC RA (F) 05 - 1.5 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	3	3	3	2	4	4	3	3	3.125
136	FP PMSC RA (F) 07 - 1.6 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Loss of Containment (Oil Product)	3	3	3	2	4	4	3	3	3.125
142	FP PMSC RA (T) 06 - 1.3 Grounding	Grounding	2	2	2	2	4	4	4	4	3
143	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 09 - 1.3 Fire / Explosion	Fire / Explosion	1	1	1	1	3	5	5	5	2.75

Document ID FP PMSC (R) 2/03 Review Due Ongoing

FORTH PORTS LIMITED

Risk Ranking - Category

Original Date
Jul-13

Revised By / Date
MM / August 2015



FORTH PORTS LIMITED Risk Assessment

			INSERT TITLE										
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk	k scored at Residual level (Most Likely) Overall Risk				t Resiled				
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People		Environment	Business
1.1													
1.2													
1.3													
1.4													
1.5													
			Risk Ranking										

Risk Assessment Scoring Matrix

LIKELIHOOD

- 1 = Extremely unlikely (More than 100 years)
- 2 = Remote (10 99 years)
- 3 = Reasonably likely (1 9 years)
- 4 = Likely (Once per Year)
- 5 = Frequent (More than once per year)

CONSEQUENCE

PEOPLE:

- 1 = None
- 2 = Minor, single slight Injury
- 3 = Slight, multiple moderate or single major injury
- 4 = Serious, multiple major injuries or single fatality
- 5 = Major, more than 1 fatality

ENVIRONMENT:

- 1 = Negligible, No Action required 2 = Minor spill Tier 1 local response,
- 3 = Moderate spill, Tier 2 some outside assistance
- 4 = Moderate spill, Tier 2 greater outside assistance
- 5 = Major spill, Tier 3 national response


PROPERTY:

- 1 = negligible < £5000
- 2 = Minor > £5000
- 3 = Moderate >£50,000
- 4 = Serious, > £500,000
- 5 = major, > £2,000,000

BUSINESS:

- 1 = Negligible impact < £5000
- 2 = Minor impact > £5000
- 3 = Moderate impact > £50,000, bad local publicity, short term reduction of activity.
- 4 = Serious Impact, >£500,000, bad widespread publicity, temporary Port Facility

OVERALL RISK



RED The Higher numbers(Greater than 10) in the matrix are considered "High-risk", These activities should not be carried out without additional controls being put in place to reduce the

AMBER Hazards with risk factors within these bands (6 - 10) are termed "consider". These lower risk factors are considered acceptable, but still need careful monitoring to ensure that everything has been done to reduce the consequences and likelihood.

GREEN The lower numbers(5 and below) in the matrix are considered "low-risk", but should still be monitored to ensure that controls remain effective.

DEF

CAUSES
System Failure
Human Error / Failure
Environmental Conditions
CONTROLS
Aids to Navigation

Legislation & Guidance
Conservancy
Emergency Plans

INITIONS

DEFINITION

A breakdown of any system hardware or operating system.

Examples of a system failure include but is not limited to:

- Any technical failure on board a vessel / craft
- Technical failure with the VTS monitoring system
- AtoN failure
- Error with survey data
- Failure with conservancy maintenance & verification process
- Techinical failure with the lock gates
- Techinical failure resulting in loss of dock level

Human failure examples can be:

- Failure of FTNS to follow and execute proper processes and procedures.
- Bridge team Error
- Human error due to lack of care or attention
- Human error due to violation of law, procedure or guidance

Environmental Condition exmples can include, but are not limited to:

- High winds
- Rough Seas
- Restricted visibility
- Strong current / tide
- Siltation

An Aid to Navigation is a device, system or service, external to vessels, designed and operated to enhance safe and efficient navigation of individual vessels and/or traffic.

These can include but are not limited to:

- Buoys
- Lights
- Lighthouses
- Sound signals
- Portable Pilot Unit (PPU)
- AIS
- ECDIS
- RADAR
- GPS
- Port Entry Lights

Legislation and guidance refers to all applicable legislation and guidance related to the navigational safety of vessels, examples of these can include but is not limited to:

- Forth Ports Bye Laws
- General Directions
- Marine Procedures Guidelines and Information
- Towage Guidelines
- All other relevant international and national legislation
- Notice to Mariners
- Surveying and survey programming
- Promulgation of survey data
- Dredging and dredging programme
- Aids to Navigation maintenance and verification
- Forth Ports contingency plans
- Local Authority contingency plans
- National contingency plans



		Fo	rth River Passage - Standard Vessel															
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk	(Mos	ed at F level st Like	ely)			Wors	red at level st Cred	dible)		Score	MRFs: 54/21 (Close quarters situation), 66/21 (Mechanical Failure), 05/22 (Mechanical Failure), 11/22 (Mechanical Failure) 32/22 (Mechanical Failure) 01/23 (Mechanical Failure), 05/23 (Mechanical Failure), 22/23 (Mechanical Failure), 25/23 (Mechanical Failure)			
	, , ,			Likelihood		Т	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People		Į.	Business	Hazard Risk				
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage	2	6	6	6	2	2	10	10	10	10	7.5	Most likely: Collision between 2 commercial vessels around the bridges area resulting in minimal damage. Worst credible: Collision betweenVLCC and cruise vessel resulting in total loss of vessels and loss of life.			
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage	3	3	6	3	3	1	5	5	5	5		Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with buoy resulting in minimal damage. Worst credible: Large impact allision with bridge resulting in extreme damage to vessel and bridge, and loss of life.			
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Aids to Navigation Conservancy Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Notice to Mariners Legislation & Guidance	3	3	3	3	6	1	5	5	5	5		Most likely: Vessel touches the bottom and continues on voyage with minimal damage. Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.			
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Emergency Plans Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Notice to Mariners	1	3	5	4	4	1	5	5	5	5		Most likely: Commercial Vessel sinks outwith main shipping areas, all crew safely abandon ship			
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Emergency Plans	3	6	6	3	6	2	10	10	10	10	7.625	Worst credible: Cruise vessel sinks resulting in total loss of vessel and loss of life. Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.			
1.6	Loss of Containment (oil products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Emergency Plans Weather Forecasting / Tidal predictions Conservancy Vetting (Tankers)	4	4	4	8	8	1	3	5	5	5	5.25	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally. Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.			

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs and POLREPs reviewed.	
Overall vessel numbers calling at Forth, also vessel type and size.	
Number , nature, and size of ongoing projects.	
	Risk Scoring updated, Collision - Most Likely + Grounding - Most Likely +
	Sinking - Most Likely scenarios updated

FORTH PORTS LIMITED		Revised By / Date CHM, MM, HMFO, HMFI, HMDD, Man Tow&PV / Oct 2012
Risk Assessment - Forth River	Review Due	Revised By / Date
Passage (Standard Vessel)	Aug-25	MMT August 23



Control Cont		Ро	rt of Leith - Arrival / S	Sailing Leith Approach Buoy to Berth with	Out	ter E	Bert	th V	Vorks	.						MRFs: 67/21 (Contact), 71/22 (mechanical failure) 01/22 (contact), 12/22 (loses Gangway)14//22
Page	Ref.	What can go wrong		Preventative & Reactive	Ris	level (Most Lik		l kely)		(Wors	level t Cred	dible)		Risk Score	(mechanical failure), 53/22 (contact), 20/23 (Contact), 31/23 (Contact) 35/23 (mechanical failures) 36/23
Place of the property of Control Contr					Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	_	Hazard F	
Exercised Contacts System Failure Processor State St	1.1	Collision	Human Error	Console Controller FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Additional towage Aids to Navigation	3	6	Ø	6	6	2	10	10	10	10	8.375	Worst Credible: Collision involving cargo vessel and cruise ship. Resulting in the loss of vessel and loss
System Falure Environmental Conditions Additional Designation And Sharing Capatre Number Fore Consider Controller Service place of Controller Additional Designation And Sharing Capatre Number Fore Consider Controller And Sharing Capatre Number Fore Consider Controller Controller Controller Consider Controller Consider Controller Controll	1.2	Contact	Human Error Environmental Conditions	Console Controller FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Additional towage due to outer berth works Aids to Navigation Conservancy Fendering Quay edge 'cargo clear' demarkation Cranes properly stowed on quayside Swing Bridge Procedure Forth Ports H&S Procedures	5	5	10	5	5	2	10	10	10	10 :	8.125	
System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Enhanced Pilicage Consider Conditions System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Enhanced Pilicage Consider Conditions System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Enhanced Pilicage Consider Conditions System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Enhanced Pilicage Consider Conditions Weather Forecasting / Todal Predictions Engagency Plans Adds to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Todal Predictions Engagency Plans Adds to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Todal Predictions Engagency Plans Adds to Navigation Adds to Navigat	1.3	Grounding	Human Error	Console Controller FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Additional towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling	3	3	6	6	3	2	6	8	8	10	6.25	longer able to operate and vessel requiring repair possible death / loss of containment. Most Likely: Vessel grounded in soft mud and floats on following tide without damage. Worst Credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated at the Port enterance. Port is closed
System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Enhanced Pilotage Console Controller FTNS Legislation & Guidance Additional towage due to user better the man Error Environmental Conditions Engregory Plans of Most Likely: Small fire on-board quickly extinguished. Worst Credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel , crew and cargo. Worst Credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel , crew and cargo. Most Likely: Small fire on-board quickly extinguished. Worst Credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel , crew and cargo. Most Likely: Small fire on-board quickly extinguished. Worst Credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel , crew and cargo. Most Likely: Small fire on-board quickly extinguished. Worst Credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel , crew and cargo. Most Likely: Small fire on-board quickly extinguished. Worst Credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel , crew and cargo. Most Likely: Small fire on-board quickly extinguished. Worst Credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel , crew and cargo. Most Likely: Small spill of non-persistent product. Most Likely: Cardible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closure and extensive environmental impact. Lockgate operational procedures Port Plansed Maintenance system Lock Gates - Interlocks to prevent opening all lock gates simultaneously Training / Auditing of Port Staff Worst Credible: Large loss of dock level. Deep drafted vessel take the bottom of dock. Possible large	1.4	Sinking / Capsize	Human Error	Console Controller FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation	1	4	4	5	4	1	5	5	5	5	4.625	Most Likely: Vessel sinks in approach to port, total loss of ship, and crew abandon ship.
1.6 Loss of Containment (Oil Products) System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Additional towage due to outer berth works Aids to Navigation Conservancy 1.7 Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations) System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Conservancy Worst Credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closure and extensive environmental impact. Lock gates - Interlocks to prevent opening all lock gates simultaneously Training / Auditing of Port Staff Worst Credible: Large loss of dock level. Deep drafted vessel take the bottom of dock. Possible large	1.5	Fire / Explosion	Human Error	FTNS Forth Byelaw & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting	1	3	3	3	2	1	5	5	5	5	3.875	Most Likely: Small fire on-board quickly extinguished.
1.7 Loss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations) System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Lock Gates - Interlocks to prevent opening all lock gates simultaneously Training / Auditing of Port Staff Lock Gate operational procedures Port Plannac Maintenance system Lock Gates - Interlocks to prevent opening all lock gates simultaneously Training / Auditing of Port Staff Most Likely: Loss of containment but does not result in significant loss of dock level. Possible impact large draft movements. Worst Credible: Large loss of dock level. Deep drafted vessel take the bottom of dock. Possible large	1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	Human Error	Console Controller FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Additional towage due to outer berth works Aids to Navigation	3	3	3	6	6	1	2	3	4	4	3.875	Most Likely: Small spill of non-persistent product. Worst Credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closure and extensive
	1.7		Human Error	Port Planned Maintenance system Lock Gates - Interlocks to prevent opening all lock gates simultaneously	3	3	3	3	9	1	3	5	4	5	4.375	Most Likely: Loss of containment but does not result in significant loss of dock level. Possible impact to large draft movements. Worst Credible: Large loss of dock level. Deep drafted vessel take the bottom of dock. Possible large

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs and POLREPs reviewed.	
Overall vessel numbers calling at Forth, also vessel type and size.	
Number , nature, and size of ongoing projects.	
	Additional controls due to Outer Berth Works, Scoring updated where required

FORTH PORTS LIMITED		Risk Assessment Team / Date MM, HMFO / 3rd Dec2012
Risk Assessment - Port of Leith	Review Due	Revised By / Date
	May-25	MMT -Leith , May 2023



	Port of Rosyth - Arrival / Sailing No1 Rosyth Channel Buoy to Berth															
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Ris	level (Most Likely)		level					(Wors	level st Credi		Score	
	(Event leading to a consequence)		(What action & now inequality)	Likelihood	-	Τ.	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property Property Property	Business	Hazard Risk	MRFs: 21/22 (Mechanical Failure), 30/22 (communication failure), 43/22 (mechanical failure) 67/22 (failure to report defect)		
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Concentration	2	4	6	2	2	1	5	5 5	5 5	4.25	Most likely: Collision between 2 vessels at slow speed resulting in minimal damage and no injuries. Worst credible: Collision between two cruise vessels resulting in loss of vessels and loss of life.		
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Quayside Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Fendering Quay edge 'cargo clear' demarkation Cranes properly stowed on quayside Aids to Navigation	3	3	6	6	3	1	5	5 5	5 5		Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with buoy resulting in minimal damage. Worst credible: Large cruise vessel contacts quayside at high speed resulting in significant damage to vessel, quayside, and serious injuries / loss of life.		
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling	2	2	6	4	6	1	5	5 5	5 5	4.75	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with minimal damage. Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.		
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage	1	3	5	5	5	1	5	5 5	5 5	4.75	Most likely: Vessel sinks, all crew / passengers safely abandon ship. Worst credible: Vessel sinks resulting in total loss of vessel, and loss of life.		
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Emergency Plans	1	3	3	3	2	1	4	4 3	3	3.125	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.		
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage	3	3	3	6	6	2	4	6 8	8	5.5	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally. Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.		

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs reviewed - contact.	
Vessel numbers, size, and type in the area.	
Ongoing projects that have an impact.	
	Risk Scoring updated / Collision - Most likely scanrio updated

FORTH PORTS LIMITED		Risk Assessment Team / Date
	FP PMSC RA (F) 03/06	MM, HMFO / 9th Jan 2013
Risk Assessment - Port of Rosyth	Review Due	Revised By / Date
	Aug-25	MMT, Aug 2023



	Port of Methil - Arrival / Sailing Methil Pilot Station to Berth													
Ref.	Hazard What one so wrong	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive	Ris	sk sco (Mo	red at level	I	idual			red at R level at Credi	esidual	Score	MRF 08/22 (Contact), 61/22 (Contact), 08/23 (Mechanical Failure)
	What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	now can it go wrong	(What action & how frequent)	Likelihood		Overa	all Ris	Business	Likelihood		Property	Risk	Hazard Risk S	mira ooze (comacy, over (comacy, coze (modianical) analy)
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	3	3	3	3	3	2	10			5.75	Most likely: Vessel collides with small craft resulting in no damage to the larger vessel and no/minor to damage to the smaller vessel. Results in no injuries to persons Worst credible: Vessel collides heavily with small craft resulting in extensive damage to both vessels and multiple injuries/fatalities
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Quayside Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Conservancy Fendering Cranes properly stowed on quayside Dock Gatemen Procedures	5	5	10	5	5	2	6	8 6	; 8	6.625	Most likely: Vessel makes light contact with object/quay resulting in no/minor damage to the vessel and quay Worst credible: Vessel makes heavy contact with object/quay resulting in extensive damage to both vessel and quay and possible injuries
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Aids to Navigation Conservancy Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling Regulations) Dock gate procedure	2	2	4	4	2	2	6	8 8	8	5.25	Most likely: Vessel runs aground with no damage to vessel, no pollution and can be refloated with the tide Worst credible: Vessel runs aground causing extensive damage to the vessel, major pollution and blocking entrance to ports
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Aids to Navigation Conservancy Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling Regulations) Dock gate procedure	3	3	9	6	3	2	10	6 8	10	6.875	Most likely: Small Vessel sinks/capsizes within harbour with everyone safely evactuated and no loss of life Worst credible: Vessel sinks/capsizes in entrance of harbour with multiple fatalities and total loss of vessel
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans	1	3	3	3	2	1	4	4 3	3	3.125	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	3	3	3	6	6	2	4	6 8	8	5.5	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally. Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

Content Rev	iewed	Changes Made	
MRF and POLRE			
Number of vessels calling, other traffic	in the vicinity, and vessel type		
calling.			
		Risk Scoring updated, Grounding - Most Likely scenario up	pdated
FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date	
	FP PMSC RA (F) 4/05	HMFO, HMDD, MM / 16th Jan 2013	
Risk Assessment - Port of Methil Review Due		Revised By / Date	
	Aug-25	MMT , August 2023	



													No relevant MRFs since previous review		
Ref.	Trazard Sauses Controls		Ris		red a	el		Ris		level	Residu	ıal	Score		
	What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	How can it go wrong	Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)			Over				Ì		all Risk		Risk Sc	
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	pusiness	Hazard Ri	
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy External standby tugs audited and issued with restricted towage licence for emergencies.	2	4	4		2	2	10	10	10	10	6.5	Most likely: Collision between small craft and larger vessel at slow speed resulting in minimal damage and no injuries. Worst credible: Collision between two commercial vessels resulting in loss of vessels and loss of life.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Quayside / Seabed Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance	3	3	6	3	3	2	6	6	6	6	4.875	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with buoy resulting in minimal damage. Worst credible: Large vessel contacts quayside at high speed resulting in significant damage to vessel, quayside, and serious injuries / loss of life.
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Survey / dredging Programme / Schedule (By Operator) Methil Energy park Procedures	3	3	6	6	6	2	6	6	6	6	5.625	Most likely: Vessel toches the bottom when manouvring with minimal damage. Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in disruption to
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Fendering SE Quayside Regulations & Risk Assessment External standby tugs audited and issued with restricted towage licence for emergencies.	3	3	9	6	3	2	10	6	8	10	6.875	ports, extreme damage and loss of contaminent. Most likely: Vessel sinks, all crew / passengers safely abandon ship. Worst credible: Vessel sinks in harbour approach resulting in total loss of vessel and loss of life.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	1	3	3	3	2	1	4	4	3	3	3.125	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Survey Programme / Schedule (By Operator)	2	2	2	4	4	2	6	6	8	В	5	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally. Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs and POLREPs reviewed.	
Overall vessel numbers calling at Forth, also vessel type and size.	
Number , nature, and size of ongoing projects.	
	Likelyhood and Risk Scoring updated, Grounding - Most Likely scenario updated

FORTH PORTS LIMITED		Risk Assessment Team / Date HMFO, HMDD, MM / 23rd Jan 2013
Risk Assessment - Methil	Review Due	Revised By / Date
	Aug-25	MMT, August 2023



		Port of Kirkcald	y - Arrival / Sailing Close Approaches of D	ock	to I	Bert	h								MRF: 17/23 (contact)
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive	Ris		ored a leve	ı	idual			red at level st Cre			Score	
	(Event leading to a consequence)	l low can it go mong	(What action & how frequent)			Over	all Ri	sk		(Overa	III Ris	k	Risks	
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Hazard R	
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	2	4	4	2	2	2	10	10	10	10	6.5	Most likely: Collision between Kirkcaldy vessel and small recreational / commercial vessel resulting in minimal damage Worst credible: Collision between outbound Kirkcaldy vessel and other vessel in anchorage resulting in extreme damage and loss of life.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Quayside Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Fendering Cranes properly stowed on quayside	4	4	4	4	4	2	8	10	10	8	6.5	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with quayside whilst berthing esulting in minimal damage. Worst credible: High impact with quayside whilst berthing resulting in extren lamage to vessel and quayside, and loss of life.
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling Regulations)	2	2	4	2	2	2	6	8	8	8	5	Most likely: Vessel touches the bottom on following tide with minimal damage. Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	3	3	9	6	3	2	10	6	8	10	6.875	Most likely: Vessel sinks outwith main shipping areas, all crew safely abandor ship Worst credible: Vessel sinks resulting in total loss of vessel and loss of life.
	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans	1	3	3	3	2	1	5	4	3	5	3.5	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	2	2	2	4	4	2	6	6	8	8	5	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally. Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

Content Revi	ewed	Changes Made
MRFs updated, Vessel call	numbers reviewed	Collision - Most likely scenario updated, Risk Scoring updated,
FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date
	FP PMSC RA (F) 6/06	HMFO, HMDD, MM / 23rd Jan 2013
Risk Assessment - Port of Kirkcaldy	Review Due	Revised By / Date
	Aug-25	MMT, August 2023



		Port of Burntisla	nd - Arrival / Sailing Close Approaches of I	Docl	k to	Bert	h							MRFs: 28/22 (Black out)
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive	Ris		red at level ost Like		ual		- 1	level	Residual	Score	
	(Event leading to a consequence)		(What action & how frequent)	Likelihood		Overal	_	\dashv	Likelihood	Т	_	Il Risk	Hazard Risk	
				Likeli	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likeli	People	Property	Environment Business	Ë	
1.1 (Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	3	3	3	3	3	2	8	10	10 10	6.25	Most likely: Collision at slow speed between large vessel and small commercial, leisure, of fishing vessel resulting in minimal damage Worst credible: High impact collision between two vessels and resulting in extreme damage and loss of life.
1.2 (Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Quayside Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Fendering Cranes properly stowed on quayside Forth Ports H&S Procedures Dock Gatemen Procedures	3	3	6	3	3	1	5	4	5 5	4.25	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with quayside whilst berthing resulting in minim damage. Worst credible: High impact with quayside whilst berthing resulting in extreme damage to vessel and quayside, and loss of life.
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling Regulations) Dock Gate Procedure	3	3	6	6	6	2	10	10	6 8	6.875	
	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions System Failure Human Error	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy Dock Gate Procedure Pilotage FTNS	2	4		4	6	1	5		3 4	4.5	Most likely: Vessel sinks, all crew safely abandon ship Worst credible: Vessel sinks resulting in total loss of vessel, cargo, and loss of life.
		Environmental Conditions	Legislation & Guidance Emergency Plans	3	3	9	6	3	2	10	6	8 10	6.875	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.
1.6	oss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	1	3	3	3	2	1	4	4	3 3	3.125	
	oss of Dock Level (Lock Gate Operations)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Port Planned Maintenance system Training / Auditing of Port Staff Dockgate Procedure	5	5	5	5	10	2	4	6	8 8	6.375	Most likely: Fault with gates which is repaired before major loss of dock level.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs review - contact - likelihood already 5. Vessels calling at B'island - number, type, size.	
Other operatrions in the area	Risk Scoring updated - Collision worst credible / Grounding most likely scenario updated

		Risk Assessment Team / Date HMFO, MM / 16th Jan 2013
Risk Assessment - Port of Burntisland	. ()	Revised By / Date
	Aug-25	MMT, August 2023



		Inverkeithi	ng - Arrival / Sailing Saint David's Beacon t	οВ	erth	h									MRF: 020/19 (Contact)
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive	Ris		lev	at Res rel Likely)	idual			leve	t Resi I edible		Score	
	(Event leading to a consequence)		(What action & how frequent)	Overall Risk					Over	all Ris	k	Risk			
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Hazard F	
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	2	2	2 6	4	4	1	5	5	5	5	4.5	Most likely: Collision between small craft and larger vessel at slow speed resulting in minimal damage and no injuries. Worst credible: Collision between two commercial vessels resulting in loss of vessels and loss of life.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Quayside Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Fendering Cranes properly stowed on quayside	3	3	3 6	3	3	1	5	4	5	5	4.25	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with the quay resulting in minimal damage. Worst credible: Commercial vessel makes a high impact contact with the quay resulting in significant damage to vessel, quayside, and serious injuries / loss of life.
1.3	Grounding Refer also: Risk Assessment (F&T) 7	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	2	2	2 4	2	2	1	4	4	4	4	3.25	Most likely: Vessel touches the bottow in soft mud and rcontinues sailing with minimal damage. Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to port, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	3	3	3 6	6	3	2	10	4	4	8	5.5	Most likely: Small Vessel sinks, all crew / passengers safely abandon ship. Worst credible: Small Vessel sinks in harbour approach resulting in total loss of vessel and loss of life.
1.8	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans	3	3	3 9	6	3	2	10	6	8	10	6.875	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Aids to Navigation Conservancy	3	3	3 3	6	6	2	4	6	8	8	5.5	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally. Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs review	
Vessels calling at B'island - number, type, size.	
Other operatrions in the area	
	Risk Scoring updated

FORTH PORTS LIMITED		Risk Assessment Team / Date HMFO, HMDD, MM / 23rd Jan 2013
Risk Assessment - Inverkeithing	Review Due	Revised By / Date
	Aug-25	MMT August 2023



Braefoot Jetty - Arrival / Sailing Eastern Limits to Berth

MRFs reviewed: 34/22 (close quarters), 38/22 (infringment of regulations), 21/23 (mechanical failure)

									_						(mechanical failure)	
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Ris	(Mo	leve ost Li	el			(Wo	lev rst C	at Res	e)	k Score		
	(2.1 st. 1 stating to a st. 1 station)		(Likelihood	People	Τ	T	_	Likelihood		T.	Τŧ	Business	Hazard Risk		
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	5	5	5	5	5	2	10	10		10	7.25	Most likely: Collision between small workboat and larger vessel at slow speed resulting in minimal damage and no injuries. Worst credible: Collision between tanker and tug / line boat resulting in loss of vessel, loss of life and pollution	
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Jetty Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Jetty Regulations Jetty Supervisor	3	3	6	3	3	2	10	10) 10	10	6.875	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with terminal resulting in minimal damage. Worst credible: Large vessel has a high impact with jetty / tanker alongside resulting in significant damage to vessels, jetty, and serious injuries / loss of life.	
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Jetty Regulations	2	2	4	2	2	1	1	5	5	5	3.25	Most likely: Vessel touchest he bottom in soft mud and continues sailing with minimal damage. Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major	
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Jetty Regulations	3	3	6	4	3	1	5	5	5	5	4.5	disruption to port, extreme damage and loss of contaminent. Most likely: Small Vessel sinks, all crew / passengers safely abandon ship. Worst credible: Vessel sinks in approach to jetties resulting in total loss of vessel	
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Conservancy Jetty Regulations	3	3	9	6	3	1	5	5	5	5	5.125	and loss of life. Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, loss of life and large scale pollution	
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage (Within compulsory pilotage Area) FTNS Forth Ports Byelaws & General Directions for Navigation Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Notice to Mariners Marine Guidelines & Port Information Jetty Regulations	3	3	3	6	6	2	6	10	10	10	6.75	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally. Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.	

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs reviewed	
Vessel numbers consulted, as well as type and size.	
	Risk Scoring updated, Contact - Worst credible scenario / Grounding most likely / Sinking + Capsizing most likely scenario updated

FORTH PORTS LIMITED		Risk Assessment Team / Date HMFO, HMD, MM / 23rd Jan 2013
Risk Assessment - Braefoot Jetty	Review Due	Revised By / Date
	Aug-25	MMT, August 2023



			Navigational Nisk Assessment												
		Port of Gran	ngemouth - Arrival/Sailing Hen & Chickens	to B	erti	h									
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	H	(Mc	leve st Li	at Res el ikely) rall Ri			(Wors	level	dible)	Risk Score	MRFs: 53/21 (contact), 61/21 (Contact), 62/21 (contact) 68/21 (contact) 02/2 (tow Line parted), 04/22 (Bow Thruster Failure) 07/22 (contact), 13/22 (contact), 15/22 (object in propulsion unit) 16/22 (mechanical failure), 20/22 (contact), 23/22
					People		Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Hazard	(Bridle Parted), 52/22 (Bridle parted), 60/22 (contact), 65/22 (Gangway conta with bollard), 68/22 (Mechanical Failure), 04/23 (mechanical failure), 07/23 (Pilot ladder), 09/23 (contact), 10/23 (mechanical failure), 12/23 (contact), 18/23 (contact), 19/23 (lock gates closed as vessel approached) 28/23 (mechanical failure), 29/23 (mechanical failure)
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Diversionary Channel Jetty / Terminal Guidelines STS Operations Manual Vessel vetting (tankers)	3	3	6	3	3	1	5	5	5	5	4.375	Most likely: In dock collision between inbound / outbound vessel and small vessel at slow speed resulting in minimal damage.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Quayside Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Fendering Cranes properly stowed on quayside Dockhead Slaff STS Operations Manual Jetty / Terminal Guidelines Vessel vetting (tankers)	5	5	10	5	5	2	6	10	8	10	7.375	Worst credible: Collision between inbound/outbound Grangemouth at higher speed resulting in total loss of vessels and loss of life.
															Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with lead in or fenders resulting in minimal damage. Worst credible: Vessel has heavy impact with lock structure resulting in exreme damage to vessel, locks, and loss ofbusiness due to potential port closure.
1.3	Grounding	Technical Failure Human Error Enviornmental Conditions Surveying Omission Failure of Aids to Navigation Unknown Underwater Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	3	3	9	3	3	2	2	10	10	10	6.25	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with damage. Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption topts, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling Regulations) Jetty / Terminal Guidelines Vessel vetting (tankers)	1	1	2	2	1	1	5	5	5	Ð	3.25	Most likely: workboat sinks, all crew safely abandon ship Worst credible: Vessel sinks between H&C and locks resulting in total loss of
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Emergency Plans / OPRC Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting JettyTermina Guidelines Vessel vetting (tankers)	3	3	9	6	3	2	10	10	10	10	7.625	vessel & cargo, channel closure, and loss of life. Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire on vessel containing munitions, total loss vessel and cargo, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Conservancy Bunkering Procedure Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling Regulations)	3	3	3	6	6	1	2	3	4	4	3.875	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally. Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port
1.7	Loss of Dock Level	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Lockgate operational procedures Port Planned Maintenance system Lock Gates - Interlocks to prevent opening all lock gates	\dagger											closures and extensive environmental impact. Most likely: Fault with ompounding pumps which is repaired before major los

Content Re	eviewed	Changes Made								
MRFs reviewed - significant number	of contacts - one major contact,	Risk Scoring updated. Collision (most likely + worst credible) likely + worst credible) / Sinking + Capsizing (worst credible)								
FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date	1							
	FP PMSC RA (F) 10/06	DMM, HMFI / 19th Dec 2012								
District Assessment Dont of	Davidson David	Books of Book Books	1							

谷		FORTH PORTS LIMITED Navigational Risk Assessment					
	Port of Gra	angemouth - Arrival/Sailing Hen & Chicke	ns to Berth				
off. Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequ	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Risk scored at Rt level (Most Likel) Overall I adopted by the property of the) (1	scored at Residulevel Norst Credible) Overall Risk	Score	MRFs: 53/21 (contact), 61/21 (Contact), 62/21 (contact) 68/21 (contact) 02/22 (tow Line parted), 04/22 (Bow Thruster Failure) 07/22 (contact), 13/22 (contact), 15/22 (object in propulsion unit) 16/22 (mechanical failure), 20/22 (contact), 23/22 (Contact), 35/22 (mechanical failure), 36/22 (Bridle Parted), 52/22 (Bridle parted), 60/22 (contact), 65/22 (Gangway contact with bolland), 68/22 (Mechanical Failure), 04/23 (mechanical failure), 12/23 (contact), 18/23 (contact), 19/23 (mechanical failure), 12/23 (contact), 18/23 (contact), 18/23 (mechanical failure), 12/23 (mechanical failure
1.1 Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Diversionary Channel Jetty / Terminal Guidelines STS Operations Manual Vessel vetting (tankers)	3 3 6 3	3 1	5 5 5	5 4.375	
1.2 Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Quayside Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Fendering Cranes properly stowed on quayside Dockhead Staff STS Operations Manual Jetty / Terminal Guidelines Vessel vetting (tankers)	5 5 10 5	5 2	6 10 8	7.375	
1.3 Grounding	Technical Failure Human Error Enviornmental Conditions Surveying Omission Failure of Aids to Navigation Unknown Underwater Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	3 3 9 3	3 2	2 10 10	10 6.25	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with damage. Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.
1.4 Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling Regulations) Jetty / Terminal Guidelines Vessel vetting (tankers)	1 1 2 2	1 1	5 5 5	5 3.25	
1.5 Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Emergency Plans / OPRC Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting Jetty/Terminal Guidelines Vessel vetting (tankers)	3 3 9 6	3 2	10 10 10 1	7.625	
1.6 Loss of Containment (Oil Prod	cts) System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Conservancy Bunkering Procedure Cargo operations procedures (Including MCA Bulk-handling Regulations)	3 3 3 6	6 1	2 3 4	4 3.875	
1.7 Loss of Dock Level	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Lockgate operational procedures Port Planned Maintenance system Lock Gates - Interlocks to prevent opening all lock gates simultaneously Training / Auditing of Port Staff Impounding Pumps	3 1 1 1	6 1	2 5 5	5 3.25	Most likely. Fault with ompounding pumps which is repaired before major loss of dock level. Worst credible: Fault with gates which cannot be repaired before major loss of dock level resulting in vessels aground with extreme damage.
Cor MRFs reviewed - significant	ent Reviewed umber of contacts - one major contact	Changes Made t. Risk Scoring updated. Collision (most likely + worst credible) / Sinking + Capsizing (worst credi	dible) / Contact (most ble) scenarios updated				
FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F) 10/06	Risk Assessment Team / Date DMM, HMFI / 19th Dec 2012	_	-			



	Crombie Berthing/Sailing										No significant MRFs during time from previous review.			
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive	Ris		ored a level ost Li	ı	idual			evel	Residual	Score	
	(Event leading to a consequence)		(What action & how frequent)	Likelihood	People	Dverty Arabeity	<u></u>	Business	Likelihood		Property Environmen		Hazard Risk	
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	2	2	4	2	2	1			5 5	3.75	Most likely: Collision between vessel and small vessel at slow speed resulting in minimal damage Worst credible: Collision between Crombie vessel carrying munitions and inbound/outbound Grangemouth tanker resulting in total loss of vessels and loss of life.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Jetty Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Fendering Cranes properly stowed on quayside	3	3	6	3	3	1	5	5	5 5	4.375	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with jetty whilst berthing resulting in minimal damage. Worst credible: High impact with jetty whilst berthing resulting in extreme damage to vessel and jetty, and loss of life.
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Unknown Underwater Obstruction	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage	2	2	4	2	2	1	4	5	5 5	3.625	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with damage. Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	1	1	5	4	5	1	5	5	5 5	4.375	Most likely: Vessel sinks outwith main shipping areas, all crew safely abandon ship Worst credible: Vessel sinks in main channel near Crombie resulting in total loss of vessel, channel closure, and loss of life.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Jetty/Terminal Guidelines	3	3	9	6	3	2	10	10	0 10	7.625	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire on vessel containing munitions, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Bunkering Procedure Standby vessel for bunkering operations	3	3	3	6	6	1	2	3	5 5	4.125	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally. Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
No MRFs since pervious review.	
Number of vessels calling at Crombie, as well as type and size.	Risk Scoring updated. Collision (most likely), contact (worst credible) Scenario updated

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date
	FP PMSC RA (F) 11/07	DMM, HMFI / 19th Dec2012
Risk Assessment - Crombie	Review Due	Revised By / Date
	Aug-25	MMT, August 2023



															MRFs since previous review: 10/22 (mechanical failure), 66/22 (towline parted)
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive	Ris		leve		idual			leve			Score	
	(Event leading to a consequence)		(What action & how frequent)	l bo		Ove	rall Ri □⊆	<u> </u>	ğ			all Ris		rd Risk	
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environme t	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environmen t	Business	Hazar	
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage (Within compulsory pilotage Area) - 2 Pilots FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Hound Point Marine Guidelines PPU	4	4	4	4	4	1	5		5	5	4.5	Most likely: Collision between small workboat and larger vessel at slow speed resulting in minimal damage and no injuries. Worst credible: Collision between two laden tankers resulting in loss of vessels, loss of life and large scale pollution
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Jetty Obstruction	Pilotage (Within compulsory pilotage Area) - 2 Pilots FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Fendering Hound Point Marine Guidelines PPU / Hound Point Docking System	3	3	6	3	3	1	5	5	5	5	4.375	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with jetty resulting in minimal damage. Worst credible: Large vessel has a high impact contact with another vessel alongside hound point resulting in significant damage to vessels, jetty, loss of containment and serious injuries / loss of life.
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Unknown Underwater Obstruction	Pilotage (Within compulsory pilotage Area) - 2 Pilots FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Hound Point Marine Guidelines	1	1	3	1	4	1	3	5	5	5	3.375	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with minimal damage. Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage (Within compulsory pilotage Area) - 2 Pilots FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Hound Point Marine Guidelines	1	3	5	5	5	1	5	5	5	5	4.75	disruption to port, extreme damage and loss of contaminent. Most likely: Vessel sinks, all crew / passengers safely abandon ship. Worst credible: Vessel sinks in approach to jetties resulting in total loss of vessel and loss of life.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage (Within compulsory pilotage Area) - 2 Pilots FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Towage Emergency Plans Hound Point Marine Guidelines	3	3	9	6	9	1	5	5	5	5	5.875	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, loss of life and large scale pollution
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage (Within compulsory pilotage Area) - 2 Pilots FTNS Forth Ports Byelaws & General Directions for Navigation Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Notice to Mariners Marine Guidelines & Port Information Hound Point Marine Guidelines	3	3	3	6	6	2	6	10	10	10	6.75	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally. Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs; No contacts since last review	
Changes to guidelines or procedures affecting HP.	
Number of vessels calling, and other traffic in the vicinity.	
	Risk Scoring updated. Contact (worst credible) scenario

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Risk Assessment Team / Date DMM, HMFI / 19th Dec 2012
Risk Assessment - Houndpoint Arrival / Sailing Eastern Limits to	Revised By / Date MMT, August 2023



															MRF: 18/22 (mechanical failure)
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Ris	(Mo	red at level ost Lik	kely)			l (Worst	evel	ible)	ıal	sk Score	
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood		_	<u> </u>	Business	Hazard Risk	
1.1	Dragging Anchor	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Designated and proven anchorages Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	5	5	5	5	5	1	5	5	5	5	5	Most likely: Vessel drags anchor, then pays out more chain resulting in no further dragging. Worst credible: Vessel drags anchor resulting in vessel going aground or making contact with bridge/Hound Point Terminal. Vessel suffers extreme damage and possibbilty of loss of life.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	5	5	10	5	5	1	5	5	5	5	5.625	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with small vessel resulting in minimal damage. Worst credible: Vessel has high speed impact with bridge/jetty resulting in significant damage to vessel and loss of life.
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Tender pack	2	6	6	2	2	1	5	5	5	5	4.5	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with minimal damage. Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	1	3	5	5	5	1	5	5	5	5	4.75	Most likely: Vessel sinks, all crew and passengers safely abandon ship Worst credible: Vessel sinks resulting in total loss of vessel, and loss of life
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	5	10	10	5	5	1	5	5	5	5	6.25	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel, and loss of life.
1.5	Loss of Containment (Oil Products) - Refer also to FP PMSC RA (F&T)5	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	3	3	3	6	3	1	2	5	5	5	4	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally. Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
MRFs review -	
Other traffic in the vicinity - type, size, density	
Cruise specific procedures, forms and guidelines.	
	Risk Scoring updated.

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date
	FP PMSC RA (F) 13/07	HMFO, MM, DMM, HMD, MT&PV / 13th Feb 2013
Risk Assessment - Cruise Vessels at	Review Due	Revised By / Date
Anchorage (Hound Point / Newhaven)	Aug-25	MMT August 2023



Risk Assessment - Forth - River Transit + Berthing/Sailing Small Aug-25 Revised By / Date MMT August 2023

	Forth	n - River Transit + Be	erthing/Sailing Small Commercial Craf	t (Tuç	js, V	Vork	boat	s et	tc)					
ef.	Hazard	Causes	Controls	Ris		red at		ıal		le	evel	Residua		
	can go wrong ng to a consequence)	How can it go wrong	Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Н	_	ost Lik Overa		1	(V		Credi verall		Risk Score	
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Business	Hazard R	MRFs: 70/21 (Vessel picked up weight in locks) 72/21 (Fouled unit) 02/22 Pated Towline, 09 (Pilot Vessel Engine Alarm), 15/22 (Fouled unit) 35/22 (Fouled Unit), 46/22 (Fouled unit) 47/ (Faulty unit) 54/22 (Fouled unit) 57/22 (Mechanical Failure) 02/23 MOB Mayday Call / 14/23 (Beach) / 22/23 (Mechanical Failure) / 30/23 (Fouled Propeller)
1.1 Collision		System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Legislation & Guidance General Directions (GD19) Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Liaison with Local Authorities & Boat Clubs Audit and license procedure	3	3	6	3	3	2	10	8	6 10	6.125	Most likely: Collision between two small vessels at slow speed resulting in minimal damage an injuries. Worst credible: Collision between two small commercial craft at high speed resulting in loss of
1.2 Contact		System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Change to Shore Infrastructure / Obstruction on the Quay Floating Debris	FTNS Legislation & Guidance General Directions (GD19) Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Liaison with Local Authorities & Boat Clubs Audit and license procedure	5	5	10	5	5	2	10	8	8 8	7.375	wessels and loss of life. Most likely: Small workboat low impact with floating debris resulting in minimal damage. Worst credible: High impact Contact with bridge, quayside, jetty resulting in significant damage loss of life.
1.3 Grounding		System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Legislation & Guidance General Directions (GD19) Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Conservancy Liaison with Local Authorities & Boat Clubs Audit and license procedure	3	3	6	3	3	1	4	5	4 5	4.125	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with damage. Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports,
1.4 Sinking / Capsize	e	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Legislation & Guidance General Directions (GD19) Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Conservancy Liaison with Local Authorities & Boat Clubs Audit and license procedure	2	2	10	8	10	2	10	10	8 10	8.5	Most likely: Vessel sinks, all crew safely abandon ship
1.5 Fire / Explosion		System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Legislation & Guidance General Directions (GD19) Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Conservancy Liaison with Local Authorities & Boat Clubs Audit and license procedure	4	4	8	4	8	2	10	10 4	B 10	7.75	
1.6 Loss of Containn	ment (oil products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Legislation & Guidance General Directions (GD19) Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Conservancy Liaison with Local Authorities & Boat Clubs Audit and license procedure	4	4	4	4	4	2	6	6 4	8 8	5.5	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel and cargo, and loss of life. Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant prodcut that dissipates naturally. Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and exter
	Content Rev	iowod	Changes Made											environmental impact.
eral contact incid		viewed ident resulting in a large cost to												
FORTH PORTS	LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F) 14/07	Risk Assessment Team / Date MT&PV, HMFO, MM, DMM, HMD / 13TH Feb 2013											



	Dam														MRF: 55/21 (Contact), 56/21 (Contact), 57/21 (contact), 58/21 contact, 17/22 Damage to tender, 31/22 (contact), 24/23 (mechanical failure)
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)		(Me	red at level ost Lil Overa	(ely)			(Wor	leve st Cr	t Res I edible))	Risk Score	
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environmen t	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environmen t	Business	Hazard F	
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Legislation & Guidance FTNS Weather Forecasting, Tidal Predictions & Monitoring Tender Pro-forma & Passage Planning Tender Pack	5	10	10	9	5	2	10	10	8	10	8.5	Most likely: Collision between two tenders at slow speed resulting in minimal damage and no injuries. Worst credible: Collision between a commercial vessel and tender carrying passengers resulting in loss of tender and loss of life.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Change to Shore Infrastructure / Obstruction on the Quay Floating Debris	FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predications & Monitoring Tender Traffic Control Procedures Tender Proforma and Passage Planning Tender Pack	5	5	5	5	5	2	10	10	8	10	7.25	Most likely: Tender has slow speed impact with pontoon resulting in minimal damage. Worst credible: Tender has heavy impact with pontoon resulting in significant damage to tender and loss of life.
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Uncharted Object	FTNS Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Legislation & Guidance Emergency Plans Conservancy Tender Proforma and Passage Planning Pack Tender	5	5	5	5	5	2	4	6	4	6	5	Most likely: Tender grounds in soft mud and continues sailing with minimal damage Worst credible: Tender hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Legislation & Guidance Emergency Plans Conservancy Tender Proforma and Passage Planning Pack Tender	1	3	4	3	3	1	5	5	3	5	3.875	Most likely: Tender sinks, all crew and passengers safely abandon ship Worst credible: Tender sinks resulting in total loss of vessel and loss of life.
1.5	Fire	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Legislation & Guidance Emergency Plans	2	2	4	2	2	1	5	4	3	4	3.25	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (oil products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	FTNS Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Legislation & Guidance Emergency Plans Conservancy Tender Proforma and Passage Planning Pack Tender	4	4	4	4	4	1	2	2	4	4	3.5	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally. Worst credible: spill which cannot be contained resulting in environmental impact.

Content Rev	iewed	Changes Made							
Greatly reduced amount of cruise training and the amour impacted the amour		Risk Scoring updated.							
FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (F) 15/06	Risk Assessment Team / Date MM, DMM, HMFO March 2014							
Risk Assessment - Cruise Vessel	Review Due	Revised By / Date MMT August 2023							
Tender Operations (Hound Point /	Aug-25								



		Та	y River Passage - Arr/Dep Buoy to Bert	h											No MRFs
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive	Ris		red at level		idual		score I (Worst	evel		ıal	Risk Score	
	(Event leading to a consequence)		(What action & how frequent)	Ţ		Overa	all Ris	sk	Ţ	0	verall	Risk	٦	Risk	
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environmen t	Business	Likelihood	People	Property Environmen	t Bueinge	CCOLLICS	Hazard	
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	1	2	3	1	1	1	5		i !	5	3.375	Most Likely: Collision with small craft. Worst Credible: Collision between cruise vessel and rig
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	5	5	10	5	5	1	5	5 5	i !	5	5.625	Most Likely: Light Contact with the quayside. Worst Credible: Extremly heavy landing structural damage to Quay and vessel
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	2	2	6	2	6	1	5	5 5	5 !	5	4.5	Most Likely: Grounding on soft material, no loss of containment with vessel continuing on. Worst Credible: Grounding on solid sea bed, loss of containment vessel unable to refloat.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy	2	8	8	8	8	1	5	5 5	5 !	5	6.5	Most Likely : Small craft sinking with no casualties Worst Credible: Cruise vessel sinking with loss of vessel and fatalities
1.5	Fire / Explosion	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Fmeronery Plans	3	3	6	3	3	1	5	5 5	i ŧ	5	4.375	Most Likely: Small fire onboard, quickly extinguished. Worst Credible: Vessel uncontrolable fire, vessel total loss.
1.6	Loss of Containment (oil products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Vetting (Tankers)	2	2	2	2	2	1	3	5 5	i E	5	3.25	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closure and extensive environmental impact.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
All content reviewed	Risk Scoring updated.

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date
	FP PMSC RA (T) 01/06	DMM, HMD 13th Dec 2012
Risk Assessment - River Passage Tay	Review Due	Revised By / Date
(General)	Aug-25	CHM/HMFT/MMD/MCM / MODAugust 2023



		Port of Dundee	- Oil Rigs - Arrival/Sailing Port L	imits	to	Ber	th							MRF: None
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive	Risi		red a leve	ı	idual	i	Risk s Resid Vorst	ual le	/el	Score	
	(Event leading to a consequence)	now can't go wrong	(What action & how frequent)	Likelihood	$\overline{}$	Droperty Property		Business y	poo	0\	Property Environment	Risk	Hazard Risk	
1.1	Collision	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTMS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Planning meeting Conservancy Towage Audit Declaration / Tug Vetting Large Vessel Movement Notice to Mariners	2			4 Em	4	1		5 5		4.5	Most Likely: Collision with small craft while underway. Worst Credible: Collision with Tug/anchor handler in failway.
1.2	Contact	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions Change to Shore Infrastructure / Obstruction on the Quay Communication Error	Pilotage / Towmaster FTNS Legislation & Guidance Adds to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Planning meeting Conservancy Additional Fendering (if achievable on berth) Towage Audit Declaration / Tug Vetting Simulation Trids	2	2	6	2	G)	2	8	10 8	10	6.5	Most Likely: Contact with navigational buoy Worst Credible: Heavy Contact with berthed vesselfrig
1.3	Grounding	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS Legislation & Guidance Adds to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Conservancy Towage Audit Declaration / Tug Vetting Simulation Trials	2	2	2	4	O)	1	5	5 5	5	4.25	Most Likely: Tug Grounding on soft material, no loss of containment and vessel confirming Worst Credible: Tug / AHT Grounding on solid sea bed, loss of containment vessel unable to refloat.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	Collision Contact Grounding Technical Failure Bridge Team Error	Pilotage / Towmaster FTNS Legislation & Guidance Adds to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Planning meeting Conservancy Towage Audit Declaration / Tug Vetting Simulation Trials	1	5	5	5	5	1	5	5 5	5	5	Most Likely-Sinking of Tug during operation Worst Credible: Sinking within navigational channel loss of containment.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	Collision Contact Human Error Technical Failure Loss of Containment	Pilotage / Towmaster FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Planning meeting Towage Audit Declaration / Tug Vetting	3	3	6	3	3	1	5	5 5	5	4.375	Most Likely: Small fire on vessel, extinguished on board Worst Credible: Large fire on rig, complete loss.
1.6	Loss of Containment (oil products)	System Failure Human Error Environmental Conditions	Pilotage / Towmaster FTNS Legislation & Guidance Adis to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Towage Planning meeting Conservancy Towage Audit Declaration / Tug Vetting Bunkering Procedure	2	2	2	2	2	1	3	5 5	5	3.25	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally. Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closure and extensive environmental impact.

Content Rev	iewed	Changes Made
All content reviewed		Risk Scoring updated.
FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID FP PMSC RA (T) 05/06	Risk Assessment Team / Date DMM, HMD 09th January 2013



	Tay - Riv	er Transit + Berth	ing/Sailing Small Commercial Craf	t (Tı	ıgs	, W	ork	boa	ts e	etc	.)				MRF: 064/22 (tow rope parted), 62/22 (mechanical failure), 27/23 (contact), 37/23 (c
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive	Risi		red a leve	Ĺ	sidual)	ı	Res	k sco sidua rst Cr	leve	ıl	Score	
	(Event leading to a consequence)		(What action & how frequent)	Likelihood	People	Droperty Property	Environment III	Business Business	Likelihood	People	Over huberty	Environment III	Business si	Hazard Risk	
1.1	Collision	Technical Failure Bridge Team Error Environmental Conditions	ETNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Audits Liaison with Local Authoritys & Boat Clubs	2	2	4	2	2	2	10	10	10	10	6.25	Most Likely: Collision with another small craft on river. Worst Credible: Collision with other small vessel causing loss of both vessels.
1.2	Contact	Technical Failure Bridge Team Error Environmental Conditions Change to Shore Infrastructure / Obstruction on the Quay	FTNS Logislation & Guidance Alds to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Audits Liaison with Local Authoritys & Boat Clubs	5	5	10	5	5	2	10	10	8	10	7.875	Most Likely: Light contact with the quayside while berthing. Worst Credible: Heavy Contact with another berthed small vessel resulting in loss of both vessels
1.3	Grounding	Technical Failure Bridge Team Error Environmental Conditions Surveying Omission	FTNS Legislation & Guidance Alds to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Audits Liaison with Local Authoritys & Boat Clubs Corservancy	2	2	2	2	2	1	4	4	4	4	3	Most Likely: Grounding of smalli vessel on soft silt, which continue on (tidal basin). Worst Credible: Grounding on hard rock, causing loss of containment, unable to refloat on same tide.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	Collision Contact Grounding Technical Failure Bridge Team Error	FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Audits Liaison with Local Authoritys & Boat Clubs	2	4	8	6	6	1	4	4	4	4	5	Most Likely: sinking of small vessel outside of navigational channel, with limited loss of containment. Worst Credible: Sinking of small vessel within navigational channel with loss of containment.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	Collision Contact Grounding Human Error Technical Failure Loss of Containment	FTNS Tay Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Marine Guidelines & Port Information Notice to Mariners Survey / dredging Programme / Schedule Plikt Vessel training & Certification Good Housekeeping Towage Guidelines Small Vessel SMS	3	3	6	3	3	1	5	5	5	-55	4.375	Most Likely: small fire which is extinguished by crew. Worst Credible: Major fire leading to total loss of vessel.
1.6	Loss of Containment (oil products)	Collision Grounding Human Error Contact Technical Failure Sinking / Capsizing Fire / Explosion Environmental Conditions	FTNS Legislation & Guidance Aids to Navigation Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Emergency Plans Audits Liaison with Local Authoritys & Boat Clubs Burkering Procedure	2	2	2	2	2	1	3	5	5	5	3.25	Most Likely: Small loss of non-persistant oil product. Worst Credible: Large spill of persistant product.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
All content reviewed	Risk Scoring updated.

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date
	FP PMSC RA (T) 06/04	DMM, HMD 09th January 2013
		·
Risk Assessment - River Tay	Review Due	Revised By / Date
Transit + Berthing/Sailing Small	Aug-25	CHM/HMFT/MMD/MCM / MOD August 2023



			Forth & Tay - Vessels at Anchor												
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive	Ris		cored a leve Most L	el .ikely)			isk scored at Residual level 50 (Worst Credible)		Risk Score	MRF: 022/22 Loss of Anchor 069/21 (Dragging Anchor) 050/20 (fouled anchor), 049/20(fouled anchor), 017/18 (Dragging Anchor)		
	(Event leading to a consequence)		(What action & how frequent)	Likelihood	People	\top	Environmen +	Business	Likelihood	People		t t connection to the content of the	pasiliess	Hazard Ris	
1.1	Dragging Anchor	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	Designated and Proven Anchorages FTNS Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Towage Byelaws & General Directions Pilotage Emergency Plans / OPRC	5	5	5 5	5	5	2	8			0	W	ost likely: Vessel drags anchor, then pays out more chain resulting in no further dragging. forst credible: Vessel drags anchor resulting in vessel going aground or making contact tith bridge/jetty. Vessel suffers extreme damage and possibbilty of loss of life.
1.2	Contact	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	Pilotage (typically only Cruise vessels @ Newhaven + South Queensferry) FTNS Towage Byelaws & General Directions Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Designated and Proven Anchorages Notice to Mariners Emergency Plans / OPRC	2	4	l 6	4	4	1	5	5	5 :	5	4.75 M	lost likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with buoy resulting in minimal damage. //orst credible: Vessel has high speed impact with bridge/jetty resulting in significant amage to vessel and loss of life.
1.3	Grounding	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	Pilotage (typically only Cruise vessels @ Newhaven + South Queensferry) Passage plan — master / pilot information exchange FTNS Towage Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions & Tidal Monitoring Designated and Proven Anchorages Emergency Plans / OPRC	2	2	2 4	2	4	1	1	5	5 :	5	3.5 _M	lost likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with minimal damage. Vorst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to orts, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.
1.4	Sinking / Capsize	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	Pilotage (typically only Cruise vessels @ Newhaven + South Queensferry) FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions	3	3	3 3	3	3	1	5	5	5 :	5	4	ost likely: Vessel sinks, all crew safely abandon ship /orst credible: Vessel sinks resulting in total loss of vessel, and loss of life.
1.5	Fire / Explosion	Human Error / Failure System Failure	Pilotage (typically only Cruise vessels @ Newhaven + South Queensferry) FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting	1	2	2 2	1	1	1	5	5	5	5		ost likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. /orst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel, and loss of life.
1.6	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	Pilotage (typically only Cruise vessels @ Newhaven + South Queensferry) FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Notice to Mariners Marine Guidelines & Port Information Bunkering Procedure	3	3	3	3	3	2	4	10	10 1	0	W	lost likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally. Forst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and densive environmental impact.
	Content Rev	iewed	Changes Made												

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
All	Updated Causes to new standard
Controls	Specified that pilotage is only used for Cruise vessels @ Newhaven/ S Queens.
Dragging Anchor	Decrease in Most Likely Property Risk
Contact	Decrease in Most Likely Business Risk
Grounding	Most likely risks reduced
Loss of Containment	Most Likely Risks reduced / Worst Credible Likelihood and risk increased

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 1/06	DMM, HMFO, HMFI, HMD, MT&PV / 11th Jan 2013
Risk Assessment - Vessels at Anchor	Review Due	Revised Bv / Date
	Jul-24	July 2022, MMT



			Forth & Tay - Towage Operations												
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Likelihood	(M		el ikely) all Ri	sk		(Wors	Property Pro	dible) ik	Hazard Risk Score	MRF: 29/2022 (Loss ofComms)23/2022 (Contact)20/2022 Contact) 14/2022 (Contact) 13/2022 (Contact)07/2022 (Contact)07/2022 (Contact)07/2022 (Contact)07/2022 (Contact)07/2022 (Tow line parted)064/2021 (Towope fooled) in prop) 037/2021 (Dangerous occurrence) 016/2021 (Uncontrolled release of bridle)070/20(contact) 022/20(collision), 005/20(contact), 002/20(contact), 001/20(Contact), 106/19 (incorrect bridle), 082/19 (potential grounding), 080/19 (parted towline), 074/18 (Grounding), 026/19 (Contact)
				Ť	People	Prop	Environmen t	Business	Š	People	Prop	t	Business	Ĭ	
1.1	Capsizing / Flooding	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	Towage Guidelines Tug SMS FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions Pilotage Crew Training Pre Operations Checks/ Briefings	3	3	3	3	3	2	10	10		10	6.5	Most Likely: Tug experiences girting but is able to recover with no significant consequence/damage Worst Credible: Tug experiences girting causing the tug to capsize with total loss of life and vessel
1.2	Fire	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	Trus SMS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Marine Guidelines & Port Information Notice to Mariners Crew Training & Certification Good Housekeeping Towage Guidelines	2	4	4	2	4	1	5	5	5	5	4.25	Most Likely: Vessel suffers a minor fire which is extinguished quickly and results in no significant damage
1.3	Allision	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predications Marine Guidelines & Port Information Towage Guidelines Notice to Mariners Turs SMS Crew Training/Qualifications	5	5	10	5	10	2	10	10	5	10	8.125	Worst Credible: Vessel suffer an extensive fire which results in loss of life and total loss of the vessel Most Likely: Vessel makes minor contact with pier/jetty/object resulting in no significat damage to either the vessel or object and no injuries Worst Credible: Vessel makes heavy conact with an object resulting in significant damage to both the vessel and object with injuries/fatalities
1.4	Collision	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predications Marine Guidelines & Port Information Towage Guidelines Notice to Mariners Tura SMS Crew Training/Qualifications	2	2	4	2	4	1	5	5	5	5	4	Most Likely. Tug collides with another vessel at slow speed resulting in no significant damage to either vessel and no injuries Worst Credible: Tug collides with another vessel at high speed resulting in possible loss of the vessels and injuries/fatalities
1.5	Grounding	Environmental Conditions Human Error / Failure System Failure	FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predications - spelling Marine Guidelines & Port Information Towage Guidelines	3	6	9	3	9	2	10	10	10	10	8.375	Most Likely: Vessel reuns aground but suffers no significant damage and is able to be refloated with the tide
			Notice to Mariners Tun SMS_Craw Training/Qualifications												Worst Credible: Vessel runs aground in the entrace to a port resulting and cannot be refloated resulting in loss of the vessel, possible injuries/fatalities and loss of business

Content Reviewed	Changes Made							
General	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions							
Grounding	Increase in likelihood - Grounding							
Man Overboard / Personal injury	Removed - RA included in Towage Risk assesments							
Fire	Removed - Control - Latest sounding chart availiable							
Contact	Changed to Allision							
Allision								

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date								
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 2/06	MT&PV, MM, HMFO, DMM, HMD / 13th Feb 2013								
Risk Assessment - Towage	Review Due	Revised By / Date								
Operations	Jul-24	July 2022, MMT								
Operations	Jul-24	July 2022, MMT								



	Forth & Tay - Immobilised Vessels (at Anchor or Alongside)							MRF 015/15 (Fire) 072/19 (Fire)							
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)			leve ost Li				(Wors	level st Cre	t Resi edible)	Risk Score	
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environmen t	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environmen t	Business	Hazard	
1.1	Allision Refer also to FP PMSC RA (F&T) 1	Human Error Technical Failure Enviromental Conditions	Byelaws & General Directions Weather Forecasting & Monitoring Marine Guidelines & Port Information Standby Tug at Anchor FTNS Extra Moorings	2	4	6	4	2	2	6	8	8	8	5.75	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with buoy resulting in minimal damage. Worst credible: Vessel has high speed impact with bridge/jetty resulting in significant damage to vessel and loss of life.
1.2	Grounding Refer also to FP PMSC RA (F&T) 1	Human Error Technical Failure Enviromental Conditions	FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting & Monitoring Marine Guidelines & Port Information Notice to Mariners Standby Tug at Anchor	3	3	3	3	3	1	3	5	4	5	3.625	Most likely: Vessel grounds in soft mud and refloats on following tide with minimal damage. Worst credible: Vessel hard aground, cannot be refloated resulting in major disruption to ports, extreme damage and loss of contaminent.
1.3	Fire / Explosion Refer also to FP PMSC RA (F&T) 1	Human Error Technical Failure	Pilotage FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting	3	6	9	3	6	1	5	5	5	5	5.5	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel, and loss of life.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
Full review	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions
Contact - Changed to Allision	Most Likely Business Risk reduced
	Worst Case Likelihood and People risk increased
Grounding	Most Likeliy Likelihood increased + All risks increased
	Worst Case Business risk increased
Fire/Explosion	Most Likely People Risk increased / Environmental risk decreased

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 3/06	MM, DMM / 26th Feb 2013
Risk Assessment - Immobilised	Review Due	Revised By / Date
Vessels	Jul-24	July 2022, MMT



	Forth & Tay - Bunkering Operations In Dock							POLREP (Leith) 07/18 - 97/19 (Gmth bunker without permission)							
Ref.	What can go wrong	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive	Ris		cored lev Most	el	sidual	R		cored lev orst C	vel	sidual le)	Risk Score	
	(Event leading to a consequence)		(What action & how frequent)	Likelihood	People		Environmen Environmen		poodiloyi	Likelinood	Property	Environmen +	-	Hazard Ris	
1	Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel	Human Error Technical Failure Enviromental Conditions	Pilotage Passage plan / berthing plan – master / pilot information exchange FTNS - Scheduling,VTS Bylaws & General Directions Notice To Mariners Weather Parameters Emergency Plans / OPRC Tugs Fenders Mooring/Unmooring Procedures Terminal Procedures Lock Gates Bunkering Procedures	2	6		2		1	1	5 5			4.5	Most likely: Slow speed collision between both vessels resulting in minimal damage and no loss of containment Worst credible: Heavy collision between both vessels resulting in extreme damage, loss of life and loss of containment
1.	² Contact	Human Error Technical Failure Enviromental Conditions	Pilotage Passage plan / berthing plan – master / pilot information exchange FTNS - Scheduling,VTS Bylaws & General Directions Notice To MarinerS Weather Parameters Emergency Plans / OPRC Tugs Fenders Mooring Procedures	3	3	3 6	3	3	2	2	8 10	0 8	8	6.125	
	3 Loss of Conrainment (Oil Products)	Human Error Technical Failure Enviromental Conditions	Pilotage FTNS - Scheduling, VTS Forth Bylaws & General Directions N To M Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Weather Forecasting Weather Parameters Fenders either side of manifold Mooring Procedures Bunkering Procedure Vetting (Bunker Vessel) Bunkering Procedures Lock Gates Port Traffic Managment	3	3	3 3	3	3	1	1	1 4	. 4	5	3.25	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally. Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.
1	⁴ Fire/Explosion	Human Error Technical Failure	Pilotage FTNS - Scheduling, VTS Bylaws & General Directions Notices To Mariners Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Weather Parameters Bunkering Procedure. Mooring Procedures Vetting (Bunker Vessel)	1	2	2 2	2	1	1	1	5 5	5 5	5	3.375	

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
General	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions
Collision	Worst Case - Env risk increased
Contact - Changed to Allision	Most Likelihood increased
	Worst Case People Risk increased
Loss of containment	Most Likely Environ / Business increased
	Worst Case People/ property risk decreased + Business risk decreased
Fire/Explosion	Most likely All risks decreased
or Explosion	most may fill fished debitedaded

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 4/06	HMFO, HMFI, MM, HMD, DMM 20th Feb 2013
Risk Assessment - Bunkering	Review Due	Revised By / Date
Operations In Dock	Jul-24	July 2022, MMT



		Forth	& Tay - Bunkering Operations Tidal Water	rs											MRF: 05/2022 (Mooring Line Parting) 04/2022 (Mechanical fail
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Ris	(Mc	ored a leve ost Li Over	el ikely)	sidual			leve rst C	at Resi	·)	Risk Score	
	(Likelihood	People		Ιc	Business	Likelihood	People	Т	Environmen	Business	Hazard Ri	
1.1	Collision with bunker vessel and receiving vessel	Human Error Technical Failure Enviromental Conditions	Pilotage Passage plan / berthing plan – master / pilot information exchange FTNS - Scheduling,VTS Bylaws & General Directions Notice To Mariners Weather Parameters Emergency Plans / OPRC Tugs Fenders Mooring/Unmooring Procedures Bunkering Procedure	3	6	6		3	1	4	5		5	4.625	Most likely: Slow speed collision between both vessels resulting in minimal damage and no loss of containment Worst credible: Heavy collision between both vessels resulting in extreme damage, loss of life and loss of containment
1.2	Contact	Human Error Technical Failure Enviromental Conditions	Pilotage Passage plan / berthing plan – master / pilot information exchange FTNS - Scheduling,VTS Bylaws & General Directions Notice To Mariners Weather Parameters Emergency Plans / OPRC Tugs Fenders Mooring Procedures Bunkering Procedure	2	4	2	2	2	1	5	5	5	5	3.75	Most likely: Vessel has slow speed impact with buoy resulting in minimal damage. Worst credible: Vessel has high speed impact with quayside resulting in significant damage to vessel and loss of life.
1.3	Loss of Containment (Oil Products)	Human Error Technical Failure	Pilotage FTNS - Scheduling, VTS Bylaws & General Directions N To M Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Weather Parameters Fenders either side of manifold Mooring Procedures Bunkering Procedure Vetting (Bunker Vessel) Oil Pollution response standby vessel	3	3	3	3	6	1	1	4	5	5	3.75	Most likely: Small spill of non-persistant product that dissipates naturally. Worst credible: Large scale spill which cannot be contained resulting in port closures and extensive environmental impact.
1.4	Fire/Explosion	Human Error Technical Failure	Pilotage FTNS - Scheduling, VTS Bylaws & General Directions Notices To Mariners Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting Weather Porecasting Weather Parameters Tugs Bunkering Procedure. Mooring Procedures Vetting (Bunker Vessel) Bunkering Procedure	1	2	2	2	1	1	5	5	5	5	3.375	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel, and loss of life.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
General	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions
Collision	Most Likely All Risks decreased
Contact - Changed to Allision	Most Likely - Likelihood decreased and people / property decreased Worst Case - People/ Env / Business risk increased
Loss of Containment	Most Likely - All risks increased
Fire / Explosion	Worst Case - People / Env / Business Risks increased Property risk decreased Most Likely All Riskd increased

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 5/06	HMFO, HMFI, MM, HMD, DMM 20th Feb 2013
Risk Assessment - Bunkering	Review Due	Revised By / Date
Operations Tidal Waters	Jul-24	July 2022, MMT



	Forth & Tay - NAABSA Berths										No relevant MRF's since previous review						
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive	Ris	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)		level					1	red at Residual level © st Credible)			Score	
	(Event leading to a consequence)		(What action & how frequent)		Overall Risk			sk	Overa			l Risk		Risk			
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Hazard F			
1.2	Capsize/Flooding	Human Error Technical Failure Enviromental Conditions	FTNS Byelaws & General Directions Emergency Plans / OPRC Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions NAABSA Berth Procedure NAABSA Berth Inspections Survey Programme	2	2	2	4	2	1	5	5	5	5	3.75	Most likely: Vessel takes on water which is contained resulting in no long term damage to the vessel and no injury Worst credible: Vessel capsizes resulting in total loss of vessel and multiple fatalities		
1.3	Fire	Human Error Technical Failure Enviromental Conditions	NAABSA Berth Procedures Emergency Procedures Welcome Pack	3	6	9	3	6	1	5	5	5	5	5.5	Most likely: Small fire on board which is quickly and easily extinguished. Worst credible: Uncontrollable fire, total loss of vessel, and loss of life.		
1,4	Hull Damage	Human Error Enviromental Conditions	NAABSA Berth Procedures Emergency Procedures Welcome Pack NAABSA Inspections Survey Programme Weather Forecasting / Tidal Predictions & Monitoring Byelaws & General Directions	1	1	2	1	3	1	5	5	5	5	3.375	Most likely: Vessel suffers minor hull damage which can be easily repiaired and no injuries occur. Worst credible: Vessel suffers extensive hull damage resulting in flooding and loss of life		

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
General	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions
Lack of Containment	Removed
Contact	Removed
Capsize / Flooding	Most Likely - Likelihood and Risks reduced
Fire	Most Likely - Likelihood increased and Property risk reduced
	Worst Case - Likelihood decreased, Environment Risk increased
Hull Damaged	Most Likely - Likelihood decreased, Property and env risk decreased
·	Worst Case - Likelihood decreased, all risks increased

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 06/06	DMM, HMFO, HMFI, HMD, MT&PV / 11th Jan 2013
Risk Assessment - NAABSA Berths	Review Due	Revised By / Date
	Jul-24	July 2022 MMT



	Forth & Tay - Diving Operations							No relevant MRFs since previous review											
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Ris	level (Most Likely) Overall Risk		level (Most Likely) Overall Risk			level (Most Likely) Overall Risk			level (Worst Cre			k scored at Residual level (Worst Credible) Overall Risk			
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Hazard Ri					
1.1	Swamping / turbulence / interaction	Human Error Enviromental Conditions	Forth Ports Dive Procedure (Permit) Dive Signals displayed Established Communications FTNS Exclusion Zones Speed Restrictions Notice to Mariners Dive Supervisor Local Monitoring	3	9	6	3	6	2	10	4	2	10		Most Likely: Passing vessel comes too close or passes at speed which will alarm divers and possibly result in minor injury. Worst Credible: Passing vessel comes too close or passes at speed which results in fatality to diver.				
1.2	Contact / Collision	Human Error Enviromental Conditions	Forth Ports Dive Procedure (Permit) Established Communications FTNS Exclusion Zones Notice to Mariners	1	3	2	1	2	1	5	5	3	5	3.25	Most Likely: Vessel makes contact with diver / dive boat resulting in minor injuries. Worst Credible: Vessel makes contact with diver / dive boat resulting in fatalities and loss of dive boat.				

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
General	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions
Swamping	Most Likely - People, Property and Buisness Risks increased
	Worst Credible Likelihood and buisness risk increased, Property and Environment Risk
	increased
Contact	Most Likely - Business Risk increased

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 7/04	HMFI/HMFO/HMD/MM/CHM 03rd Sep 14
Risk Assessment - Diving Operations	Review Due	Revised By / Date
	Jul-24	July 2022, MMT



	Forth & Tay - Recreational Events (e.g.swim events)								MRF 068/2018 - Swim Event						
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive (What action & how frequent)	Ris	(Mc	level le (Most Likely) (Worst		level (Worst Cred			Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible) Overall Risk				
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Hazard Risk	
1.1	Collision / contact	Human Error Enviromental Conditions	Event Notification Form Notice to Mariners Exclusion Zones (as considered appropriate) FTNS Planning Meetings (Where appropriate) Appropriate Safety Craft Established Communications Localised monitoring by Event Organisers	2	6	2	2	6	1	5	2	3	5	3.875	Most Likely: Contact between participant and other water user resulting in alarm or minor inury. Worst Credible: Contact between participant and other water user resulting in fatality.
1.2	Swamping / interaction / turbulence	Human Error Enviromental Conditions	Event Notification Form Notice to Mariners Exclusion Zones (as considered appropriate) FTNS Planning Meetings (Where appropriate) Appropriate Safety Craft Established Communications Localised monitoring by Event Organisers	2	6	2	2	2	1	5	5	3	5	3.75	Most Likely: Passing vessel comes too close or passes at speed causing alarm and possibly result in minor injury. Worst Credible: Passing vessel comes too close or passes at speed which results in falality.

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
General	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions
Collision	Most Likely - Property Risk increased
	Worst Credible - Property and Environment Risk decreased / Buisness risk increased
	Most Likely - People Risk increased
Swamping	Worst Credible - Property, Environment and business risk increased

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 8/04	HMFI/HMFO/HMD/MM/CHM 03rd Sep 14
Risk Assessment - Recreational	Review Due	Revised By / Date
Events	Jul-24	July 2022, MMT



	Forth & Tay - Underwater Cables & Pipelines									No relevant MRFs since previous review				
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong (Event leading to a consequence)	go wrong How can it go wrong Preventative & Re		Ris	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)					scored lev Vorst C	rel	le)	Risk Score	
				Likelihood	People	Property	1 ~ 1	Business	Likelihood	People Property	Environment	Business	Hazard Ri	
1.1	Contact	Human Error Technical Failure Enviromental Conditions	FTNS Emergency Procedures (Pipeline Damage Procedure) Pilotage Marine Guidelines & Port Information Byelaws & General Directions Exclusion Zone Survey Programme and Schedule Weather Forecast / Tidal Information & Monitoring Aids to Navigation	2	2	2	2	2	1	2 5	5	5	3.125	Most Likely: Minor contact is made with a pipeline/cable resulting in no significant damage Worst Credible: Pipleine/Cable receives heavy contact resulting in substantial damage causing widespread pollution or major loss of supply from cables
1.2	Fire / Explosion	Human Error Technical Failure Enviromental Conditions	FTNS Emergency Procedures (Pipeline Damage Procedure) Pilotage Marine Guidelines & Port Information Byelaws & General Directions Exclusion Zone Survey Programme and Schedule Weather Forecast / Tidal Information & Monitoring Aids to Navigation	1	1	1	1	1	1	3 5	5	5	2.75	Most Likely: Small fire at production end resulting in minimal impact to pipeline Worst Credible: Major fire/explosion at production end resulting in severe damage to a pipeline and extensive widespread pollution
1.3	Loss of Containment / Power / Communication	Human Error Technical Failure Enviromental Conditions	FTNS Emergency Procedures (Pipeline Damage Procedure) Pilotage Marine Guidelines & Port Information Byelaws & General Directions Exclusion Zone Survey Programme and Schedule Weather Forecast / Tidal Information & Monitoring Aids to Navigation	2	2	2	2	2	1	2 5	5	5	3.125	Most Likely: Minor loss of containment/supply which is rectified quickly and results in no widespread pollution/effects Worst Credible: Major loss of containment resulting in extensive and widespread pollution/loss of powere, data

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
General	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions
Pipeline Damage	Removed as similar to other hazards
Contact - changed to Allision	Most Likely - Property and Business risk increased
	Worst Credible - People risk decreased / Environment risk increased
Fire / Explosion	Most Likely - All risks reduced
	Worst Credible People Risk Reduced
Loss of Containment	Most Likely All risks reduced
	Worst Credible People risk reduced / Environment risk increased

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 9/03	CHM/MM 18th Feb 2015
Risk Assessment - Underwater Cables & Pipelines	Review Due	Revised By / Date
	Jul-24	July 2022, MMT

	Marine Pollution (Tidal Waters)										POLREP: 05/2022 (Leaking Gangway Seal) 08/2021 (Cruise Tender)07/2021 (Oil sheen) 05/21 (Oil Sheen) 02/2021 (Cruise tender) Limekilns (19/2/19), N. Queensferry (12/8/19), Bridges (09/3/20), Pittenweem(15.11.20),			
Ref.	Hazard What can go wrong	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive			Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)				isk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)			Score	
	(Event leading to a consequence)		(What action & how frequent)		Overall Risk				Overall Risk		Risk S			
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property Environment	Business	Hazard R	
1.1	Loss of Containment (oil product)	Human Error Technical Failure	FTNS Bunkering Procedure Byelaws & General Directions Pilotage Survey Programme / Schedule Marine Guidelines & Port Information Emergency Plans - OPRC Towage Guidelines Oil Terminal Guidelines Weather / tidal Forecasting & Monitoring Oil Spill Prediction Software Notice to Mariners	5	5	5	5	5	1	3	5 5	5	4.75	Most Likely: Minor pollution consisting of a light product which has no adverse effects on the marine environment and dissipates naturally Worst Credible: Major widespread pollution consisting of a heavy product which results in extensive adverse effects to the marine environment/wildlife requiring significant resources to tackle

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
General	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions
Loss of Containment	Most Likely EnvironmentRisk Decreased

FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date
	FP PMSC RA (F&T) 10/03	CHM, MM, DMM, HMD / 12th August 2015
	` ,	-
Risk Assessment - Marine Pollution	Review Due	Revised By / Date
(Tidal Waters)	Jul-24	July 2022, MMT

	Marine Pollution (Enclosed Dock)									01/2021 (Oil Sheen) 03/2021 (Oil Sheen) 04/2021 (Black Soot)06/2021 (Oil Sheen) Leith (19/2/19) (1/9/19), (07.04.20), (21.10.20) (27.1.21) Gmth - (17.6.20), (21.7.20), (9.12.20), (15.1.21)(18.3.21) Burntisland - (27.1.21)							
Ref	Hazard What can go wrong	Causes How can it go wrong	Controls Preventative & Reactive	Ris	Risk scored at Residual level (Most Likely)			level				Risk scored at Residual level (Worst Credible)				Score	
	(Event leading to a consequence)		(What action & how frequent)			Over	all Ri	sk		c	overall	Risk	Risk				
				Likelihood	People	Property	Environment	Business	Likelihood	People	Property	Business	ard				
1	1 Loss of Containment (oil product)	Human Error Technical Failure	FTNS Bunkering Procedure Byelaws & General Directions Pilotage Survey Programme / Schedule Marine Guidelines & Port Information Emergency Plans - OPRC Towage Guidelines Oil Terminal Guidelines Notice to Mariners Lock Gates	5	5	5	5	5	1	5	5	5 5	5	Most Likely: Small scale pollution consisting of a light product which is contained within a dock and dissipates naturally Worst Credible: Major pollution consisting of a heavy product which cannot be contained with the dock and results in extensive damage to the marine environment requiring extensive resources to tackle			

Content Reviewed	Changes Made
General	Causes updated to match with standard causes in definitions

ſ	FORTH PORTS LIMITED	Document ID	Risk Assessment Team / Date					
-		FP PMSC RA (F) 11/03	CHM, MM, DMM, HMD / 12th August 2015					
L								
- [Risk Assessment - Marine Pollution	Review Due	Revised By / Date					
L	(Encolsed Docks)	Jul-24	July 2022, MMT					